conviction exception in Minnesota

2006Had Dettman admitted to a prior criminal conviction, we do not dispute that the conviction could have been used to enhance his sentence under the prior conviction exception, if otherwise permitted under a particular enhancement statute. [5] The Oregon Supreme Court has likewise concluded that an "admission" for Blakely purposes must be a judicial admission—that is, a "statement[] `made by a party * * * for the purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact in issue. '" State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 244 (2005) (quoting Foxton v. Woodmansee, 236 Or. 271 , 386 P.2d 659, 662 (1963)).

2006Had Dettman admitted to a prior criminal conviction, we do not dispute that the conviction could have been used to enhance his sentence under the prior conviction exception, if otherwise permitted under a particular enhancement statute. [5] The Oregon Supreme Court has likewise concluded that an "admission" for Blakely purposes must be a judicial admission—that is, a "statement[] `made by a party * * * for the purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact in issue. '" State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 244 (2005) (quoting Foxton v. Woodmansee, 236 Or. 271 , 386 P.2d 659, 662 (1963)).

2001State v. Loyd, 321 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Minn.1982).

2000State v. Loyd, 321 N.W.2d 901, 902 (Minn.1982).

2006Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). 1 State supreme courts are equally divided on whether the prior conviction exception should be extended to juvenile adjudications.

2006Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ). 1 State supreme courts are equally divided on whether the prior conviction exception should be extended to juvenile adjudications.

2006I see no reason to conclude, given the Supreme Court’s emphatic pronouncements on the separate importance of the right to a jury trial, that the Court did not mean to limit the prior conviction exception to prior proceedings “satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 . 2 Although the right to a jury trial provides fact reliability and due process guarantees, the “right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 .

2006I see no reason to conclude, given the Supreme Court’s emphatic pronouncements on the separate importance of the right to a jury trial, that the Court did not mean to limit the prior conviction exception to prior proceedings “satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.” Jones, 526 U.S. at 249 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 . 2 Although the right to a jury trial provides fact reliability and due process guarantees, the “right is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 .

2006We also examined the prior conviction exception in State v. Leake, where we noted that, “after Blakely , the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi retains vitality and it is constitutional for a defendant’s sentence to be increased based on a prior conviction without submitting the fact of the conviction to the jury.” 699 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn.2005).

2006We began our analysis in Leake by discussing “the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi” Leake, 699 N.W.2d at 323 .

2024Evid. 609(b); see also State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Minn. 1993).

2018See Welch , 578 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency , 401 U.S. 715 , 724, 91 S.Ct. 1041 , 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971) ). 6 Because the function of the Birchfield rule is substantive, defining who can and who cannot be culpable for refusing to submit to a chemical test, the fact that the police need to *684 change their procedure to conform to the rule does not change the nature of the rule for retroactivity purposes.

2018See Welch , 578 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency , 401 U.S. 715 , 724, 91 S.Ct. 1041 , 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971) ). 6 Because the function of the Birchfield rule is substantive, defining who can and who cannot be culpable for refusing to submit to a chemical test, the fact that the police need to *684 change their procedure to conform to the rule does not change the nature of the rule for retroactivity purposes.

2017We must reverse the conviction if the error “deprived the defendant of a substantial right, namely, the opportunity to prepare a defense to the charge against him.” Id. at 159 (quotation omitted).

2017“Ultimately, [the court] must ask whether the erroneous charge denied the defendant the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.” Id.

2017See, e.g., Moore, 699 N.W.2d at 737–38 (holding instruction that loss of a tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily member improperly established great-bodily-harm element of assault).

2016Fleming’s appeal was timely under State v, Fields, 416 N,W.2d 734, 736 (Minn.1987) (holding that a defendant may wait until probation is revoked before challenging his or her sentence); see also State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn.2006) (holding that Minn.Stat. § 244.11, subd. 3 (2014), which imposes a time limit on sentencing appeals, is unconstitutional). 4 .

2016See Salyers, 858 N.W.2d at 160 .

2015See State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Minn. 2010) (affirming a conviction on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction when jury would not have reached a different conclusion even if it had been properly instructed and any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights).

2014But the district court reasoned that the conviction is “not stale due to the subsequent history that Mr. Johnson has.” The district court’s reasoning is sound because “even an older conviction can remain probative if later convictions demonstrate a history of lawlessness.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Minn. 1998) (eight-year-old conviction had not lost any relevance because two subsequent convictions showed a “pattern of lawlessness”).

2014But the district court reasoned that the conviction is “not stale due to the subsequent history that Mr. Johnson has.” The district court’s reasoning is sound because “even an older conviction can remain probative if later convictions demonstrate a history of lawlessness.” Swanson, 707 N.W.2d at 655 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Minn. 1998) (eight-year-old conviction had not lost any relevance because two subsequent convictions showed a “pattern of lawlessness”).

2013We conclude that section 609.035, subdivision 3, is unambiguous in stating that neither the single-behavioral-incident rule nor section 609.04 is “a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” (Emphasis added.) “The word ‘any’ is given broad application in statutes, regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826, 828 (Minn.2005) (interpreting “any person” in context of Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004) to include municipal owners of police dogs); see also In re PERA Police

2013We conclude that section 609.035, subdivision 3, is unambiguous in stating that neither the single-behavioral-incident rule nor section 609.04 is “a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” (Emphasis added.) “The word ‘any’ is given broad application in statutes, regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826, 828 (Minn.2005) (interpreting “any person” in context of Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004) to include municipal owners of police dogs); see also In re PERA Police

2013We conclude that section 609.035, subdivision 3, is unambiguous in stating that neither the single-behavioral-incident rule nor section 609.04 is “a bar to conviction of or punishment for any other crime committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.” (Emphasis added.) “The word ‘any’ is given broad application in statutes, regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep’t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826, 828 (Minn.2005) (interpreting “any person” in context of Minn. Stat. § 347.22 (2004) to include municipal owners of police dogs); see also In re PERA Police

2008State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn.2006).

2007See Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d at 613 (applying harmless-error analysis).

2006See also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 , 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”).

2006See also Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 , 125 S.Ct. 1254 , 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A] majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”).

2006Had Dettman admitted to a prior criminal conviction, we do not dispute that the conviction could have been used to enhance his sentence under the prior conviction exception, if otherwise permitted under a particular enhancement statute. [5] The Oregon Supreme Court has likewise concluded that an "admission" for Blakely purposes must be a judicial admission—that is, a "statement[] `made by a party * * * for the purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact in issue. '" State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 244 (2005) (quoting Foxton v. Woodmansee, 236 Or. 271 , 386 P.2d 659, 662 (1963)).

2006Had Dettman admitted to a prior criminal conviction, we do not dispute that the conviction could have been used to enhance his sentence under the prior conviction exception, if otherwise permitted under a particular enhancement statute. [5] The Oregon Supreme Court has likewise concluded that an "admission" for Blakely purposes must be a judicial admission—that is, a "statement[] `made by a party * * * for the purpose of dispensing with proof of a fact in issue. '" State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 244 (2005) (quoting Foxton v. Woodmansee, 236 Or. 271 , 386 P.2d 659, 662 (1963)).

2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding “the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver”), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile “adjudication should not be counted as a ‘prior conviction’ for Apprendi purposes”), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind.2005) (holding that juvenile adju

2006Compare State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157 , 118 P.3d 236, 246 (2005) (holding "the Sixth Amendment requires that when [a juvenile] adjudication is offered as an enhancement factor to increase a criminal sentence, its existence must either be proved to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing purposes following an informed and knowing waiver"), and State v. Brown, 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (La.2004) (holding that a juvenile "adjudication should not be counted as a `prior conviction' for Apprendi purposes"), with Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 2005) (holding that juvenile adj