conviction exception in Colorado

2022See Lopez v. People , 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Col o. 2005) (holding the prior conviction exception to the right to jury trial “remains valid”); see also Mountjoy v. People , 2018 CO 9 2M, ¶¶ 11-24 (rejecting a challenge to Lopez ); People v. Pointdext er , 2013 COA 93, ¶¶ 72-73 (“The Colorado Supreme Court rea ffirmed the prior conviction exception in Lopez . . . .”).

2021Our suprem e court recognized the continued vitality of this prior conviction exception in Lopez v. People , 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo. 2005).

2024People v. Montoya , 141 P.3 d 916, 922-23 (Colo. App. 2006); see also People v. Huber , 139 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo. 2006); People v. Hines , 2021 COA 45 , ¶¶ 63 - 65 . ¶ 24 To the extent Lopez ’s articulation of the prior conviction exception allows a sentencing court to consider facts beyond “what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of,” we 13 question whether it survives the United States Supreme Court’ s more recent delineation of the limits of the exception .

2024People v. Montoya , 141 P.3 d 916, 922-23 (Colo. App. 2006); see also People v. Huber , 139 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo. 2006); People v. Hines , 2021 COA 45 , ¶¶ 63 - 65 . ¶ 24 To the extent Lopez ’s articulation of the prior conviction exception allows a sentencing court to consider facts beyond “what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of,” we 13 question whether it survives the United States Supreme Court’ s more recent delineation of the limits of the exception .

2019Prior Convictions are Blakely-Exempt Facts Appropriately Decided by a Judge ¶ 25 Quezada-Caro next contends that, even if prior convictions are a sentence enhancer, we should still require that they be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) the prior conviction exception is unsound and should be rejected by this court and (2) they transform a misdemeanor into a felony. ¶ 26 “Generally, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doub

2017See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 -90 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; Misenhelter v. People, 234 P.3d 657 , 660 (Colo.2010). ¶ 38 But because the Supreme Court has not overruled the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi and Blakely , those authorities continue to control our resolution of defendant's argument.

2020See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Misenhelter v. People, 234 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. 2010). ¶36 I conclude that the legislature intended a repeat DUI offender’s prior convictions to serve as a sentence enhancer under section 42-4-1301.

2020“Although there is some doubt about the continued vitality of the prior conviction exception,” Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo. 2005), the United States Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme Court have repeatedly affirmed the exception, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 ; People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 631 (Colo. 2006); Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723 . ¶ 25 Apprendi’s prior conviction exception extends to the additional statutory factual findings for each prior conviction necessary to support a habitual criminal sentence, including: (1) that each

2013See also People v. Moore, 226 P.3d 1076, 1089-90 (Colo.App.2009) (a defendant is not entitled to have a jury make habitual criminal findings; recognizing the ongoing vitality of the prior conviction exception); People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222, 224-28 (Colo.App.2006) (same; collecting cases).

2011The Colorado Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is “some doubt about the continued vitality of the prior conviction exception,” but has concluded that the exception “remains valid after Blakely.” Nunn, 148 P.3d at 225 (quoting Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo.2005)).

2019See Misenhelter v. People, 234 P.3d 657, 660 (Colo. 2010) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has now firmly established that the fact of a prior conviction is specifically exempted and need not be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”); People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 631 (Colo. 2006) (declining to readdress the validity of the prior conviction exception absent new legal developments). ¶ 27 Even so, Quezada-Caro contends that the prior conviction exception should not apply where, as here, proof of prior convictions transforms a misdemeanor into a felony because (1) felonies carry significantly grea

2017See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 -90 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 ; Misenhelter v. People, 234 P.3d 657 , 660 (Colo.2010). ¶ 38 But because the Supreme Court has not overruled the prior conviction exception recognized in Apprendi and Blakely , those authorities continue to control our resolution of defendant's argument.

2005We reject this argument for the reasons set forth in Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo.2005)(recognizing the ongoing vitality of the prior conviction exception), and People v. Benzor, 100 P.3d 542, 544-45 (Colo.App.2004)(holding that the prior conviction exception exempts habitual criminal proceedings from the constitutional jury requirement).

2005See People v. Benzor, 100 P.3d 542, 545 (Colo.App.2004)("The prior conviction exception permits the trial court to make findings regarding prior convictions."); People v. Carrasco, 85 P.3d 580, 582 (Colo.App.2003)("there is no right to a jury trial in habitual criminal proceedings and thus the statute authorizing the court to determine habitual criminality issues does not violate the Sixth Amendment").

2017Specifically, he asserts that, "[w]hile it has not been expressly overruled," the case from which the prior conviction exception arose - Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) - has been called into question and will be overturned by the United States Supreme Court when the opportunity arises.

2017Specifically, he asserts that, "[w]hile it has not been expressly overruled," the case from which the prior conviction exception arose - Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) - has been called into question and will be overturned by the United States Supreme Court when the opportunity arises.

2005In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the Court explained that the prior conviction exception rested in substantial part on: the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the indictment.

2005In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 , 119 S.Ct. 1215 , 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the Court explained that the prior conviction exception rested in substantial part on: the tradition of regarding recidivism as a sentencing factor, not as an element to be set out in the indictment.

2024Montoya , 141 P.3d at 923 (citation omitted). ¶ 26 Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by imposing an aggravated sentence based on facts that were neither Blake ly - exempt nor Blakely -compliant.

2024Montoya , 141 P.3d at 923 (citation omitted). ¶ 26 Thus, we conclude that the district court erred by imposing an aggravated sentence based on facts that were neither Blake ly - exempt nor Blakely -compliant.

2017See People v. Hopkins, 2013 COA 74 , ¶ 25, 328 P.3d 253 ; see also People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762 , 768 n.3 (Colo.App.2010) ("[W]e are bound to follow supreme court precedent.").

2017See People v. Hopkins, 2013 COA 74 , ¶ 25, 328 P.3d 253 ; see also People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762 , 768 n.3 (Colo.App.2010) ("[W]e are bound to follow supreme court precedent.").

2017See People v. Hopkins, 2013 COA 74, ¶ 25 ; see also 22 People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762 , 768 n.3 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[W]e are bound to follow supreme court precedent.”).

2017See People v. Hopkins, 2013 COA 74 , ¶ 25, 328 P.3d 253 ; see also People v. Gladney, 250 P.3d 762 , 768 n.3 (Colo.App.2010) ("[W]e are bound to follow supreme court precedent.").

2013See also People v. Moore, 226 P.3d 1076, 1089-90 (Colo.App.2009) (a defendant is not entitled to have a jury make habitual criminal findings; recognizing the ongoing vitality of the prior conviction exception); People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222, 224-28 (Colo.App.2006) (same; collecting cases).

2010See also Moore, 226 P.3d at 1089-90 (a defendant is not entitled to have a jury make habitual criminal findings; recognizing the ongoing vitality of the prior conviction exception); People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222, 224-28 (Colo.App.2006)(same; collecting cases).

2008People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916, 922 (Colo.App.2006); accord People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 633-34 (Colo.2006) (prior conviction exception extends to facts regarding prior convictions that are contained in conclusive judicial ree-ords).

2008People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916, 922 (Colo.App.2006); accord People v. Huber, 189 P.3d 628 , 683 (Colo.2006) ("Because a defendant's sentence to probation or supervision can be found in the judicial record, we conclude that a trial court may properly consider this fact without violating the defendant's Blakely rights."); see also DeHerrera v. People, 122 P.3d 992, 994 (Colo.2005) (aggravated sentence based on "[plrior conviction facts are Blakely-ex-empt in large part because these facts have been determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt").

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 ("we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact ( other than a prior conviction ), which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt")(emphasis added); United States v. Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960 , 2005 WL 768134 *2 (11th Cir. Apr.6, 2005)("Put another way, because the prior-conviction exception remains undisturbed after Booker, a district court does not err by relying on prior convictions to enhanc

2005See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 ("we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact ( other than a prior conviction ), which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt")(emphasis added); United States v. Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960 , 2005 WL 768134 *2 (11th Cir. Apr.6, 2005)("Put another way, because the prior-conviction exception remains undisturbed after Booker, a district court does not err by relying on prior convictions to enhanc

2020“Although there is some doubt about the continued vitality of the prior conviction exception,” Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo. 2005), the United States Supreme Court and the Colorado Supreme Court have repeatedly affirmed the exception, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 ; People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628, 631 (Colo. 2006); Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723 . ¶ 25 Apprendi’s prior conviction exception extends to the additional statutory factual findings for each prior conviction necessary to support a habitual criminal sentence, including: (1) that each

2019Prior Convictions are Blakely-Exempt Facts Appropriately Decided by a Judge ¶ 25 Quezada-Caro next contends that, even if prior convictions are a sentence enhancer, we should still require that they be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) the prior conviction exception is unsound and should be rejected by this court and (2) they transform a misdemeanor into a felony. ¶ 26 “Generally, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doub

2022See Lopez v. People , 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Col o. 2005) (holding the prior conviction exception to the right to jury trial “remains valid”); see also Mountjoy v. People , 2018 CO 9 2M, ¶¶ 11-24 (rejecting a challenge to Lopez ); People v. Pointdext er , 2013 COA 93, ¶¶ 72-73 (“The Colorado Supreme Court rea ffirmed the prior conviction exception in Lopez . . . .”).

2018See Lopez, 113 P.3d at 723 ; People v. Parks, 2015 COA 158, ¶ 29 ; People v. Poindexter, 2013 COA 93, ¶ 72 .

2020The trial court properly made findings of fact regarding the prior convictions pursuant to the habitual criminal statute and, in light of Lopez, Blakely, and Apprendi, didn’t violate Session’s Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution or Session’s rights under article II, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution in doing so. ¶ 27 We are also unpersuaded by Session’s contention that Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), did away with the prior conviction exception under the Sixth Amendment.

2018This argument is based on a more recent Supreme Court opinion in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 111 (2013), which some have construed as criticizing Almendarez and its progeny. ¶ 56 But the prior conviction exception remains well-settled law.

2025Id.; People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001).

2025Under this standard, we will reverse a conviction if the error “substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.” People v. Martinez, 2020 COA 141, ¶ 28 (citation omitted).

2025But if the claim is unpreserved, we will reverse only if the error is plain, meaning an error occurred, the error was obvious, and the error’s effect is “so grave that it undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial itself and casts doubt upon the reliability of the conviction.” People v. Ambrose, 2021 COA 62, ¶ 66 (citation omitted). ¶ 22 To preserve a claim for appeal, a party must object in the trial court on the same grounds they assert on appeal.

2022See Lopez v. People , 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Col o. 2005) (holding the prior conviction exception to the right to jury trial “remains valid”); see also Mountjoy v. People , 2018 CO 9 2M, ¶¶ 11-24 (rejecting a challenge to Lopez ); People v. Pointdext er , 2013 COA 93, ¶¶ 72-73 (“The Colorado Supreme Court rea ffirmed the prior conviction exception in Lopez . . . .”).