8 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1958–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Blackgreen2 sentences2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c 2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colfgreen2 sentences2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c 2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c 2018They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness . . . concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . ."); Rule 609(b), SCRE ("Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Boyd, 288 S.C. 206, 209 , 341 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ct.App.1986) ("We hold that where a defendant has been convicted on two or more counts for the violation of the Controlled Substance Act arising out of simultaneous acts committed in the course of a single incident, the convictions will be considered as only one for the purpose of sentencing under a subsequent conviction for a violation of the Controlled Substance Act."). 2010See State v. Boyd, 288 S.C. 206, 209 , 341 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ct.App.1986) ("We hold that where a defendant has been convicted on two or more counts for the violation of the Controlled Substance Act arising out of simultaneous acts committed in the course of a single incident, the convictions will be considered as only one for the purpose of sentencing under a subsequent conviction for a violation of the Controlled Substance Act."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Scrivengreen2 sentences2006Rule 609(b), SCRE. The party attempting to introduce the prior conviction for impeachment purposes has the initial burden of establishing the basis for its admission. State v. Scriven , 339 S.C. 333, 340 , 529 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ct. App. 2000). 2006Rule 609(b), SCRE. The party attempting to introduce the prior conviction for impeachment purposes has the initial burden of establishing the basis for its admission. State v. Scriven , 339 S.C. 333, 340 , 529 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ct. App. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spencergreen2 sentences1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). 1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Grochowiakgreen2 sentences1960This last question of appellants was raised in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Grochowiak, supra, 1957, 184 Pa. Super. 522 , 136 A. (2d) 145, 147, which sustained a conviction for violation of a statute that prohibited the exhibition of motion pictures on Sunday, except during certain hours. 1960This last question of appellants was raised in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Grochowiak, supra, 1957, 184 Pa. Super. 522 , 136 A. (2d) 145, 147, which sustained a conviction for violation of a statute that prohibited the exhibition of motion pictures on Sunday, except during certain hours. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Care & Treatment of Matthews
green
1 sentence2002To the extent our Act differs from the Hendricks statute it is “a distinction without a difference” since the use of the word “conviction” included “persons charged but found incompetent to stand trial, those found not guilty by reason of insanity, and those found guilty but mentally ill.” Id. at 649-50, 550 S.E.2d at 316 ; see S.C.Code Ann. §§ 44-48-30(6)(c)-(e) (Supp.2000). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States
green
1 sentence1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
In the Interest of Terrence M.
green
2 sentences1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). 1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Mansel
green
1 sentence1998See State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 358 , 181 S.E. 217, 222 (1935) (vacating a conviction because violation of a repealed statute is “no longer among the category of crimes under our law”); cf. In re Terrence M., 317 S.C. 212 , 452 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1994) (holding a court is without jurisdiction to convict a defendant of a statutory offense when the underlying statute is no longer in effect) (citing State v. Lewis, 33 S.E. 351 (S.C.1899); State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468 , 30 S.E. 481 (1898)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Carter
green
2 sentences1991Again, in State v. Carter, 291 S.C. 385 , 353 S.E. (2d) 875 (1987), we held that double jeopardy prohibited the defendant’s subsequent prosecution for reckless homicide where the State relied on and proved the same facts of the adjudicated DUI offense to establish the reckless act necessary to prove reckless homicide. 1991Again, in State v. Carter, 291 S.C. 385 , 353 S.E. (2d) 875 (1987), we held that double jeopardy prohibited the defendant’s subsequent prosecution for reckless homicide where the State relied on and proved the same facts of the adjudicated DUI offense to establish the reckless act necessary to prove reckless homicide. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Grampus
green
2 sentences1991In State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395 , 343 S. E. (2d) 26 (1986), we held that a felony “driving while under the influence” prosecution violated the defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy since the prosecution was based on the same act which served as a basis for the defendant’s prior conviction for violation traffic laws. 1991In State v. Grampus, 288 S.C. 395 , 343 S. E. (2d) 26 (1986), we held that a felony “driving while under the influence” prosecution violated the defendant’s right to be free from double jeopardy since the prosecution was based on the same act which served as a basis for the defendant’s prior conviction for violation traffic laws. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Glasgow
neutral
1 sentence1958Law 40, 23 S.C.L. 40 , State v. Switzer, supra , and State v. Dewees, supra , that in determining whether a former conviction is a bar to another prosecution the test generally applied is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Edwards v. Wessinger
neutral
1 sentence1958L. 40, State v. Switzer, supra, and State v. Dewees, supra, that in determining whether a former conviction is a bar to another prosecution the test generally applied is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
State v. Dewees
green
1 sentence1958L. 40, State v. Switzer, supra, and State v. Dewees, supra, that in determining whether a former conviction is a bar to another prosecution the test generally applied is whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.