course defense in Ohio

2022It is nonetheless possible to establish prejudice as long as the suppressed evidence “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 23 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).

1999The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response." More recently, in Kyles v. Whitley (1995), 514 U.S. 419 , the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the Bagley standard for materiality.

2004The Brady rule "does not entail the allowance of pure conjecture; the effect must be assessed `* * * with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense * * *' been supplied with the statement." State v. Evans (Oct. 29, 1998), Cuyahoga App. No. 72330, citing United States v. Bagley (1985), 473 U.S. 667 , 676 . {¶ 12} Accordingly, appellant's sole Assignment of Error is overruled. {¶ 13} For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the Mount Vernon Municipal Court, Knox Co

1988The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” United States v. Bagley, supra, at 683 .

1990First, the Scott court overruled its prior holding in United States v. Jenkins (1975), 420 U.S. 358 .

1985First, the Scott court overruled its prior holding in United States v. Jenkins (1975), 420 U.S. 358 .

2023The domestic relations court made these findings in the context of what appears to have been its application of the test set forth in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976).3 In GTE, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, [t]o prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, wh

2023The domestic relations court made these findings in the context of what appears to have been its application of the test set forth in GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 , 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976).3 In GTE, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, [t]o prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, wh

2022Sands v. Kelly, 164 Ohio St.3d 449 , 2021-Ohio-769 , the Supreme Court observed: Sands filed an affidavit with his complaint that included three sections containing information required under R.C. 2969.25(A)(2) through (4).

2022Sands v. Kelly, 164 Ohio St.3d 449 , 2021-Ohio-769 , the Supreme Court observed: Sands filed an affidavit with his complaint that included three sections containing information required under R.C. 2969.25(A)(2) through (4).

2022To determine whether a Brady violation prejudiced the defendant, a court must look at the “totality of the circumstances,” including “any adverse effect that the [suppression] might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case.” Bagley at 683 . {¶ 64} Establishing that prejudice has occurred in the context of pretrial preparations and the strategic decisions of defense counsel is not an easy task, given the “difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken,” id. at 683 , had the Brady violation not occurre

2022Columbiana No. 20 CO 27 , 2021-Ohio-3161, ¶ 31 , quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 5 Ohio App.3d 94, 98 , 449 N.E.2d 478 (5th Dist. 1982). {¶13} “An in-court agreement is one that occurs ‘during the course of a hearing’ and in the ‘presence of the court.’ ” Richmond v. Evans, 8th Dist.

2022Columbiana No. 20 CO 27 , 2021-Ohio-3161, ¶ 31 , quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 5 Ohio App.3d 94, 98 , 449 N.E.2d 478 (5th Dist. 1982). {¶13} “An in-court agreement is one that occurs ‘during the course of a hearing’ and in the ‘presence of the court.’ ” Richmond v. Evans, 8th Dist.

2022Columbiana No. 20 CO 27 , 2021-Ohio-3161, ¶ 31 , quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 5 Ohio App.3d 94, 98 , 449 N.E.2d 478 (5th Dist. 1982). {¶13} “An in-court agreement is one that occurs ‘during the course of a hearing’ and in the ‘presence of the court.’ ” Richmond v. Evans, 8th Dist.

2018E-16-066 and E-16-067, 2017-Ohio-7271, ¶ 17 . {¶ 16} The record reflects that at no time during the course of the hearing did counsel for appellant, or the trial court, in any way inquire of appellant whether or not he wished to exercise his right to directly address the trial court prior to being sentenced. {¶ 17} Wherefore, we find appellant’s assignment of error well-taken.

2017Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2017Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2017Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2017Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2014Id. {¶ 7} In the present case, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it held that statements he made during the course of the claim investigation violated the fraud provision of the insurance policy.

2013In addition, the surveyor shall, when necessary, confer with the owner(s) of the property being surveyed. {¶ 40} “The identity and validity of a given monument, where in question, must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Owens v. Haunert, 137 Ohio App.3d 507 , 739 N.E.2d 5 (12th Dist. 2000). {¶ 41} Geuy and Scholl employed different methods to determine the location of the boundary line between 21 and 19 Pike Street, and the trial court found both methods to be “valid.” Geuy deferred to McCullough’s 1972 notes, survey and plat, which he described as the course of standard pract

2013In addition, the surveyor shall, when necessary, confer with the owner(s) of the property being surveyed. {¶ 40} “The identity and validity of a given monument, where in question, must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Owens v. Haunert, 137 Ohio App.3d 507 , 739 N.E.2d 5 (12th Dist. 2000). {¶ 41} Geuy and Scholl employed different methods to determine the location of the boundary line between 21 and 19 Pike Street, and the trial court found both methods to be “valid.” Geuy deferred to McCullough’s 1972 notes, survey and plat, which he described as the course of standard pract

2013Bank of Columbus v. Bilikam, 2 Ohio App.3d 300 (10th Dist.1982), paragraph four of the syllabus (“Evid.R. 804(B)(5) is an exception to the hearsay rule for the benefit of a representative of a decedent * * *.”). {¶19} Here, Jackson offered her testimony during the course of a hearing on the appointment of the Estate’s administrator.

2010No. 06JE8, 2007-Ohio-3174, ¶43 . ¶{46} Concerning whether counsel’s choice of defense amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, we have explained that an appellate court will not second guess trial strategy: ¶{47} “When considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court should not consider what, in hindsight, may have been a more appropriate course of defense.

2008The Ninth Appellate District held: "An in-court settlement agreement may be adopted by the court, incorporated into judgment entry [sic], and enforced even in the absence of written approval by one party." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 412 . {¶ 28} The trial court noted in its June 13, 2007 judgment entry, "Herein, unlike in each of the cases cited by the Defendant [in her motion to adopt], not one document was filed with the Court acknowledging an agreement between the parties, or to this case proceeding as an uncontested divorce * * *." {¶ 29} According to the foregoing authority and, in particul

2008The Ninth Appellate District held: "An in-court settlement agreement may be adopted by the court, incorporated into judgment entry [sic], and enforced even in the absence of written approval by one party." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 412 . {¶ 28} The trial court noted in its June 13, 2007 judgment entry, "Herein, unlike in each of the cases cited by the Defendant [in her motion to adopt], not one document was filed with the Court acknowledging an agreement between the parties, or to this case proceeding as an uncontested divorce * * *." {¶ 29} According to the foregoing authority and, in particul

2007“Factors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel include ‘the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the conflict between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate de *8 fense.’ ” State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , quoting United States v. Jennings (C.A.6 1996), 83 F.3d 145, 148 . {¶ 27} In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by-denying Holin’s r

2007“Factors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel include ‘the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the conflict between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate de *8 fense.’ ” State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , quoting United States v. Jennings (C.A.6 1996), 83 F.3d 145, 148 . {¶ 27} In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by-denying Holin’s r

2007“Factors to consider in deciding whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant’s motion to substitute counsel include ‘the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and whether the conflict between the attorney and client was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate de *8 fense.’ ” State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d 335, 342 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , quoting United States v. Jennings (C.A.6 1996), 83 F.3d 145, 148 . {¶ 27} In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by-denying Holin’s r

2006In a judgment entry filed the next day, the trial court noted that during the course of the hearing, `it became apparent that appellants had failed to correctly and timely perfect their appeal ab initio.' Accordingly, the trial court found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and sua sponte dismissed the administrative appeal." Id. {¶ 6} In Davis I , Davis appealed that ruling.

2004State v. Hester (1976), 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , 75 . {¶ 52} If we aggregate the testimony alleged as erroneously admitted in the present case, we can find, first, no unprofessional error on the part of trial counsel in choosing the course of the defense, and second, no actual prejudice to appellant in failing to object to the specific evidence raised in this appeal.

2003Moreover, the court in Ferber noted that Miller expressly included lewd depiction of genitalia as the kind of conduct that could be proscribed. {¶ 62} In the course of its analysis the United States Supreme Court in Ferber noted that "[the] prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757 .

2002One could surmise from this record that it would be completely devoid of the critical IAD information at issue if defense counsel had not appended it to the dismissal motion. {¶ 51} During the course of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, defense counsel stated, without objection or exception from either the prosecution or the trial court, the following, with respect to the "teletype" discussed above: {¶ 52} "* * * I just wanted to point out that on one of the documents the court cited, which was the document filed June 22, 2001, the second page of that shows on the teletype that Franklin Co

2002Gatewood , 15 Ohio App.3d at 16 .

1997Officer Karaffa’s testimony that the Breathalyzer machine had been tested for RFI as prescribed by the Ohio Department of *509 Health’s regulations was sufficient in the absence of any specific challenge raised during the course of the hearing under Ohio Adm.Code 3702 [sic ] — 53— 02(C)(2)(d).” Id. at 795-796 , 669 N.E.2d at 528-529 .

1997Officer Karaffa’s testimony that the Breathalyzer machine had been tested for RFI as prescribed by the Ohio Department of *509 Health’s regulations was sufficient in the absence of any specific challenge raised during the course of the hearing under Ohio Adm.Code 3702 [sic ] — 53— 02(C)(2)(d).” Id. at 795-796 , 669 N.E.2d at 528-529 .

1996Doherty, 862 F.2d at 575 .

1995The court of appeals reasoned that BOZA derived this authority from administrative rules which empowered its presiding officer to “ ‘regulate the course of the hearing’ and to ‘take any other action authorized by these rules or necessary under these rules.’ ” Id. at 1279 .

1995The court of appeals concluded that BOZA’s authority to disqualify a lawyer was necessary to “protect the integrity of its own hearings, and to *195 implement the public policy of deterring conflict of interest.” Id. at 1282 .

1990An analysis of this issue was undertaken by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Calhoun, supra, the court referring to Scott, supra, in stating: ”* * *[T]he court embarked on a new course of analysis with respect to the Double Jeopardy Clause.