course analysis in California

2024The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” (Id. at p. 683.) 30 Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103 , Giglio v. U.S. (1972) 405 U.S. 150 . 61 initially recited the Napue formulation to describe when Brady evidence is “material,” the Court went on to state—consistent with Bagley, supra, 473

2024The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” (Id. at p. 683.) 30 Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103 , Giglio v. U.S. (1972) 405 U.S. 150 . 61 initially recited the Napue formulation to describe when Brady evidence is “material,” the Court went on to state—consistent with Bagley, supra, 473

1969The Attorney General contends that multiple punishment should be allowed in accord with the statement in Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 , that "the purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability." The Neal opinion made the quoted statement in the course of an inquiry into legislative purpose [3] *615 with respect to the extent of punishment of a defendant who criminally injures or kills more than one victim.

1969The Attorney General contends that multiple punishment should be allowed in accord with the statement in Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal.2d 11, 20 , that “the purpose of the protection against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability.” The Neal opinion made the quoted statement in the course of an inquiry into legislative purpose 3 with respect to the extent of punishment of a defendant who criminally injures or kills more than one victim.

2025They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.” ’ ” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 772 .) The court added: “The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.” (Id. at pp. 772–773.) The high court reiterated and expanded upon the

2025They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.” ’ ” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 772 .) The court added: “The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.” (Id. at pp. 772–773.) The high court reiterated and expanded upon the

2025They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.” ’ ” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 772 .) The court added: “The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.” (Id. at pp. 772–773.) The high court reiterated and expanded upon the

2025They are hospitals, where human ailments are treated, where patients and relatives alike often are under emotional strain and worry, where pleasing and comforting patients are principal facets of the day’s activity, and where the patient and his family . . . need a restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmosphere.” ’ ” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 772 .) The court added: “The First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of political protests.” (Id. at pp. 772–773.) The high court reiterated and expanded upon the

2023Standard of Review “[A]ny aggrieved party may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal.” (§ 1756, subd. (a); see also Pacific Bell v. Public Utilities Com’n (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 269, 278 .) “There is a strong presumption of validity of the commission’s decisions.” (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406, 410 (Greyhound).) Review of a Commission decision “shall not extend further than to determine, on the basis of the entire record . . . whether any of the following occurred: [¶] (1) The commission acted without, or in excess of, its powers or jur

2023Standard of Review “[A]ny aggrieved party may petition for a writ of review in the court of appeal.” (§ 1756, subd. (a); see also Pacific Bell v. Public Utilities Com’n (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 269, 278 .) “There is a strong presumption of validity of the commission’s decisions.” (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406, 410 (Greyhound).) Review of a Commission decision “shall not extend further than to determine, on the basis of the entire record . . . whether any of the following occurred: [¶] (1) The commission acted without, or in excess of, its powers or jur

2022(Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 92 .) In the course of its analysis, the court looked specifically at its prior decision in Dickey in response to an argument that Dickey specifically approved the appointment of counsel to review limited issues.

2021(Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 92 .) In the course of its analysis, the court looked specifically at its prior decision in Dickey in response to an argument that Dickey specifically approved the appointment of counsel to review limited issues.

2019In People v. Wade (2016) 63 Cal.4th 137 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 , the Supreme Court held that a defendant who wore a backpack containing a gun had carried a loaded firearm "on the person" within the meaning of section 25850, subdivision (a). ( Wade , at pp. 139-140, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 .) Relying on decisions interpreting "similar statutory language," including " ' "upon the person" ' " and " 'upon his person,' " the Court determined that "[t]he backpack was on [the defendant's] person and, accordingly, anything inside that backpack was also on his person." ( Id. at

2019In People v. Wade (2016) 63 Cal.4th 137 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 , the Supreme Court held that a defendant who wore a backpack containing a gun had carried a loaded firearm "on the person" within the meaning of section 25850, subdivision (a). ( Wade , at pp. 139-140, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 .) Relying on decisions interpreting "similar statutory language," including " ' "upon the person" ' " and " 'upon his person,' " the Court determined that "[t]he backpack was on [the defendant's] person and, accordingly, anything inside that backpack was also on his person." ( Id. at

2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision

2017Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 620 , 622, 119 Cal.Rptr. 536 ; see § 1281.2.) If that preliminary question requires the resolution of factual issues, then the court must resolve such issues in the course of the hearing on the petition. " 'Ordinarily, we review a denial of a petition to compel arbitration for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, where the trial court's denial of a petition to arbitrate presents a pure question of law, we review the order de novo.' " ( Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534 , 541, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 80 .) If the superior court's decision

2017It is true that a Brady violation can impact " 'defense investigations and trial strategies ....' " ( Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 279 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 .) As indicated, it remains speculative that he would not have made his admissions had he been timely given the Brady material.

2017It is true that a Brady violation can impact " 'defense investigations and trial strategies ....' " ( Verdugo , supra , 50 Cal.4th at p. 279 , 113 Cal.Rptr.3d 803 , 236 P.3d 1035 .) As indicated, it remains speculative that he would not have made his admissions had he been timely given the Brady material.

2013Crawford, supra, at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ." (Id. at p. 311, fn. omitted.) In the course of its analysis, the Supreme Court explained "the relationship between the business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause." (Id. at p. 324.) "As we stated in Crawford: 'Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.' 541 U.S., at 56 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2013Crawford, supra, at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ." (Id. at p. 311, fn. omitted.) In the course of its analysis, the Supreme Court explained "the relationship between the business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause." (Id. at p. 324.) "As we stated in Crawford: 'Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.' 541 U.S., at 56 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 .

2013Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial." (Ibid.) In Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) ___ U.S. ___ ( 131 S.Ct. 2705 ), the defendant was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated.

2013Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the administration of an entity's affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial." (Ibid.) In Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) ___ U.S. ___ ( 131 S.Ct. 2705 ), the defendant was charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated.

2013(People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).) During the course of that hearing counsel informed the court that defendant “wishes to take the stand” to “testify as to those factors that are in mitigation, exactly as the doctor did.” Counsel stated he did not want defendant to testify because defendant would be subject to cross-examination, which would bring in more damaging information as well as cause defendant to get “worked up” because he “doesn‟t hold up very well.” When it became clear to the court that defendant was not seeking to discharge his counsel, i.e., this was not a Marsden

1995Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. [6] Defendant contends the trial court erred in the course of the hearing in refusing to permit him to testify or present evidence in support of his claim *1102 of ineffective representation, resulting in a denial of his right to counsel, among other rights guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions. (9a) In People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at page 124 , the seminal case regarding the substitution of appointed counsel, we held that "a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom obs

2008Any such additional criteria must be stated on the record by the sentencing judge.” In People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th 398 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 539 , 150 P.3d 220 ] (Calhoun), our Supreme Court recently addressed an issue relevant to our analysis here, concluding that the presence of separate victims named in separate counts will justify an upper term sentence, and also stating in the course of its analysis that the same facts would, in the alternative, be sufficient to justify a consecutive sentence.

2008Any such additional criteria must be stated on the record by the sentencing judge.” In People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th 398 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 539 , 150 P.3d 220 ] (Calhoun), our Supreme Court recently addressed an issue relevant to our analysis here, concluding that the presence of separate victims named in separate counts will justify an upper term sentence, and also stating in the course of its analysis that the same facts would, in the alternative, be sufficient to justify a consecutive sentence.

2007Over the course of the next 16 sessions which took place between August and December 2001, the Hospital called witnesses to testify in support of the charges." ( Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 546 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .) The course of these hearing sessions was tumultuous, and is set forth in detail in Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal. App.4th at pages 540-548, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .

2007Over the course of the next 16 sessions which took place between August and December 2001, the Hospital called witnesses to testify in support of the charges." ( Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 546 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .) The course of these hearing sessions was tumultuous, and is set forth in detail in Tenet Healthsystem, supra, 128 Cal. App.4th at pages 540-548, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 171 .

1990In the course of its analysis, the Donald R. court stated: “[Ujnless hearsay in a social study falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, the juvenile court must disregard it, and focus exclusively upon admissible evidence, in determining whether dependency has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” ( 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 715 , italics added.) To the extent that this language suggests that the juvenile court, in making its dependency determination, must disregard all legally inadmissible evidence and may consider only legally admissible evidence, I cannot agree with that reading

1990In the course of its analysis, the Donald R. court stated: "[U]nless hearsay in a social study falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, the juvenile court must disregard it, and focus exclusively upon admissible evidence, in determining whether dependency has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence." ( 195 Cal. App.3d at p. 715 , italics added.) To the extent that this language suggests that the juvenile court, in making its dependency determination, must disregard all legally inadmissible evidence and may consider only legally admissible evidence, I cannot agree with that reading

1983Gallo Winery, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d 103 .) In Douglas the court said “[t]he same gross inequity [which would result absent the dual capacity doctrine] would be present if common law liability were denied where an employee buys an automobile manufactured by his employer which contains a hidden defect and, while driving the car in the course of his employment {other than in the course of test driving the car while the defect is being repaired), suffers injury as a result of that defect.” (Id., at p. 111, italics supplied.) General’s argument, however, is more properly directed to different facts

1983Gallo Winery, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d 103 .) In Douglas the court said “[t]he same gross inequity [which would result absent the dual capacity doctrine] would be present if common law liability were denied where an employee buys an automobile manufactured by his employer which contains a hidden defect and, while driving the car in the course of his employment {other than in the course of test driving the car while the defect is being repaired), suffers injury as a result of that defect.” (Id., at p. 111, italics supplied.) General’s argument, however, is more properly directed to different facts

1962Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 35 Cal.App.2d 257 [95 P.2d 188]; Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]; Holmes Eureka L.

1962Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 35 Cal.App.2d 257 [95 P.2d 188]; Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]; Holmes Eureka L.

1962Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 35 Cal.App.2d 257 [95 P.2d 188]; Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]; Holmes Eureka L.

1962Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 35 Cal.App.2d 257 [95 P.2d 188]; Young v. Industrial Acc. Com., 38 Cal.App.2d 250 [ 100 P.2d 1062 ]; Holmes Eureka L.

1930A contract for a complete course of instruction or for a specified period of time is entire, and the school proprietor is entitled to recover the whole sum agreed upon or nothing.’ ” “Likewise to the same effect is the case of Teeter v. Horner Military School, 165 N. C. 564 [Ann.

1926A contract for a complete course of instruction or for a specified period of time is entire, and the school proprietor is entitled to recover the whole sum agreed upon or nothing.” *477 Likewise to the same effect is the case of Teeter v. Horner Military School, 165 N. C. 564 [Ann.

2025In the course of the analysis, the Court discussed the origins of the prevailing wage laws, which were first enacted in an uncodified version in 1931 in response “ ‘to the dire economic conditions of the Great Depression, when private construction diminished severely and “the oversupply of labor was exploited by unscrupulous contractors to win government contracts.” ’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1123 .) The prevailing wage law evolved through three versions.