course analysis in Washington

2014Id. at 176-80 . ¶29 The majority unfortunately seizes upon some of that language and substitutes it for the Saenz holding that an unexplained transfer of jurisdiction is insufficient to allow use of the prior offense in a persistent offender sentencing.

2014Id. at 176-80 .

2019Id. at 483 .

2019Id. at 483 .

2017In the course of our analysis, we noted that section .535 "does not differentiate between subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) [of RCW 9.94A.589]." Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 329-30 ; see also State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878, 884 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014) (noting there is no "legal basis to reject or depart from [this court's] prior interpretation" that RCW 9.94A.535 does not differentiate between subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) of RCW 9.94A.589).

2017In the course of our analysis, we noted that section .535 "does not differentiate between subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) [of RCW 9.94A.589]." Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d at 329-30 ; see also State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878, 884 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014) (noting there is no "legal basis to reject or depart from [this court's] prior interpretation" that RCW 9.94A.535 does not differentiate between subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b) of RCW 9.94A.589).

2015Ed. 2d 235 (1979) (unlocked luggage) and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.

2015Ed. 2d 235 (1979) (unlocked luggage) and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S. Ct. 2476 , 53 L.

2015In the course of its analysis, the Houser court relied in part on the decisions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S. Ct. 2586 , 61 L.

2015In the course of its analysis, the Houser court relied in part on the decisions in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S. Ct. 2586 , 61 L.

2014In the course of its analysis, the C.M.F. majority noted several cases where trial courts had reserved parenting plans for one-year periods (as Judge Leveque did here). 179 Wn.2d at 425-27 .

2014A hearing to determine In the course of its analysis, the eMF. majority noted several cases where trial 2 courts had reserved parenting plans for one year periods (as Judge Leveque did here). 179 Wn.2d at 425-27 .

2013See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 (“[T]he primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”); State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 742 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (defendant’s fundamental right to make decisions about the course of the defense is mandated by “ ‘respect for [his or her] freedom as a person’ ” (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979))).

2013See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 (“[T]he primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.”); State v. Jones, 99 Wn.2d 735, 742 , 664 P.2d 1216 (1983) (defendant’s fundamental right to make decisions about the course of the defense is mandated by “ ‘respect for [his or her] freedom as a person’ ” (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1979))).

2013In the course of our analysis, we examined key distinctions between available tort remedies and statutory remedies and concluded that Smith should not be barred from bringing a tort claim “simply because her administrative and contractual remedies may partially compensate her wrongful discharge.” Id. at 806 . f 16 Not surprisingly, the Piels rely on Smith in asserting a wrongful termination claim against the City.

2013In the course of our analysis, we examined key distinctions between available tort remedies and statutory remedies and concluded that Smith should not be barred from bringing a tort claim "simply because her administrative and contractual remedies may partially compensate her wrongful discharge." Id. at 806 .

2008In the course of its analysis in Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521 , 115 S.Ct. 2310 , the Court observed that "[i]t is commonplace for the same mixed question of law and fact to be assigned to the court for one purpose, and to the jury for another." The Court gave as an example the question of probable cause to conduct a search, which is a question for the court when it arises in the context of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search, but a question for the jury when it is an element of the crime of depriving an individual of constitutional rights under color of law.

2008In the course of its analysis in Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 521 , the Court observed that “[i]t is commonplace for the same mixed question of law and fact to be assigned to the court for one purpose, and to the jury for another.” The Court gave as an example the question of probable cause to conduct a search, which is a question for the court when it arises in the context of a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search, but a question for the jury when it is an element of the crime of depriving an individual of constitutional rights under color of law.

2020In the course of its analysis, Trujillo also noted its prior decision in State v. Enriquez, 45 Wn.

2020App. 580 , 725 P.2d 1384 (1986) (informant pointing out defendant could support his drug addiction by selling drugs not improper inducement).

2019Id. at 483, 251 P.3d 877 .

2018Id. at 156-157 (discussing State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 , 319 P.3d 31 (2014) (upholding search of luggage in control of arrestee that had been moved one car length away prior to search) and State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 , 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (fanny pack that fell off defendant during chase searched 17 minutes after chase and some distance from location of arrest was properly searched incident to arrest)).2 The court determined that the lapse of time between seizure and search “had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack.” Id. at 159.

2018Id. at 156-157 (discussing State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 , 319 P.3d 31 (2014) (upholding search of luggage in control of arrestee that had been moved one car length away prior to search) and State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 , 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (fanny pack that fell off defendant during chase searched 17 minutes after chase and some distance from location of arrest was properly searched incident to arrest)).2 The court determined that the lapse of time between seizure and search “had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack.” Id. at 159.

2018Id. at 156-157 (discussing State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 , 319 P.3d 31 (2014) (upholding search of luggage in control of arrestee that had been moved one car length away prior to search) and State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 , 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (fanny pack that fell off defendant during chase searched 17 minutes after chase and some distance from location of arrest was properly searched incident to arrest)).2 The court determined that the lapse of time between seizure and search “had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack.” Id. at 159.

2018Id. at 156-157 (discussing State v. MacDicken, 179 Wn.2d 936 , 319 P.3d 31 (2014) (upholding search of luggage in control of arrestee that had been moved one car length away prior to search) and State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675 , 835 P.2d 1025 (1992) (fanny pack that fell off defendant during chase searched 17 minutes after chase and some distance from location of arrest was properly searched incident to arrest)).2 The court determined that the lapse of time between seizure and search “had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his backpack.” Id. at 159.

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016App. 133 , 245 P.3d 242 (2010), rev'd, 176 Wn.2d 427 , 295 P.3d 212 (2013). 3 This opinion will address the Division One analysis later in this opinion. 3 No. 33204-7-III Garcia v. Franklin Co. dismissed from the current case.

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016App. 133 , 245 P.3d 242 (2010), rev'd, 176 Wn.2d 427 , 295 P.3d 212 (2013). 3 This opinion will address the Division One analysis later in this opinion. 3 No. 33204-7-III Garcia v. Franklin Co. dismissed from the current case.

2016App. 133 , 245 P.3d 242 (2010), rev'd, 176 Wn.2d 427 , 295 P.3d 212 (2013). 3 This opinion will address the Division One analysis later in this opinion. 3 No. 33204-7-III Garcia v. Franklin Co. dismissed from the current case.

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016The court also discussed the actions of the 911 operator in the course of its analysis. 3 After the Division One opinion issued, the city of Pasco was 2 159 Wn.

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),

2016In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888 , 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynesworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244 , 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where courts similarly had stated that court-sanctioned withdrawals serve as bars to malpractice actions. 186 S.W.3d at 205 . 3 ¶18 The Schibels, in turn, rely on the decisions in Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971), Allen v. Rivera, 125 A.D.2d 278 , 509 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1986), and Greening v. Klamen, 719 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),