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11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blauvelt v. County of Maricopagreen2 sentences2006In the course of its analysis, the court stated that “[t]he earliest intention [of prior service statutes] ... was that suits against counties be served upon the board (the chairman or a member) or, in their absence, upon the board’s clerk.” Id. at 79 , 770 P.2d at 383 (emphasis added). 2006In the course of its analysis, the court stated that “[t]he earliest intention [of prior service statutes] ... was that suits against counties be served upon the board (the chairman or a member) or, in their absence, upon the board’s clerk.” Id. at 79 , 770 P.2d at 383 (emphasis added). | 2 | 2 |
Finnegan v. Industrial Com'n of Arizonagreen2 sentences1995E.g., Finnegan v. Industrial Comm’n, 157 Ariz. 108, 109 , 755 P.2d 413, 414 (1988). 1995E.g., Finnegan v. Industrial Comm’n, 157 Ariz. 108, 109 , 755 P.2d 413, 414 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1995Exchange v. Industrial Comm’n, 22 Ariz.App. 158, 160 , 524 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1974) (“In this case we are primarily concerned with the ‘in the course of requirement, for if we determine that automobile racing was in the scope of Henderson’s employment, obviously there is a causal relationship between that racing and his fatal accident.”) *270 Appellate courts defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact when reasonably supported by the record, but we independently determine whether those facts support the conclusion that an injury did or did not occur in the course of employment. 1995Exchange v. Industrial Comm’n, 22 Ariz.App. 158, 160 , 524 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1974) (“In this case we are primarily concerned with the ‘in the course of requirement, for if we determine that automobile racing was in the scope of Henderson’s employment, obviously there is a causal relationship between that racing and his fatal accident.”) *270 Appellate courts defer to the ALJ’s findings of fact when reasonably supported by the record, but we independently determine whether those facts support the conclusion that an injury did or did not occur in the course of employment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Rosan
green
2 sentences1977Under these circumstances her future earnings and earning capacity were completely unknown, and such unknown future developments are better left to modification proceedings which have been provided for that very purpose, than to automatic reduction provisions operative one and two years, respectively, in the future. ‘Much of what we have said in reference to those portions of the support order hereinabove considered is applicable also to that part of the judgment ordering absolute termination of spousal support at the end of three years.’ 24 Cal.App.3d at 896-897 , 101 Cal.Rptr. at 303 .” Oppe 1977Under these circumstances her future earnings and earning capacity were completely unknown, and such unknown future developments are better left to modification proceedings which have been provided for that very purpose, than to automatic reduction provisions operative one and two years, respectively, in the future. ‘Much of what we have said in reference to those portions of the support order hereinabove considered is applicable also to that part of the judgment ordering absolute termination of spousal support at the end of three years.’ 24 Cal.App.3d at 896-897 , 101 Cal.Rptr. at 303 .” Oppe | 2 | 1974–1977 |
State v. Emanuel
green
1 sentence2024Emanuel, 159 Ariz. at 466 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Calmat of Arizona v. State Ex Rel. Miller
green
2 sentences2008The court thus determined that the proper time to value property in inverse condemnation actions is the date on which the government takes the property — in Calmat, December of 1985, “the date of the state’s original entry.” Id. at 192-95 , 859 P.2d at 1325-28 . ¶ 23 In the course of its analysis, the Cal-mat court observed that, in direct condemnation actions, the Legislature’s decision to value condemned property on the date of the summons serves the purpose of placing “the property owner in the position he or she would have occupied had no taking occurred” because the date of the summons is 2008The court thus determined that the proper time to value property in inverse condemnation actions is the date on which the government takes the property — in Calmat, December of 1985, “the date of the state’s original entry.” Id. at 192-95 , 859 P.2d at 1325-28 . ¶ 23 In the course of its analysis, the Cal-mat court observed that, in direct condemnation actions, the Legislature’s decision to value condemned property on the date of the summons serves the purpose of placing “the property owner in the position he or she would have occupied had no taking occurred” because the date of the summons is | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wainscott v. Ossenkop
green
2 sentences1988Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured (see Bogart, supra; Wainscott v. Ossenkop, *460 633 P.2d 237 (Alaska 1981) (application of "resident of same household" definition, while not technically ambiguous, defeats reasonable expectations of spouse)); 2. 1988Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured (see Bogart, supra; Wainscott v. Ossenkop, 633 P.2d 237 (Alaska 1981) (application of “resident of same household” definition, while not technically ambiguous, defeats reasonable expectations of spouse)); 2. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Matter of Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros., Inc.
green
2 sentences1985In the course of its analysis, the court noted: We observe that it is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary injury by medical and surgical treatment is compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Acts. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 1321, and see, e.g., Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716 , 166 P.2d 857 (1946) and Matter of Parchefsky v. Kroll Brothers, Inc., 267 N.Y. 410 , 196 N.E. 308 (1935). 1985In the course of its analysis, the court noted: We observe that it is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary injury by medical and surgical treatment is compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Acts. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 1321, and see, e.g., Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716 , 166 P.2d 857 (1946) and Matter of Parchefsky v. Kroll Brothers, Inc., 267 N.Y. 410 , 196 N.E. 308 (1935). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.
green
2 sentences1985In Heaton v. Kerlan, the court said, quoting from an earlier California case, that: * * * the employee is entitled to recover under the schedule of compensation for the extent of his disability, based on the ultimate result of the accident, regardless of the fact that the disability has been aggravated and increased by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the employer’s selected physician. 111 Ariz. at 263 , 527 P.2d 1091 (citations omitted). 1985In Heaton v. Kerlan, the court said, quoting from an earlier California case, that: * * * the employee is entitled to recover under the schedule of compensation for the extent of his disability, based on the ultimate result of the accident, regardless of the fact that the disability has been aggravated and increased by the intervening negligence or carelessness of the employer’s selected physician. 111 Ariz. at 263 , 527 P.2d 1091 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Heaton v. Kerlan
green
2 sentences1985In the course of its analysis, the court noted: We observe that it is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary injury by medical and surgical treatment is compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Acts. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 1321, and see, e.g., Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716 , 166 P.2d 857 (1946) and Matter of Parchefsky v. Kroll Brothers, Inc., 267 N.Y. 410 , 196 N.E. 308 (1935). 1985In the course of its analysis, the court noted: We observe that it is now uniformly held that aggravation of the primary injury by medical and surgical treatment is compensable under Workmen’s Compensation Acts. 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 1321, and see, e.g., Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal.2d 716 , 166 P.2d 857 (1946) and Matter of Parchefsky v. Kroll Brothers, Inc., 267 N.Y. 410 , 196 N.E. 308 (1935). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer
green
2 sentences1977Under these circumstances her future earnings and earning capacity were completely unknown, and such unknown future developments are better left to modification proceedings which have been provided for that very purpose, than to automatic reduction provisions operative one and two years, respectively, in the future. ‘Much of what we have said in reference to those portions of the support order hereinabove considered is applicable also to that part of the judgment ordering absolute termination of spousal support at the end of three years.’ 24 Cal.App.3d at 896-897 , 101 Cal.Rptr. at 303 .” Oppe 1977Under these circumstances her future earnings and earning capacity were completely unknown, and such unknown future developments are better left to modification proceedings which have been provided for that very purpose, than to automatic reduction provisions operative one and two years, respectively, in the future. ‘Much of what we have said in reference to those portions of the support order hereinabove considered is applicable also to that part of the judgment ordering absolute termination of spousal support at the end of three years.’ 24 Cal.App.3d at 896-897 , 101 Cal.Rptr. at 303 .” Oppe | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Gibson
green
2 sentences1973The course of the rule changed in 1968 with State v. Gibson, 103 Ariz. 428 , 443 P.2d 424 (1968). 1973The course of the rule changed in 1968 with State v. Gibson, 103 Ariz. 428 , 443 P.2d 424 (1968). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Craig v. Harney
green
2 sentences1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Schavey v. Roylston
green
2 sentences1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 1971On an application for a writ of prohibition, we held that “[t]he restraint imposed by the trial court * * * strikes at the very foundation of freedom of the press by subjecting it to censorship by the judiciary.” And compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 , 67 S.Ct. 1249 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 , where the Supreme Court of the United States said, “Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity.” While it has been recognized that a magistrate has the inherent power to secure the integrity of the judicial processes by ordering a closed hearing, Schavey v. Roylston, 8 Ariz.App. 574 , 4 | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.