course hearing in Connecticut

2005This is a project that the judiciary is ill equipped to undertake.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 590 , 687 A.2d 111 (1996).

1997The defendants are likewise correct in their reading of Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital , supra, 239 Conn. 574 , as the court joined its sister courts in declining to recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice: where a court is "asked to evaluate the course of instruction [and] called upon to review the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by [that] educational institution . . . [the] . . . project [is one] that the judiciary is ill equipped to undertake." (Citation omitted.) Id., 590 .

2024Emerick v. United Technologies Corp., 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S. Ct. 500 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1999). 21 See C.

2024Emerick v. United Technologies Corp., 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S. Ct. 500 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1999). 21 See C.

2000I Our Supreme Court has defined a stipulated judgment "as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Bryan v. Reynolds , 143 Conn. 456 , 460 (1956).

2000I Our Supreme Court has defined a stipulated judgment "as a contract of the parties acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded by a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Bryan v. Reynolds , 143 Conn. 456 , 460 (1956).

2000State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

1987On the other hand, we must also recognize that the “mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, however, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

2000State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

2000State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

2000The defendant next contends that the present case is not controlled by Kirchner v. Yale University, supra, 150 Conn. 623 , because, the defendant asserts, “there is nothing in [Kirchner] to indicate that the plaintiff challenged educational techniques, decision making or evaluative assessments in any way.” Instead, the defendant likens the injured plaintiff in Kirchner to a student whose chair collapses during class.

1997Id. at 590 (quoting Ross v. Creighton University , 957 F.2d at 416 .).

2000State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

1987On the other hand, we must also recognize that the “mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, however, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Mak, 105 Wash. 2d 692, 704-705 , 718 P.2d 407 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S. Ct. 599 , 93 L.

2024A., 560 U.S. 538 , 130 S. Ct. 2485 , 177 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2010), explicitly adopting a construction of rule 15 (c) (1) (C) (ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that balances the interests of defen- during the course of the hearing’’ did ‘‘not reveal any bias against the plaintiff or for the defendant’’); Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn. App. 724, 761, 762, 763 , 737 A.2d 456 (reviewing conduct of trial court—which ‘‘took pains to explain to the [self-represented] plaintiff that . . . the defendants were entitled to cross-examine him,’’ ‘‘carefully explained to the plaintiff why it could not guar

2024A., 560 U.S. 538 , 130 S. Ct. 2485 , 177 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2010), explicitly adopting a construction of rule 15 (c) (1) (C) (ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that balances the interests of defen- during the course of the hearing’’ did ‘‘not reveal any bias against the plaintiff or for the defendant’’); Emerick v. Kuhn, 52 Conn. App. 724, 761, 762, 763 , 737 A.2d 456 (reviewing conduct of trial court—which ‘‘took pains to explain to the [self-represented] plaintiff that . . . the defendants were entitled to cross-examine him,’’ ‘‘carefully explained to the plaintiff why it could not guar

2021Id., 508-509, citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979) (‘‘[t]he fact that [the defendant] was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the defendant] himself was engaged in criminal conduct’’); see also State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668 , 679 n.15, 490 A.2d 984 (1985) (‘‘[t]he lesson from Brown . . . is simply that physical presence in a geographical area where the police may have reason to anticipate possible violations of the law does not in and of itself justify arbitrary investigatory stops’’).

2021Id., 508-509, citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 , 99 S. Ct. 2637 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979) (‘‘[t]he fact that [the defendant] was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the defendant] himself was engaged in criminal conduct’’); see also State v. Scully, 195 Conn. 668 , 679 n.15, 490 A.2d 984 (1985) (‘‘[t]he lesson from Brown . . . is simply that physical presence in a geographical area where the police may have reason to anticipate possible violations of the law does not in and of itself justify arbitrary investigatory stops’’).

2019On the other hand, we must also recognize that the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, however, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. State, 143 Conn. App. 655, 664 , 70 A.3d 180 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 908 , 83 A.3d 1163 (2014).

2019On the other hand, we must also recognize that the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, however, does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Small v. State, 143 Conn. App. 655, 664 , 70 A.3d 180 (2013), cert. denied, 311 Conn. 908 , 83 A.3d 1163 (2014).

2014See, e.g., Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 100 , 570 A.2d 690 (1990); Kolkmeyer v. Kolkmeyer, 18 Conn. App. 336, 337 , 558 A.2d 253 (1989).’’ Holcombe v. Holcombe, supra, 22 Conn. App. 365 . 14 As of April 11, 2013, the older child was enrolled in and attending a private school in Buffalo, New York. 15 During the course of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘We need to get off of the frozen zone and get something done one way or the other.

2014See, e.g., Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 100 , 570 A.2d 690 (1990); Kolkmeyer v. Kolkmeyer, 18 Conn. App. 336, 337 , 558 A.2d 253 (1989).’’ Holcombe v. Holcombe, supra, 22 Conn. App. 365 . 14 As of April 11, 2013, the older child was enrolled in and attending a private school in Buffalo, New York. 15 During the course of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘We need to get off of the frozen zone and get something done one way or the other.

2013On the other hand, we must also recognize that the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have helped the defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial, however does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533, 546 , 747 A.2d 487 (2000).

2010Geisler , as we know, is grounded on the well established principle that “federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 684 .

2010Geisler , as we know, is grounded on the well established principle that "federal constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 684 , 610 A.2d 1225 .

2009In the course of its analysis, the court clarified that "[i]t is not the [s]tate which bears the burden of demonstrating that its rule is deeply rooted, but rather [the] respondent who must show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by due process) is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 47 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 .

2009In the course of its analysis, the court clarified that "[i]t is not the [s]tate which bears the burden of demonstrating that its rule is deeply rooted, but rather [the] respondent who must show that the principle of procedure violated by the rule (and allegedly required by due process) is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 47 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 .

2009In the course of its analysis, the court referenced the discussion set forth in Ross Realty Corp. v. Surkis, 163 Conn. 388, 392 , 311 A.2d 74 (1972), in which our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue: “While it has been suggested that it might be desirable for the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts necessary to bring the matter within the purview of § 52-592 . . . [our Supreme Court] has never held this to be a requirement. ...

2009In the course of its analysis, the court referenced the discussion set forth in Ross Realty Corp. v. Surkis, 163 Conn. 388, 392 , 311 A.2d 74 (1972), in which our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue: “While it has been suggested that it might be desirable for the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts necessary to bring the matter within the purview of § 52-592 . . . [our Supreme Court] has never held this to be a requirement. ...

2007Nevertheless, “[w]hile ajudge trying a case in which one party is acting pro se must be careful, as always, to preserve the fairness of the trial, the adversary system is not suspended, and the judge cannot become the adviser or tactician for the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, 311-12 , 782 A.2d 702 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 928 , 783 A.2d 1029 (2001).

2007Nevertheless, “[w]hile ajudge trying a case in which one party is acting pro se must be careful, as always, to preserve the fairness of the trial, the adversary system is not suspended, and the judge cannot become the adviser or tactician for the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, 311-12 , 782 A.2d 702 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 928 , 783 A.2d 1029 (2001).

2007Nevertheless, “[w]hile ajudge trying a case in which one party is acting pro se must be careful, as always, to preserve the fairness of the trial, the adversary system is not suspended, and the judge cannot become the adviser or tactician for the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, 311-12 , 782 A.2d 702 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 928 , 783 A.2d 1029 (2001).

2007Nevertheless, “[w]hile ajudge trying a case in which one party is acting pro se must be careful, as always, to preserve the fairness of the trial, the adversary system is not suspended, and the judge cannot become the adviser or tactician for the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murray v. Taylor, 65 Conn. App. 300, 311-12 , 782 A.2d 702 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 928 , 783 A.2d 1029 (2001).

2007In Kelly v. Kelly, supra, 54 Conn. App. at 50 , 732 A.2d 808 , we stated emphatically: "To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.

2007In Kelly v. Kelly, supra, 54 Conn. App. at 50 , 732 A.2d 808 , we stated emphatically: "To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.

2007This is evidenced, he argues, by the court’s questioning of various witnesses to elicit testimony favorable to the defendant and by the court’s interruptions of the plaintiff s counsel when he attempted to make objections during the course of the hearing. “[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carr v. Fleet Bank, 73 Conn. App. 593, 595-96 , 812 A.2d 14 (2002).

2007This is evidenced, he argues, by the court’s questioning of various witnesses to elicit testimony favorable to the defendant and by the court’s interruptions of the plaintiff s counsel when he attempted to make objections during the course of the hearing. “[I]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carr v. Fleet Bank, 73 Conn. App. 593, 595-96 , 812 A.2d 14 (2002).

2006In United States v. Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 600-601 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031 , 1035 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997), the alleged victims of the defendant’s molestation, aged five and seven, testified solely via videotape to relieve their apprehension about appearing in court.

2002Meadows v. Higgins , 249 Conn. 155 (1999).

2002The grievance giving rise to the reprimand arose from the plaintiff's behavior during the course of a hearing on a previous administrative appeal, Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 573397 (September 24, 1998, McWeeny, J .), rev'd, 60 Conn. App. 698 , 760 A.2d 1027 (2000).

2002The grievance giving rise to the reprimand arose from the plaintiff's behavior during the course of a hearing on a previous administrative appeal, Burton v. Statewide Grievance Committee , Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. 573397 (September 24, 1998, McWeeny, J .), rev'd, 60 Conn. App. 698 , 760 A.2d 1027 (2000).

2002"It is the peculiar province of the trial court to observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to draw inferences therefrom as to the motives underlying their testimony and conduct." Solomon v. Aberman , 196 Conn. 359 , 379 , 493 A.2d 1933 , (1985), Dadio v. Dadio , 123 Conn. 88 , 92-93 , 192 A. 557 (1937); see Christie v. Eager , 129 Conn. 62 , 64-65 , 26 A.2d 352 (1942).

2002"It is the peculiar province of the trial court to observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to draw inferences therefrom as to the motives underlying their testimony and conduct." Solomon v. Aberman , 196 Conn. 359 , 379 , 493 A.2d 1933 , (1985), Dadio v. Dadio , 123 Conn. 88 , 92-93 , 192 A. 557 (1937); see Christie v. Eager , 129 Conn. 62 , 64-65 , 26 A.2d 352 (1942).

2002"It is the peculiar province of the trial court to observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses and to draw inferences therefrom as to the motives underlying their testimony and conduct." Solomon v. Aberman , 196 Conn. 359 , 379 , 493 A.2d 1933 , (1985), Dadio v. Dadio , 123 Conn. 88 , 92-93 , 192 A. 557 (1937); see Christie v. Eager , 129 Conn. 62 , 64-65 , 26 A.2d 352 (1942).