course hearing in Texas

2009Id. at 954 ; Welch v. State , 993 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tex. Ap.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.).

2008Welch v. State, 993 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (holding that no hearing was required when the State made a written proffer of what it intended to prove).

2008See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Marshall v. State , 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim.

1994The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s [failure to disclose].” Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 405 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

1994The reviewing court should assess the possibility that such effect might have occurred in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s [failure to disclose].” Thomas, 841 S.W.2d at 405 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 , 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3384 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

2008Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950, 953-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Nanez v. State, 179 S.W.3d 149, 151-52 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) Moreover, there is no requirement that this threshold determination be made within the course of a hearing.

2008App. 1996); Nanez v. State, 179 S.W.3d 149 , 151-52 2 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2005, no pet.) Moreover, there is no requirement that this threshold determination be made within the course of a hearing.

2019“In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, assigns the weight to be given their testimony, may accept or reject all or any part of their testimony, and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.” Rich v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

2019“In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, assigns the weight to be given their testimony, may accept or reject all or any part of their testimony, and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.” Rich v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). 17 “We may not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if a different answer could be reached upon review of the evidence.” Id.; see Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,

2012In the course of its analysis in Patrick, the court addressed the concept of "continuing jurisdiction," noting that the Legislature "knows how to provide continuing jurisdiction if doing so is its intent." Id. at 595, n.13 .

2012In the course of its analysis in Patrick , the court addressed the concept of “continuing jurisdiction,” noting that the Legislature “knows how to provide continuing jurisdiction if doing so is its intent.” Id. at 595, n. 13 .

2010See id. at 265-67 .

2010While holding that the student’s claims did not fall within the complete absence of an “integral safety component” exception for personal property furnished to an individual to use, id. at 263-65 , the Texarkana court nonetheless concluded that the college had “used” the hoist through the manner in which it had utilized the hoist as part of the student’s course instruction.

2009Id. at 954 ; Welch v. State , 993 S.W.2d 690, 697 (Tex. Ap.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.).

2008Mitchell v. State, 931 S.W.2d 950, 953-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Nanez v. State, 179 S.W.3d 149, 151-52 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) Moreover, there is no requirement that this threshold determination be made within the course of a hearing.

2023See Salinas, 861 S.W.2d at 23–24.

2019“In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, assigns the weight to be given their testimony, may accept or reject all or any part of their testimony, and resolves any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.” Rich v. Olah, 274 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). 17 “We may not pass upon the credibility of the witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if a different answer could be reached upon review of the evidence.” Id.; see Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,

2019Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646, 652-53, 656 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied).

2016In the course of its analysis of the potential for fundamental error from a prosecutor’s voir dire statements, the court in Escobar stated, “Notably, once voir dire is over and the jury is impanelled, [t]he Court of Criminal Appeals has held that ‘a defendant’s failure to object to a jury argument or a defendant’s failure to pursue to an adverse ruling his objection to a jury argument forfeits his right to complain about the argument on appeal.’” Id. at *4 (quoting Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim.

2016App. 1996), citing also Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 667 (Tex. Crim.

2014We address the State’s grounds in reverse order, which we perceive to be the logical progression of these 14 Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.

2012Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 230 (presentment “includes actual notice of the desire to have a hearing”) (citing Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 79 ).

2012Bank, FSB v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (“[R]emarks of counsel during the course of a hearing are not competent evidence unless the attorney is actually testifying.”). 6 intentional or the result of conscious indifference is a fact-finding within the trial court’s discretion.”).