9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1959–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sami Leka v. Leonard A. Portuondo, Superintendent, Shawangunk Correctional Facilitygreen2 sentences2011Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 382 (2d Cir.1974) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Leka, 257 F.3d at 102 . 2011Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 382 (2d Cir.1974) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord, Leka, 257 F.3d at 102 . | 1 | 1 |
Robert Wayne Grant v. Noah L. Alldredge, Wardengreen2 sentences2011We are thus called upon to decide whether the conclusion that there was “no suppression” is correct where, in this case, as in Grant, 498 F.2d at 382 , the government’s delayed disclosure has hindered the defense from pursuing a course of inquiry which might well have “ferreted out” the necessary information in time to use it effectively. 2011We are thus called upon to decide whether the conclusion that there was "no suppression" is correct where, in this case, as in Grant, 498 F.2d at 382 , the government's delayed disclosure has hindered the defense from pursuing a course of inquiry which might well have "ferreted out" the necessary information in time to use it effectively. | 1 | 1 |
McCauley v. Sulsgreen2 sentences2008See McCauley v. Suls, 123 Md.App. 179 , 716 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1998); Fireman’s Fund Ins. 2008See McCauley v. Suls, 123 Md.App. 179 , 716 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1998); Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Warren Brown, A/K/A Prince Asielgreen2 sentences2001As a result, the record that is generated in the course of the inquiry will be less than exhaustive; and the reasons for the disruption of deliberations may be less than clear. 15 We therefore adopt the standard that “if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in the original); accord, Brown, 262 U.S.App.D.C. at 188-89 , 823 F.2d at 596-97 ; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 . 2001As a result, the record that is generated in the course of the inquiry will be less than exhaustive; and the reasons for the disruption of deliberations may be less than clear. 15 We therefore adopt the standard that “if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in the original); accord, Brown, 262 U.S.App.D.C. at 188-89 , 823 F.2d at 596-97 ; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 . | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. John Fife Symington, Iii, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2001As a result, the record that is generated in the course of the inquiry will be less than exhaustive; and the reasons for the disruption of deliberations may be less than clear. 15 We therefore adopt the standard that “if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in the original); accord, Brown, 262 U.S.App.D.C. at 188-89 , 823 F.2d at 596-97 ; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 . | 1 | 1 |
Hawkins v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1979Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Hawkins v. United States, 304 A.2d 279, 282 (D.C.App.1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2001As a result, the record that is generated in the course of the inquiry will be less than exhaustive; and the reasons for the disruption of deliberations may be less than clear. 15 We therefore adopt the standard that “if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that the impetus for a juror’s dismissal stems from the juror’s views on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror.” Symington, 195 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in the original); accord, Brown, 262 U.S.App.D.C. at 188-89 , 823 F.2d at 596-97 ; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 621-22 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lockhart v. Cade
green
1 sentence2000Lockhart, 728 A.2d at 69 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
2 sentences1992For example, in Brown v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C.1980), 7 where the Board of Zoning Adjustment’s rules empowered the presiding officer to “regulate the course of the hearing,” id. at 1279 , and to take any action necessary under its rules, we held: “[T]he BZA has the inherent authority and the duty to protect the integrity of its proceedings by entertaining a motion to disqualify an attorney who was alleged to have violated [a disciplinary rule].” Id. at 1284 . 1992For example, in Brown v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 413 A.2d 1276 (D.C.1980), 7 where the Board of Zoning Adjustment’s rules empowered the presiding officer to “regulate the course of the hearing,” id. at 1279 , and to take any action necessary under its rules, we held: “[T]he BZA has the inherent authority and the duty to protect the integrity of its proceedings by entertaining a motion to disqualify an attorney who was alleged to have violated [a disciplinary rule].” Id. at 1284 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Thomas W. Whalem v. United States
green
2 sentences1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def 1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences1979Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Hawkins v. United States, 304 A.2d 279, 282 (D.C.App.1973). 1979Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Hawkins v. United States, 304 A.2d 279, 282 (D.C.App.1973). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Vega v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to “forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts.” On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Wha-lem, emphasize that criminal def 1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def 1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def | 1 | 1979–1979 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def 1979On the one hand, Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331 , 346 F.2d 812 (en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 , 86 S.Ct. 124 , 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1965), requires the trial court to interpose the defense of insanity to "forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts." On the other hand, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided by the Supreme Court subsequent to Whalem , emphasize that criminal def | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Lister v. England
green
1 sentence1963Since the time of the hearing we have ruled in Lister v. England, Director of Motor Vehicles of the District of Columbia, D.C.App., 195 A.2d 260 , that in an administrative hearing the result of a urinalysis is not admissible without testimony of an expert qualified to interpret such result, because the statutory presumption is expressly limited in its application to the trial for certain specified offenses in a court of competent jurisdiction. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Clawans v. Sheetz
green
2 sentences1959Clawans v. Sheetz, 1937, 67 App.D.C. 366 , 92 F.2d 517 . 1959Clawans v. Sheetz, 1937, 67 App.D.C. 366 , 92 F.2d 517 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.