Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1887–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Taitano v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2001The reviewing court must "assess the reasonable probability of a different result in 'light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the [nondisclosure].'" Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 349 , 358 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1987) (citation omitted). 2001The reviewing court must "assess the reasonable probability of a different result in 'light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the [nondisclosure].'" Taitano v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 342, 349 , 358 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1987) (citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Robinson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1987Bagley requires a court to assess the reasonable probability of a different result “in light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 152 , 341 S.E.2d 159, 165 (1986) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683 ). 1987Bagley requires a court to assess the reasonable probability of a different result “in light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor’s incomplete response.” Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 152 , 341 S.E.2d 159, 165 (1986) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683 ). | 2 | 2 |
Bowman v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1997We must look at the totality of the circumstances with an awareness of the "difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response" to [his duty to provide] Brady information. 4 Id. (citation omitted). 1995Bowman, 248 Va. at 134 , 445 S.E.2d at 112 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Riggins v. Nevadagreen1 sentence2021See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364 (explaining how the consequences of an erroneous determination threaten the fundamental fairness of our criminal justice system).8 7 For example, a defendant’s inability to communicate with counsel impacts his ability to determine his plea and waive privilege or his right to a jury trial, as well as “a myriad of smaller decisions concerning the course of his defense.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 8 The risks associated with ordering a potentially “unnecessary” competency evaluation are negligible for a defe | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2021See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364 (explaining how the consequences of an erroneous determination threaten the fundamental fairness of our criminal justice system).8 7 For example, a defendant’s inability to communicate with counsel impacts his ability to determine his plea and waive privilege or his right to a jury trial, as well as “a myriad of smaller decisions concerning the course of his defense.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 8 The risks associated with ordering a potentially “unnecessary” competency evaluation are negligible for a defe 2021See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364 (explaining how the consequences of an erroneous determination threaten the fundamental fairness of our criminal justice system).8 7 For example, a defendant’s inability to communicate with counsel impacts his ability to determine his plea and waive privilege or his right to a jury trial, as well as “a myriad of smaller decisions concerning the course of his defense.” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139-40 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 8 The risks associated with ordering a potentially “unnecessary” competency evaluation are negligible for a defe | 1 | 1 |
GTE Sprint Communications Corp. v. AT&T Communications of Virginia, Inc.green2 sentences2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea 2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea | 1 | 1 |
Rosenberger v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea 2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea | 1 | 1 |
Haugen v. SHENANDOAH VALLEY SOCIAL SERVICESgreen2 sentences2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea 2017Servs., 274 Va. 27, 34 , 645 S.E.2d 261, 265 (2007)); cf. GTE Sprint Commc’ns Corp. of Va. v. AT&T Commc’ns of Va., 230 Va. 295, 306 , 337 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1985) (corporation commission proceeding). “[T]o entitle a party to a reversal” on the ground of refusal of a continuance request, the challenging party must clearly demonstrate that the hearing officer “abused [his] discretion and that injury resulted to the party complaining.” Haugen, 274 Va. at 34 , 645 S.E.2d at 265 (quoting Rosenberger v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 953, 957 , 166 S.E. 464, 465 (1932)); see Code § 2.2-4020 (giving agency hea | 1 | 1 |
Parsons v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016“No trial is perfect, and error will at times creep in.” Parsons v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 832, 852 , 152 S.E. 547, 554 (1930). 2016“No trial is perfect, and error will at times creep in.” Parsons v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 832, 852 , 152 S.E. 547, 554 (1930). | 1 | 1 |
Srinivasan v. Srinivasangreen1 sentence2016Assuming without deciding that Williamson’s repeating Kekic’s questions to the witness exceeded her statutory authority to “regulate and expedite the course of the hearing” under Code § 2.2-4020, we next examine whether the questions and answers constituted more than mere harmless error. 4 Because the error, if any, was a statutory violation, we turn to Code § 8.01-678, which makes “harmless-error review required in all cases.” Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. ix , ix, 396 S.E.2d 675, 675 (1990) (noting in a text parenthetical that “harmless-error review [is] required in all cases”). | 1 | 1 |
Stephen M. Epperly v. E.L. Booker, Warden Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginiagreen1 sentence2002See Epperly v. Booker, 997 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. Gordongreen2 sentences2000Our decision of Carter v. Gordon, 28 Va. App. 133, 141 , 502 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1998), also incorrectly states that the Act permits hearsay evidence and, as its sole authority for that proposition, wrongly cites to Code § 9-6.14:12. 2000Our decision of Carter v. Gordon, 28 Va. App. 133, 141 , 502 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1998), also incorrectly states that the Act permits hearsay evidence and, as its sole authority for that proposition, wrongly cites to Code § 9-6.14:12. | 1 | 1 |
Williamson v. the Old Brogue, Inc.green1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel J. McDougall Jr. v. Kenneth R. Dunngreen1 sentence1996Most courts have held that statements taken by an insurance adjuster in the normal course of a claim are made during the regular course of the insurer’s business, not in anticipation of a trial, and are therefore discoverable.” Citing, McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1972), 102 F.R.D. 235 at 237 . | 1 | 1 |
Currie v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1994In addition, the court must “assess the reasonable probability of a different result in light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the [nondisclosure].” Taitano, 4 Va. App. at 349, 358 S.E.2d at 594 ; see Currie v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 204, 209-10 , 391 S.E.2d 79, 82-83 (1990). 1994In addition, the court must “assess the reasonable probability of a different result in light of the totality of circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the [nondisclosure].” Taitano, 4 Va. App. at 349, 358 S.E.2d at 594 ; see Currie v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 204, 209-10 , 391 S.E.2d 79, 82-83 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Bagley
green
2 sentences1991In addition, the possibility that any adverse effect on preparation and presentation of the defendant's case might have occurred must be assessed "in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683 , 105 S.Ct. at 3384 . 1991In addition, the possibility that any adverse effect on preparation and presentation of the defendant's case might have occurred must be assessed "in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense not been misled by the prosecutor's incomplete response." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683 , 105 S.Ct. at 3384 . | 5 | 1986–1994 |
Morris v. Slappy
green
2 sentences2017Hearing officers, like circuit courts, “necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 , 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). 2017Hearing officers, like circuit courts, “necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 , 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616 , 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Perrigan
green
1 sentence1996Most courts have held that statements taken by an insurance adjuster in the normal course of a claim are made during the regular course of the insurer’s business, not in anticipation of a trial, and are therefore discoverable.” Citing, McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1972), 102 F.R.D. 235 at 237 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Snouffer's Adm'r v. Hansbrough
green
1 sentence1887The cases on this subject are numerous, and are perfectly familiar to the profession.” And iu Snouffer’s Adm’r v. Hansbrough, 79 Va. 166 , the court said: “In cases of this character, where there is an utterly irreconcilable conflict between the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant, where the proper solution of the controversy depends upon the credibility of the witnesses, where the cause has been remanded solely with the view to obtain the opinion of the jury as to some paramount fact necessary, to be ascertained before a decree in accordance with the justice of the case and the rights of | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.