medical malpractice claim (Alabama) · Go Syfert
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medical malpractice claim in Alabama

34 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (23)

CaseFollowedCited
Bradford v. McGeegreen
ala · 1988 · cited in 9 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2008–2013
2 sentences

2013This Court has stated: “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ T) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the doctor’s deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the doctor’s act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” Pruitt [v. Zeiger], 590 So.2d [236,] 238 [(Ala.1991) ] (quoting Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).’ Giles v. Brookwood Health Seros., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008). “ ‘A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action must ... present expert testimony establishin

2012Hrynkiw timely appealed. “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ 1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 8) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood, Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008) (quoting Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).” Mosley v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 24 So

99
Giles v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc.green
ala · 2008 · cited in 9 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2013
2 sentences

2013This Court has stated: “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ T) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the doctor’s deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the doctor’s act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” Pruitt [v. Zeiger], 590 So.2d [236,] 238 [(Ala.1991) ] (quoting Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).’ Giles v. Brookwood Health Seros., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008). “ ‘A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice action must ... present expert testimony establishin

2012Hrynkiw timely appealed. “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ 1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 8) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood, Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008) (quoting Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).” Mosley v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 24 So

89
Pruitt v. Zeigergreen
ala · 1991 · cited in 8 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1993–2013
2 sentences

2012Hrynkiw timely appealed. “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ 1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 8) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood, Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008) (quoting Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).” Mosley v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 24 So

2011See Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 832 (Ala.2000) (‘The AMLA applies “[i]n any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider for breach of the standard of care.” ’ (quoting § 6-5-548(a), Ala.Code 1975)). ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ T) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the doctor’s deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the doctor’s act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs.,

78
McAfee v. Baptist Medical Centergreen
ala · 1994 · cited in 3 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011See McAfee, 641 So.2d at 267 (‘In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence “probably caused the injury.” Parrish v. Russell, 569 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1990), citing Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985).

2009See McAfee 641 So.2d at 267 (“ ‘[T]here must be more than a mere possibility or one possibility among others that the negligence complained of caused the injury.

33
Tucker v. Tombigbee Healthcare Authoritygreen
ala · 2014 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See Ex parte Hodge, 153 So. 3d 734 (Ala. 2014) (permitting mandamus review of a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss when it was clear from the face the complaint that the plaintiff’s medical-malpractice claim was barred by the four-year period of repose set forth in § 6-5-482(a)).

2025See Ex parte Hodge, 153 So. 3d 734 (Ala. 2014) (permitting mandamus review of a trial court's order denying a motion to dismiss when it was clear from the face the complaint that the plaintiff’s medical-malpractice claim was barred by the four-year period of repose set forth in § 6-5-482(a)).

22
Uldrych v. Vhs of Illinois, Inc.green
ill · 2011 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See, e.g. , Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. , 239 Ill.2d 532 , 347 Ill.Dec. 694 , 942 N.E.2d 1274 (2001) (holding that a hospital's indemnity claim against two doctors, which was predicated on a medical-malpractice claim against the hospital based on vicarious liability for the doctors' negligence, was subject to a statute of repose applicable to medical-malpractice claims); Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare Sys. v. South Carolina Med.

2017See, e.g. , Uldrych v. VHS of Illinois, Inc. , 239 Ill.2d 532 , 347 Ill.Dec. 694 , 942 N.E.2d 1274 (2001) (holding that a hospital's indemnity claim against two doctors, which was predicated on a medical-malpractice claim against the hospital based on vicarious liability for the doctors' negligence, was subject to a statute of repose applicable to medical-malpractice claims); Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare Sys. v. South Carolina Med.

22
Hagan v. Antoniogreen
va · 1990 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2000–2015
2 sentences

2015See Hagan v. Antonio, 240 Va. 347 , 397 S.E.2d 810 (1990) (physician’s act of fondling patient’s breasts and making improper comments during what was supposed to be a routine breast examination occurred during the delivery of professional services).

2015See Hagan v. Antonio, 240 Va. 347 , 397 S.E.2d 810 (1990) (physician’s act of fondling patient’s breasts and making improper comments during what was supposed to be a routine breast examination occurred during the delivery of professional services).

22
Mosley v. BROOKWOOD HEALTH SERVICES, INC.green
ala · 2009 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2011–2012
2 sentences

2012Hrynkiw timely appealed. “ ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ 1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 8) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood, Health Servs., Inc., 5 So.3d 533, 549 (Ala.2008) (quoting Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.1991), quoting in turn Bradford v. McGee, 534 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.1988)).” Mosley v. Brookwood Health Servs., Inc., 24 So

2011See Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 832 (Ala.2000) (noting that the AMLA “applies ‘[i]n any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider for breach of the standard of care.’ ” (quoting § 6-5-548(a), Ala.Code 1975)). ‘“To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ ‘1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plai

22
Williams v. Bhoopathigreen
ala · 1985 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011See McAfee, 641 So.2d at 267 (‘In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence “probably caused the injury.” Parrish v. Russell, 569 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1990), citing Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985).

2009See McAfee, 641 So.2d at 267 (“In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence ‘probably caused the injury.’ Parr ish v. Russell, 569 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1990), citing Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985).

22
Parrish v. Russellgreen
ala · 1990 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011See McAfee, 641 So.2d at 267 (‘In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence “probably caused the injury.” Parrish v. Russell, 569 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1990), citing Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985).

2009See McAfee, 641 So.2d at 267 (“In medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff must prove that the alleged negligence ‘probably caused the injury.’ Parr ish v. Russell, 569 So.2d 328, 330 (Ala.1990), citing Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690, 691 (Ala.1985).

22
Mock v. Allengreen
ala · 2000 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 832 (Ala.2000) (‘The AMLA applies “[i]n any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider for breach of the standard of care.” ’ (quoting § 6-5-548(a), Ala.Code 1975)). ‘To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ T) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the doctor’s deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the doctor’s act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plaintiff.’ ” ’ Giles v. Brookwood Health Servs.,

2011See Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 832 (Ala.2000) (noting that the AMLA “applies ‘[i]n any action for injury or damages or wrongful death, whether in contract or in tort, against a health care provider for breach of the standard of care.’ ” (quoting § 6-5-548(a), Ala.Code 1975)). ‘“To prevail on a medical-malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove “ ‘1) the appropriate standard of care, 2) the [health-care provider’s] deviation from that standard, and 3) a proximate causal connection between the [health-care provider’s] act or omission constituting the breach and the injury sustained by the plai

22
Crutcher v. Williamsgreen
ala · 2009 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See, e.g., Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-549 ("In the case of a jury trial, the jury shall be instructed that in order to return a verdict against a health care provider, the jury shall be reasonably satisfied by substantial evidence that the health care provider failed to comply with the standard of care and that such failure probably caused the injury or death in question."); cf. Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So.3d 631, 640 (Ala.2008)(opinion on return to second remand) ("[T]o prevail on a medical-malpractice claim ... the plaintiff must prove that a breach of the standard of care ... proximately and prob

2009See, e.g., Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-549 (“In the case of a jury trial, the jury shall be instructed that in order to return a verdict against a health care provider, the jury shall be reasonably satisfied by substantial evidence that the health care provider failed to comply with the standard of care and that such failure probably caused the injury or death in question.”); cf. Crutcher v. Williams, 12 So.3d 631, 640 (Ala.2008)(opinion on return to second remand) (“[T]o prevail on a medical-malpractice claim ... the plaintiff must prove that a breach of the standard of care ... proximately and prob

22
Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green
ala · 2000 · cited in 2 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2006–2024
2 sentences

2024See, generally, Cackowski, 767 So. 2d at 329-30 .

2006Consequently, the court explained its intention to instruct the jury that the burden was on the plaintiff "to prove by substantial evidence" all of the elements of her claim. *Page 1018 In Cackowski , supra, the response of the defendant health-care provider to the plaintiffs' medical-malpractice claim included the assertion of the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.

12
Johnson v. McMurraygreen
ala · 1984 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See also Ex parte Golden, 628 So. 2d 496, 498 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the fraud claim alleged by the plaintiff was really a medical-malpractice claim under the AMLA because the "substance" of that claim was that the misrepresentation made to the plaintiff induced her to undergo allegedly unnecessary treatment); Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (holding that a fraudulent-concealment claim about participation of one doctor in surgery was, in substance, a medical-malpractice claim under the AMLA). 31 1210175 a pure standpoint of the patient's medical prognosis," a medical-ca

11
Ex Parte Goldengreen
ala · 1993 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023See also Ex parte Golden, 628 So. 2d 496, 498 (Ala. 1993) (holding that the fraud claim alleged by the plaintiff was really a medical-malpractice claim under the AMLA because the "substance" of that claim was that the misrepresentation made to the plaintiff induced her to undergo allegedly unnecessary treatment); Johnson v. McMurray, 461 So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (holding that a fraudulent-concealment claim about participation of one doctor in surgery was, in substance, a medical-malpractice claim under the AMLA). 31 1210175 a pure standpoint of the patient's medical prognosis," a medical-ca

11
Ford v. Stringfellow Memorial Hospitalgreen
alacivapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Timmerman v. Fitts , 514 So.2d 907 (Ala. 1987) ; see also Ford v. Stringfellow Mem'l Hosp. , 39 So.3d 184 , 191 (Ala. Civ.

11
Timmerman v. Fittsgreen
ala · 1987 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Timmerman v. Fitts , 514 So.2d 907 (Ala. 1987) ; see also Ford v. Stringfellow Mem'l Hosp. , 39 So.3d 184 , 191 (Ala. Civ.

2017See Timmerman , 514 So.2d at 913 ; Wilson v. Manning , 880 So.2d 1101 , 1110-11 (Ala. 2003) ; and Dansby v. Hagood , 719 So.2d 839 , 842 (Ala. Civ.

11
Ex Parte HealthSouth Corp.green
ala · 2002 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See also Ex parte HealthSouth, 851 So.2d at 42 -43 (See, J., concurring specially) ("I concur with the majority's decision to affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals because the Heaths' claim on which that court reversed the summary judgment does not appear to be a medical-malpractice claim, but is instead a claim alleging negligent or wanton-and-willful failure to provide requested custodial care.

2008See also Ex parte HealthSouth, 851 So.2d at 42 -43 (See, J., concurring specially) (“I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals because the Heaths’ claim on which that court reversed the summary judgment does not appear to be a medical-malpractice claim, but is instead a claim alleging negligent or wanton-and-willful failure to provide requested custodial care.

11
Mobile Infirmary v. Delchampsgreen
ala · 1994 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007In Mobile Infirmary v. Delchamps, 642 So.2d 954, 956-57 (Ala.1994), the plaintiff attempted to avoid the statute of limitations of the AMLA by alleging fraud and breach of warranty instead of medical malpractice.

11
Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc.green
ala · 2004 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007See, e.g., Owens v. Coosa Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So.2d 983 (Ala.2004) (compelling the arbitration of a medical-malpractice action against a nursing home).

11
Levesque v. Regional Medical Center Bd.green
ala · 1993 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Levesque v. Regional Medical Ctr., 612 So.2d 445, 449 (Ala.1993).

1999Levesque v. Regional Medical Ctr ., 612 So.2d 445 , 449 (Ala. 1993).

11
Rudolph v. Lindsaygreen
ala · 1993 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
Ellingwood v. Stevensgreen
ala · 1990 · cited in 1 Alabama opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
1 sentence

1996See Ellingwood v. Stevens, 564 So.2d 932 (Ala.1990); see also Rudolph v. Lindsay, 626 So.2d 1278 (Ala.1993).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Crosslin v. Health Care Authority of Huntsville green
ala · 2008
2 sentences

2017In the present case, that act or omission occurred more than four years before Benchmark commenced its action against McNamara. 3 In an argument that appears to be based partly on policy considerations, Benchmark asserts that its indemnity action against McNamara did not accrue until "Benchmark paid the settlement to the Avants on behalf of Southern Medical in February 2014" and that the "trial court correctly rejected McNamara's request to implement a statute of limitations that would have expired before Benchmark paid any claims." As Benchmark points out, there is precedent construing the pe

2017In the present case, that act or omission occurred more than four years before Benchmark commenced its action against McNamara. 3 In an argument that appears to be based partly on policy considerations, Benchmark asserts that its indemnity action against McNamara did not accrue until "Benchmark paid the settlement to the Avants on behalf of Southern Medical in February 2014" and that the "trial court correctly rejected McNamara's request to implement a statute of limitations that would have expired before Benchmark paid any claims." As Benchmark points out, there is precedent construing the pe

22017–2017
Mitchum v. Hudgens green
ala · 1988
2 sentences

2009Where the client is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised procedure.” (Emphasis added.) In Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So.2d 194 (Ala.1988), an obstetrician sued the attorney who had been designated by the insurer to defend the medical-malpractice claim against the obstetrician, alleging that the attorney had committed malpractice by settling the medical-malpractice action within policy limits without giving prior notice of the settlement to the obstetrician.

1990In Mitchum , the language in the policy read: "We have the right to investigate, negotiate and settle any suit or claim, if we think that is appropriate." Id. at 196 .

21990–2009
Ex Parte Kennedy green
ala · 1995
2 sentences

2001Moreover, in Kennedy, this Court held that a medical-malpractice claim alleging an act or omission in Jefferson County, added by amendment to a workers’ compensation claim pending against Walker County in the Walker Circuit Court, “must be severed and transferred to the Jefferson Circuit Court.” 2 656 So.2d at 369 .

2001Under the authority of Ex parte Kennedy, supra, wherein this Court applied the mandatory venue provisions of § 6-5-546 to a medical-malpractice claim added by amendment, we hold that the trial court was required in the instant case to transfer the claim added by amendment against the McCreless defendants to Winston County, where their acts and omissions were alleged to have occurred and where McCullar resided.

22001–2001
Dansby v. Hagood green
alacivapp · 1998
1 sentence

2017See Timmerman , 514 So.2d at 913 ; Wilson v. Manning , 880 So.2d 1101 , 1110-11 (Ala. 2003) ; and Dansby v. Hagood , 719 So.2d 839 , 842 (Ala. Civ.

12017–2017
Wilson v. Manning green
ala · 2003
1 sentence

2017See Timmerman , 514 So.2d at 913 ; Wilson v. Manning , 880 So.2d 1101 , 1110-11 (Ala. 2003) ; and Dansby v. Hagood , 719 So.2d 839 , 842 (Ala. Civ.

12017–2017
Okeke v. Craig green
ala · 2000
1 sentence

2004In Okeke , this Court held that "[a] wrongful-death action is barred by the statute of limitations if the decedent, on the date of her death, would have been time-barred from filing a medical-malpractice claim based on the medical malpractice that is alleged to have caused the death." 782 So.2d at 283 .

12004–2004
Shanes v. Kiser green
ala · 1999
1 sentence

2001Shanes v. Kiser, 729 So.2d 319 (Ala.1999).” We affirmed the summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Roberts.

12001–2001
McMickens v. Waldrop green
ala · 1981
1 sentence

2000QUESTION POSED BY THE INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL ANSWERED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. *Page 284 HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, HOUSTON, COOK, SEE, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. 1 Section 6-5-482 (a) states: "All actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, medical institutions, or other health care providers for liability, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must be commenced within two years next after the act, or omission, or failure giving rise to the claim, and not afterwards; provided, that if the cause of action is not discovered and could

12000–2000
Georgia Cas. and Sur. Co. v. White green
ala · 1991
11996–1996

Statutes the citing opinions construe

AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-480 (19) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-540 (15) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-548 (12) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-482 (6) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-484 (6) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-542 (6) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-541 (5) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-551 (4) AL § Ala. Code § 12-2-7 (3) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-481 (3) AL § Ala. Code § 6-5-549 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

LA 208 (1978–2026) MI 181 (1982–2026) OH 140 (1983–2026) NY 139 (1980–2026) TX 137 (1984–2024) IL 105 (1978–2026) IN 92 (1983–2025) CA 73 (1971–2026) CT 68 (1988–2024) TN 67 (1986–2024) PA 66 (1979–2025) FL 62 (1979–2025) MD 58 (1978–2025) MS 46 (1994–2026) GA 44 (1984–2025) NJ 41 (1976–2024) AL 34 (1990–2025) WA 32 (1973–2025) VA 32 (1987–2026) NC 30 (1980–2023) WI 29 (1981–2026) OR 28 (1986–2025) MN 26 (1971–2026) NM 26 (1996–2025) DC 24 (1982–2026) AZ 22 (1986–2025) SC 20 (1993–2024) ID 18 (1988–2023) CO 18 (1977–2024) MO 16 (1991–2020) KS 15 (1996–2026) MA 14 (1980–2025) IA 13 (1976–2026) NE 13 (1990–2025) KY 12 (1978–2026) UT 12 (1993–2024) WY 11 (1989–2025) AR 10 (1992–2024) WV 9 (1991–2025) MT 8 (1996–2026) RI 8 (1997–2014) NV 8 (1998–2022) ND 7 (1983–2019) VT 6 (2005–2021) VI 5 (1999–2026) DE 5 (1989–2020) SD 5 (1985–2020) AK 5 (1992–2023) NH 4 (2001–2018) OK 3 (1999–2023) ME 3 (2019–2019) HI 3 (2003–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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