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8 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Peace v. Weismangreen1 sentence2014In denying the patient’s medical malpractice claim, the court held as a matter of law that the parties did not establish a physician-patient relationship and that the doctor’s only duty to the patient under a theory of negligence “was to conduct the examination in such a manner as not to injure him.” Id. at 321. | 1 | 1 |
Zuccolo v. Blazargreen1 sentence2006See also Zuccolo v. Blazar, 694 A.2d 717, 719 (R.I.1997) (applying the Anthony analysis to a medical malpractice claim also regarding the side effects of a prescription drug). | 1 | 1 |
The Merchants National Bank v. Bernice I. Morrissgreen1 sentence2003Accord Merchants National Bank v. Morriss, 269 F.2d 363, 366 (1st. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Medical Associates of Rhode Island, Inc.green1 sentence1998See Buja, 688 A.2d at 818 (defense counsel argued obstetrician not qualified to testify concerning standard of care required of family practitioner performing obstetrical procedures); Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426-27 (defense counsel argued physician skilled in pediatries and family medicine not qualified to testify against physician certified in emergency and internal medicine when the alleged malpractice concerned treatment of animal bite). | 1 | 1 |
Buja v. Morningstargreen1 sentence1998See Buja, 688 A.2d at 818 (defense counsel argued obstetrician not qualified to testify concerning standard of care required of family practitioner performing obstetrical procedures); Marshall, 677 A.2d at 426-27 (defense counsel argued physician skilled in pediatries and family medicine not qualified to testify against physician certified in emergency and internal medicine when the alleged malpractice concerned treatment of animal bite). | 1 | 1 |
Millar v. Beacon Insurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence1997Fogarty Memorial Hospital, 481 A.2d 1 (R.I.1984) (affirming dismissal of “medical malpractice” claim against nurse because it was time barred pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 (the medical-malpractice limitations period), notwithstanding a dissent arguing that "[i]t appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice,” 481 A.2d at 6 ), or as an ordinary negligence action, see Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Roderick
green
2 sentences2010In Lewis , our Supreme Court held that the "Legislature intended that the [patient-physician] privilege automatically be waived when a patient . . . elects to bring a medical-malpractice claim or otherwise puts his or her medical condition at issue." Id. 2001Waiver In Lewis, our Supreme Court held that the privilege protections afforded by the CHCIA were automatically waived when a patient elected to bring a medical malpractice claim. 617 A.2d at 121-122 . | 2 | 2001–2010 |
Bakalakis v. Women & Infants' Hospital
green
1 sentence2007In Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1106 , two parents brought a medical malpractice claim on behalf of their infant son for alleged negligent care immediately after his birth, on December 18, 1984. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Vigue v. John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Fogarty Memorial Hospital, 481 A.2d 1 (R.I.1984) (affirming dismissal of “medical malpractice” claim against nurse because it was time barred pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 (the medical-malpractice limitations period), notwithstanding a dissent arguing that "[i]t appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice,” 481 A.2d at 6 ), or as an ordinary negligence action, see Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 1997Fogarty Memorial Hospital, 481 A.2d 1 (R.I.1984) (affirming dismissal of “medical malpractice” claim against nurse because it was time barred pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 (the medical-malpractice limitations period), notwithstanding a dissent arguing that "[i]t appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice,” 481 A.2d at 6 ), or as an ordinary negligence action, see Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence1997Fogarty Memorial Hospital, 481 A.2d 1 (R.I.1984) (affirming dismissal of “medical malpractice” claim against nurse because it was time barred pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-14.1 (the medical-malpractice limitations period), notwithstanding a dissent arguing that "[i]t appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice,” 481 A.2d at 6 ), or as an ordinary negligence action, see Ramage v. Central Ohio Emergency Services, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97 | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.