medical malpractice claim in Pennsylvania

2025To establish a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Id. (quoting Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (op. announcing judgment of court)).

2018To establish a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish: a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Id. (quoting Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (op. announcing judgment of court)).

2025To establish a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must prove: a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Id. (quoting Toogood v. Rogal, 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003) (op. announcing judgment of court)).

2020He is claiming that it is not necessary because it sounds in “medical battery”5 and not “medical malpractice.” In Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. Super. 2005), we said that: A medical malpractice claim is distinguished by two defining characteristics.

2018The underlying elements of negligence in a medical malpractice claim, mirroring those of a basic negligence claim, see Estate of Swift [by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp.], 690 A.2d [719,] 722 [(Pa. Super. 1997)], are more specifically described as a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the -5- J-S74017-17 harm.” Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (quoting Hightower- Warren v. Silk, [] 698 A.2d 52, 54 [(Pa.] 1997)).

2017Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003).] The underlying elements of negligence in a medical malpractice claim, mirroring those of a basic negligence claim, see Estate of Swift [by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp., 456 Pa. Super. 330 , 690 A.2d 719, 722 (1997)], are more specifically described as a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (quoting Hightower- Warren v. Silk, 548 Pa. 459 , 698 A.2d 52

2001To support a medical malpractice claim and get it past summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence from an expert “who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.” Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 526 Pa. 54, 62 , 584 A.2d 888, 892 (1990).

2001To support a medical malpractice claim and get it past summary judgment a plaintiff must present evidence from an expert “who will testify, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts of the physician deviated from good and acceptable medical standards, and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the harm suffered.” Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 526 Pa. 54, 62 , 584 A.2d 888, 892 (1990).

2025Thus, to determine whether a plaintiff has pled a medical malpractice claim, we must consider whether the plaintiff’s claim “pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional -7- J-A01006-25, J-A01007-25, J-A01046-25 & J-A01047-25 relationship [and] whether the claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added).

2021Grossman v. Barke, 866 A.2d 561, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005). “[T]he need for expert testimony in a medical malpractice claim will rest upon the facts and averments of the individual case.” Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp., 917 A.2d 317, 323 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 17 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2011). “[I]f, at the conclusion of discovery, the plaintiff fails to produce expert medical opinion addressing the elements of his cause of action within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he has failed to establish a prima facie case and may not proceed to trial.” Miller v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 753 A.2d 829, 833 (Pa. Su

2023Releases, however, “are strictly construed so as not to bar the enforcement of a claim that had not accrued at the date of the execution of the release.” Fortney v. Callenberger, 801 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. 2002); see also Vaughn v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 39 (Pa. Super. 1994) (refusing to bar a medical malpractice claim where the relevant surgery occurred months after the plaintiff signed the release).

2013Vaughn , at 40-41.

2020See Heldring v. Lundy Beldecos & Milby, P.C., 151 A.3d 634 , 644- 45 (Pa.Super. 2016).

2020See Heldring v. Lundy Beldecos & Milby, P.C., 151 A.3d 634 , 644- 45 (Pa.Super. 2016).

2019This Court has stated: “[G]enerally[,] when the complexities of the human body are involved expert testimony is required to aid the jury in reaching conclusions as to the cause of pain or injury.” [Wareham v. Jeffes, 534 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).] The only time expert testimony will not be required for a medical malpractice claim is where the causal connection between the defendants’ allegedly negligent act and the harm suffered by the plaintiff is “generally a matter of common knowledge,” rendering the jury “capable through its every day experience and knowledge of comprehending the

2019This Court has stated: “[G]enerally[,] when the complexities of the human body are involved expert testimony is required to aid the jury in reaching conclusions as to the cause of pain or injury.” [Wareham v. Jeffes, 534 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).] The only time expert testimony will not be required for a medical malpractice claim is where the causal connection between the defendants’ allegedly negligent act and the harm suffered by the plaintiff is “generally a matter of common knowledge,” rendering the jury “capable through its every day experience and knowledge of comprehending the

2006Eaddy v. Hamaty, 694 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa.Super.1997) (citing Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 526 Pa. 54, 62 , 584 A.2d 888, 891 (1990)).

2000Eaddy v. Hamaty, 694 A.2d 639, 642 (Pa.Super.1997).

2022Indeed, it does not appear that the Muhammad majority ever even considered the possibility that the Muhammads’ attorneys really might have been negligent, and that the couple might have suffered damages in the form of a lower settlement as a result.15 If this holding did not startle readers thirty years ago, it surely should today. 15 Accord Kristine Heim Marino, Legal Malpractice Law—the “Lawyer’s Holiday:” for Victims of Legal Malpractice, Justice Goes on Vacation—Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1991), 65 TEMP.

2019Muhammad, 587 A.2d at 1347 .

2025Critically, “where a complaint is predicated upon facts constituting medical treatment, that is, when it involves diagnosis, care[,] and treatment, by licensed professionals, the action must be characterized as a professional negligence action.” Yee v. Roberts, 878 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Smith v. Friends Hosp., 928 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining that because “nothing in [the] complaint is predicated upon substandard medical treatment, that is, acts involving diagnosis, care[,] and treatment by licensed professionals,” th

2006Yee v. Roberts, 878 A.2d 906 , (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, — Pa.—, 901 A.2d 499 (2006). ¶ 53 The instant case is one involving ordinary negligence arising out of a motor vehicle accident.

2017Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003).] The underlying elements of negligence in a medical malpractice claim, mirroring those of a basic negligence claim, see Estate of Swift [by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp., 456 Pa. Super. 330 , 690 A.2d 719, 722 (1997)], are more specifically described as a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (quoting Hightower- Warren v. Silk, 548 Pa. 459 , 698 A.2d 52

2017Rogal, D.D.S., P.C., 824 A.2d 1140, 1145 (Pa. 2003).] The underlying elements of negligence in a medical malpractice claim, mirroring those of a basic negligence claim, see Estate of Swift [by Swift v. Northeastern Hosp., 456 Pa. Super. 330 , 690 A.2d 719, 722 (1997)], are more specifically described as a “duty owed by the physician to the patient, a breach of that duty by the physician, that the breach was the proximate cause of the harm suffered, and the damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.” Toogood, 824 A.2d at 1145 (quoting Hightower- Warren v. Silk, 548 Pa. 459 , 698 A.2d 52

2025Critically, “where a complaint is predicated upon facts constituting medical treatment, that is, when it involves diagnosis, care[,] and treatment, by licensed professionals, the action must be characterized as a professional negligence action.” Yee v. Roberts, 878 A.2d 906, 912 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Smith v. Friends Hosp., 928 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining that because “nothing in [the] complaint is predicated upon substandard medical treatment, that is, acts involving diagnosis, care[,] and treatment by licensed professionals,” th

2025See, e.g., Keffer v. Bob Nolan's Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 638 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted) (employer not liable where agent found not negligent); Skalos v. Higgins, 449 A.2d 601, 603-04 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“Where the master is joined with his servant in an action based wholly on the servant’s negligence or misconduct, the master cannot be held liable unless there is a cause of action against the servant”).

2025See, e.g., Keffer v. Bob Nolan's Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 638 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted) (employer not liable where agent found not negligent); Skalos v. Higgins, 449 A.2d 601, 603-04 (Pa.Super. 1982) (“Where the master is joined with his servant in an action based wholly on the servant’s negligence or misconduct, the master cannot be held liable unless there is a cause of action against the servant”).

2023Releases, however, “are strictly construed so as not to bar the enforcement of a claim that had not accrued at the date of the execution of the release.” Fortney v. Callenberger, 801 A.2d 594, 597 (Pa. Super. 2002); see also Vaughn v. Didizian, 648 A.2d 38, 39 (Pa. Super. 1994) (refusing to bar a medical malpractice claim where the relevant surgery occurred months after the plaintiff signed the release).

2021Haun v. Community Health Systems, Inc., 14 A.3d 120, 123 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). “[W]hen a plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim sounds in negligence, the elements of the plaintiff’s case are the same as those in ordinary negligence actions.” Toogood v. Owen J.

2021Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 823-24 (Pa. Super. 2001) (court may properly grant summary judgment where evidentiary record contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out prima facie cause of action or defense).

2021Grossman v. Barke, 866 A.2d 561, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005). “[T]he need for expert testimony in a medical malpractice claim will rest upon the facts and averments of the individual case.” Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp., 917 A.2d 317, 323 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 17 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2011). “[I]f, at the conclusion of discovery, the plaintiff fails to produce expert medical opinion addressing the elements of his cause of action within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, he has failed to establish a prima facie case and may not proceed to trial.” Miller v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 753 A.2d 829, 833 (Pa. Su

2021Id. (citing Billman v. Saylor, 761 A.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Pa. Super. 2000) (establishing four factors a plaintiff must allege in a medical malpractice claim: (1) physician owed a duty to patient; (2) physician breached duty; (3) breach was proximate cause of or substantial factor in bringing about harm to patient; and (4) damages suffered by patient were direct result of harm)).

2020Mitchell v. Shikora, 209 A.3d 307, 315 (Pa. 2019).

2020Co.), 599 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991)).) Further, the Board explained that under Section 508 of the MCARE Act and Protz, an employer was limited to the “subrogation of indemnity and medical benefits paid after the medical malpractice third-party adjudication.” (Id. at 4.) The Board held that, pursuant to Protz, an employer is entitled to subrogate “all benefits paid after the claimant’s medical malpractice claim settled, not as of the date the [employer] sought reimbursement,” and this entitlement begins upon the recovery of the third-party award, here April 2, 2013.

2017Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hosp., 97 A.3d 1225, 1229-30 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citations omitted). “[T]he need for expert testimony in a medical malpractice claim will rest upon the facts and averments of the individual case.” Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp., 917 A.2d 317, 323 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 17 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2011).

2014See Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574 , 798 A.2d 742, 748-749 (2002).

2014See Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 568 Pa. 574 , 798 A.2d 742, 748-749 (2002).

2014We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “[0]ur standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review is plenary.” Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 797-798 (Pa.Super.2012) (citations omitted).