medical malpractice claim in Florida

2007It is up to the court to decide from the allegations in the complaint whether the claim arises `out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services.'" (citation omitted)); see also J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Pensacola, 635 So.2d 945, 949 (Fla.1994) (looking at the allegations made in complaint and determining it "does not state a medical malpractice claim"); Tenet St.

2004It held that (1) because the injuries alleged by the plaintiff did not arise "from the [h]ospital's medical diagnosis, treatment, or care of [the plaintiff]," the action was "not a medical malpractice action" and, therefore, the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations was inapplicable (id. at 948); and (2) because "[t]he complaint d[id] not allege that the [h]ospital was negligent in any way in the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services to [the plaintiff]," it "d[id] not state a medical malpractice claim for chapter 766 purposes, and the notice and presuit

2018The elements of a medical malpractice claim are: "(1) a duty by the physician, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) causation." Saunders , 151 So.3d at 441 (citing Gooding v. Univ.

2018The elements of a medical malpractice claim are: "(1) a duty by the physician, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) causation." Saunders , 151 So.3d at 441 (citing Gooding v. Univ.

2015This Court has previously held that “[t]he primary test for whether a claim is one for rhedical malpractice is whether the claim relies on the application of the medical malpractice standard of care.” Pierrot [v. Osceola Mental Health, Inc.], 106 So.3d [491] at 493 [ (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ] (citing Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1993); Joseph v. Univ.

2014This Court has previously held that “[t]he primary test for whether a claim is one for medical malpractice is whether the claim relies on the application of the medical malpractice standard of care.” 4 Pierrot, 106 So.3d at 493 (citing Weinstock v. Groth, 629 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1993); Joseph v. Univ.

2015Behavioral LLC., 71 So.3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So.3d 138, 141-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).

2014Behavioral LLC., 71 So.3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So.3d 138, 141-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).

2015Behavioral LLC., 71 So.3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So.3d 138, 141-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).

2014Behavioral LLC., 71 So.3d 913, 917 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); GalenCare, Inc. v. Mosley, 59 So.3d 138, 141-43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)).

2013Integrated II, 840 So.2d at 980-81 . 5 Similarly, the Baker Act provides several statutory standards of care applicable to specific patient rights.

2011Integrated Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Lang-Redway, 840 So.2d 974, 980 (Fla.2002).

2025See Clare, 220 So. 3d at 1261-62 ; Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056, 1058-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that an affidavit from an infectious disease doctor was insufficient to establish the standard of care for an ophthalmologist and could not be used to initiate a medical malpractice claim).

2025See Clare, 220 So. 3d at 1261-62 ; Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056, 1058-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that an affidavit from an infectious disease doctor was insufficient to establish the standard of care for an ophthalmologist and could not be used to initiate a medical malpractice claim).

2025See Clare, 220 So. 3d at 1261-62 ; Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056, 1058-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that an affidavit from an infectious disease doctor was insufficient to establish the standard of care for an ophthalmologist and could not be used to initiate a medical malpractice claim).

2025See Clare, 220 So. 3d at 1261-62 ; Edwards v. Sunrise Ophthalmology ASC, LLC, 134 So. 3d 1056, 1058-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (stating that an affidavit from an infectious disease doctor was insufficient to establish the standard of care for an ophthalmologist and could not be used to initiate a medical malpractice claim).

2019A claim for medical malpractice or medical negligence has been defined by the legislature as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a); Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Townes, 242 So. 3d 303, 309 (Fla. 2018); Ferraro, 206 So. 3d at 731 . "[P]roving a medical malpractice claim requires establishing that the allegedly negligent act 'represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care,' as testified to by -4- a qualified medical expert." Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 (quoting § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2008)).

2019A claim for medical malpractice or medical negligence has been defined by the legislature as "a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render, medical care or services." § 766.106(1)(a); Nat'l Deaf Academy, LLC v. Townes, 242 So. 3d 303, 309 (Fla. 2018); Ferraro, 206 So. 3d at 731 . "[P]roving a medical malpractice claim requires establishing that the allegedly negligent act 'represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care,' as testified to by -4- a qualified medical expert." Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 (quoting § 766.102(1), Fla. Stat. (2008)).

2017See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 909 So.2d 333, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

2017See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 909 So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

2017See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 909 So.2d 333, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

2017See, e.g., Barker v. Barker, 909 So. 2d 333, 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Andreatta v. Hunley, 714 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

1986Applying this rule the supreme court stated in Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So.2d 1283, 1287 (Fla.1980) that the four-year limit expressed in the medical malpractice statute of repose may not be applied to a medical malpractice claim where the occurrence or incident out of which the claim arose predates the effective date of the statute.

1983The court held that the four-year limitation period contained in the statute may not be applied retroactively to bar a medical malpractice claim “where the occurrence or incident out of which the claim arose predates the effective date of the statute.” Id. at 1287 .

2012Id. at 1297 .

2003See 569 So.2d at 1296-97 .

2018The alleged “breach of the prevailing professional standard of care” must be testified to by a qualified medical expert. § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013); see Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 . 5 2008) (concluding that allegations a nurse and hospital failed to render appropriate medical care and treatment implicated medical negligence standard of care so that the claim was a medical malpractice claim); Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 941 So. 2d 468, 469-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Puentes v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, 843 So. 2d 356, 357-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim t

2018See id. § 766.102(1), (5). 7 As we stated in Silva , "[i]n the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, we are not at liberty to construe" terms defined in chapter 766 "so as to deprive plaintiffs of their causes of action." 601 So.2d at 1189 .

2018The alleged “breach of the prevailing professional standard of care” must be testified to by a qualified medical expert. § 766.102(5), Fla. Stat. (2013); see Townes, 242 So. 3d at 309 . 5 2008) (concluding that allegations a nurse and hospital failed to render appropriate medical care and treatment implicated medical negligence standard of care so that the claim was a medical malpractice claim); Quintanilla v. Coral Gables Hosp., Inc., 941 So. 2d 468, 469-70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006); Puentes v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, 843 So. 2d 356, 357-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim t

2017See id. at 538-39 (finding that while the plaintiff could be compelled to reveal “the names of the attorneys whom she consulted with” in pursuing a medical malpractice claim, “the reasons why she sought out legal counsel and any subsequent counsel” was protected by the attorney-client privilege).

2017Ctr., Inc. v. Dumigan, 151 So.3d 1282, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

2015Dr. Navarro’s Vein Ctr. of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Miller, 22 So.3d 776, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (complaint’s claim of general negligence for laser hair removal is one for medical negligence despite “plaintiffs creative dance around the obvious”).