92 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mayhue v. Sparkmangreen2 sentences2024The elements of a medical-malpractice claim are “‘(1) that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187 (quoting Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ind. 1995)). 2016For a medical malpractice claim, those elements are “(1) that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.” Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ind.1995). | 9 | 10 |
Chamberlain v. Walpolegreen2 sentences2024Id. at 961-62 . 2019Chamberlain v. Walpole, 822 N.E.2d 959, 961 (Ind. 2005). | 6 | 7 |
Martin v. Richeygreen2 sentences2012Statute of Limitations We first address whether the Act’s statute of limitations bars Stacy’s claim against the Estate.3 Indiana Code Section 34-18-7-1(b) states in part that a medical malpractice claim “may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect . . . .” This is an “occurrence-based” rather than “discovery-based” statute of limitations, meaning that “an action for medical malpractice gener 2012Statute of Limitations We first address whether the Act’s statute of limitations bars Stacy’s claim against the Estate. 3 Indiana Code Section 34-18-7-l(b) states in part that a medical malpractice claim “may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect....” This is an “occurrence-based” rather than “discovery-based” statute of limitations, meaning that “an action for medical malpractice gener | 6 | 7 |
Putnam County Hospital v. Sellsgreen2 sentences2009Ind.Code § 34-18-8-4; see Putnam County Hosp. v. Sells, 619 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (submission of a proposed complaint to the medical review panel is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim). 2005See Ind.Code § 34-18-8-4; see also Putnam County Hosp. v. Sells, 619 N.E.2d 968, 970 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (holding that the submission of a proposed complaint to the medical review panel is a condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice claim). | 6 | 6 |
Houser v. Kaufmangreen2 sentences2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-258 | June 26, 2020 Page 5 of 12 A claim, whether in contract or tort, may not be brought against a health care provider based upon professional services or health care that was provided or that should have been provided unless the claim is filed within two (2) years after the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect[.] Accordingly, the Act institutes an occurrence-based statute of limitations, “meaning that an action for medical malpractice generally must be filed within two years from the date the alleged negligent act occurred rather than fr 2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1601-CT-102 | August 17, 2016 Page 9 of 12 two years from the date the alleged negligent act occurred rather than from the date it was discovered.” Houser v. Kaufman, 972 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation omitted), trans. denied. “[I]n determining whether a medical malpractice claim has been commenced within the medical malpractice statute of limitations, the discovery or trigger date is the point when a claimant either knows of the malpractice and resulting injury, or learns of facts that, in the exercise of reasonable dili | 3 | 3 |
Larry Robert David, II, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Lisa Marie David v. William Kleckner, M.D.green2 sentences2025See David v. Kleckner, 9 N.E.3d 147, 152-153 (Ind. 2014) (“[I]n determining whether a medical malpractice claim has been commenced within the medical malpractice statute of limitations, the discovery or trigger date is the point when a claimant either knows of the malpractice and resulting injury, or learns of facts that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should lead to the discovery of the malpractice and the resulting injury. 2017David v. Kleckner, 9 N.E.3d 147, 152-153 (Ind. 2014). | 2 | 3 |
Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Herron v. Anigbo, 897 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind.2008) (four months); Overton v. Grillo, 896 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind.2008) (nine months); Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 699 (eleven months). [14] In this case, the alleged negligence occurred on July 6, 2011, meaning that the two-year statute of limitations expired on July 6, 2013. 2004See also Boggs, 730 N.E.2d at 697 ; Jacobs v. Manhart, 770 N.E.2d 344, 355 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trams. denied. | 2 | 2 |
Winona Memorial Foundation of Indianapolis v. Lomaxgreen2 sentences2010For example, in Winona Memorial Fdn. of Indianapolis v. Lomax, 465 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), reh'g denied, we determined a patient's claim against a health care provider stemming from a slip and fall was not a medical malpractice claim that had to be sent to a medical review panel. 2008In Winona Memorial Foundation, of Indianapolis v. Lomax, 465 N.E.2d 731, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1984), reh’g denied, we considered an appeal of a trial court’s determination that a patient’s claim against a health care provider stemming from a slip and fall caused by a protruding floor board was not a medical malpractice claim required to be sent to a medical review panel. | 2 | 2 |
Community Hospital of Anderson v. McKnightgreen2 sentences2004Community Hospital v. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ind.1986). 1999Community Hospital of Anderson and Madison County v. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d 775, 776 (Ind.1986). | 2 | 2 |
Ellenwine v. Fairleygreen2 sentences2011The medical malpractice claim, however, was brought by Minix in her capacity as personal representative of Zick’s estate and seeks recovery for Zick’s injuries allegedly resulting from the Medical Providers’ professional negligence. 9 Tr. p. 17; see also Ellenwine, 846 N.E.2d at 662 (noting that a medical malpractice claim is a negligence claim by or on behalf of the injured party). 2008As such, the Survival Act mandates that the medical malpractice claim does not survive Dustin’s death and may not be brought.” Ellenwine, 846 N.E.2d at 661 . | 1 | 4 |
Chi Yun Ho v. Fryegreen2 sentences2024Generally, a plaintiff cannot prevail without presenting “expert opinion that a defendant health care provider’s conduct fell below the applicable standard of care.” Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1201 (Ind. 2008). 2019Id. [18] In a medical malpractice claim, a medical review panel initially determines whether the defendant has met the applicable standard of care. | 1 | 2 |
St. Anthony Medical Center, Inc. v. Smithgreen2 sentences1996Anthony Medical Center, Inc. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992), trans. denied ). 1996Anthony Medical Center, Inc. v. Smith, 592 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied). | 1 | 2 |
Basinger v. Sullivangreen2 sentences1995See Basinger, 540 N.E.2d at 93 ; Schneider, 521 N.E.2d at 1343 . 1990Id. | 1 | 2 |
Shuamber v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2025In Keim v. Potter, for example, the Court of Appeals held that a patient mistakenly diagnosed with a “life-altering and deadly disease” could maintain a malpractice claim for emotional damages under the modified-impact rule—a rule that requires the plaintiff to sustain a direct impact by the tortfeasor without the need to show physical injury. 783 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991)).7 In another case, Spangler v. Bechtel, the parents of a stillborn child brought a medical-malpractice claim for emotional distress against a hospita | 1 | 1 |
Keim v. Pottergreen1 sentence2025In Keim v. Potter, for example, the Court of Appeals held that a patient mistakenly diagnosed with a “life-altering and deadly disease” could maintain a malpractice claim for emotional damages under the modified-impact rule—a rule that requires the plaintiff to sustain a direct impact by the tortfeasor without the need to show physical injury. 783 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991)).7 In another case, Spangler v. Bechtel, the parents of a stillborn child brought a medical-malpractice claim for emotional distress against a hospita | 1 | 1 |
G.F. v. St. Catherine Hospital, Inc., Vatsal K. Patel, D.O., and Indiana Patient's Compensation Fundgreen1 sentence2025Catherine Hosp., Inc., 124 N.E.3d 76, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. [18] The elements of a medical malpractice claim are “‘(1) that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Siner v. Kindred Hosp. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Haggerty and Cathy Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, Anonymous Party 2, and Anonymous Party 3green2 sentences2024See Haggerty v. Anonymous Party 1, 998 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that immunity is an affirmative defense to a medical malpractice claim). [10] Thus, our analysis proceeds by determining whether Defendants can establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that they are immune from civil Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1632 | May 9, 2024 Page 5 of 15 liability as a matter of law. 2024Id. at 294-95 . | 1 | 1 |
Cindy and Ron Glon v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. and/or its Employees and agentsgreen1 sentence2023Glon v. Mem’l Hosp. of S. Bend, Inc., 111 N.E.3d 232, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Anonymous Doctor a v. Sherrardgreen1 sentence2023See also Anonymous Dr. A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296 , Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-992 | November 28, 2023 Page 7 of 9 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion arguing the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice action had expired was not a final appealable judgment despite the trial court’s use of the magic language in Trial Rule 54(B) and dismissing the appeal), reh’g denied. [10] Here, the only substantive claim is the Estate’s medical malpractice claim. | 1 | 1 |
Anonymous Hospital, Inc. v. Jane Doe, Indiana Dept. of Insurancegreen1 sentence2023See Anonymous Hosp., 996 N.E.2d at 331-336 (observing the plaintiff was admitted to a hospital’s psychiatric ward for in-patient psychiatric care, at some point she was placed on monitoring where staff were to check on her every fifteen minutes, and she engaged in sexual activity with another patient; noting the plaintiff’s “participation in sexual acts . . . was not accomplished by force or threat of force,” “the gravamen of [her] complaint is that she was rendered incompetent to make an informed decision regarding sexual conduct because of psychotropic Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Dahlin v. Amoco Oil Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| John Green v. Stephen Robertson, Commissioner, Indiana Department of Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Francisco Perez, Jr., Individually, and by Laura Aguirre his natural guardian and next friend, and Laura Aguirre, Individually v. Michael Hu, M.D. St. Catherine Hospital of East Chicago Indiana, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Oelling v. Raogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spar v. Chagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bader v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jamie Thomson v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center and Michael Borkowski, M.D.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cacdac v. Hilandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Overton v. Grillogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Herron v. Anigbogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cram v. Howellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Martinez v. Parkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cutter v. Herbstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Van Sice v. Sentanygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cahoon v. Cummingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Haileygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eiss v. Lillisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Randolph v. Methodist Hospitals, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jacobs v. Manhartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vesolowski Ex Rel. Vesolowski v. Repay
green
2 sentences2009Id. 2009Id. | 3 | 2004–2009 |
Kathy L. Siner, Personal Representative of the Estate of Geraldine A. Siner v. Kindred Hospital Limited Partnership, d/b/a Kindred Hospital of Indianapolis
green
2 sentences2024The elements of a medical-malpractice claim are “‘(1) that the physician owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the physician breached that duty; and (3) that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.’” Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187 (quoting Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384, 1386 (Ind. 1995)). 2019Id. | 2 | 2019–2024 |
Smith v. Johnston
green
2 sentences2014In Smith , plaintiff Johnston filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Smith with the Indiana Department of Insurance in which Dr. Smith was represented by the law firm Locke Reynolds Boyd & Weissell (“Locke Reynolds”). 711 N.E.2d at 1261 . 2014In Smith, plaintiff Johnston filed a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Smith with the Indiana Department of Insurance in which Dr. Smith was represented by the law firm Locke Reynolds Boyd & Weissell (“Locke Reynolds”). 711 N.E.2d at 1261 . | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Garneau v. Bush
green
2 sentences2012Garneau, 838 N.E.2d at 1141 . 2012Garn eau, 838 N.E.2d at 1141 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Collins v. Thakkar
green
2 sentences2010Like the patient in Lomax, whose claim was based on a slip and fall, and thus was not a medical malpractice claim that had to be sent to a medical review panel, and like the plaintiff in HD., whose claim was one of "ordinary negligence, unrelated to the provision of medical care or treatment," id., Gordon's claim was premised on the tort of spoliation of evidence, and was unrelated to "the promotion of a patient's health or the provider's exercise of professional expertise, skill or judgment." Collins, 552 N.E.2d at 510 . 2009Collins, 552 N.E.2d at 510 . | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Ramon v. Glenroy Const. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1996Ramon, supra . *453 IND.CODE § 27-12-7-1 (1993) (formerly IND.CODE § 16-9.5-3-1) provides that a medical malpractice claim must be brought within two years after the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect. 1996Ramon, supra. Ind.Code § 27-12-7-1 (1993) (formerly Ind.Code § 16-9.5-3-1) provides that a medical malpractice claim must be brought within two years after the date of the alleged act, omission or neglect. | 2 | 1994–1996 |
Spangler v. Bechtel
green
2 sentences2025The defendant-hospital argued that, “because neither of the parents suffered physical injury,” their emotional-distress claim amounted only to “one derivative of an injury to a patient covered by the MMA.” Id. at 469 . 2025In Keim v. Potter, for example, the Court of Appeals held that a patient mistakenly diagnosed with a “life-altering and deadly disease” could maintain a malpractice claim for emotional damages under the modified-impact rule—a rule that requires the plaintiff to sustain a direct impact by the tortfeasor without the need to show physical injury. 783 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ind. 1991)).7 In another case, Spangler v. Bechtel, the parents of a stillborn child brought a medical-malpractice claim for emotional distress against a hospita | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Anonymous Hospital v. A.K.
green
1 sentence2023We reasoned that, “the examination, testing and diagnosis of the child are inextricably linked with the making of the report because without the examination, testing and diagnosis, there would be no report.” Id. at 708-09 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Morgan County Hospital v. Upham
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 278-79 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023But, here, we are presented with a different statute, which contains a medical malpractice exception and does not make the distinction clearly expressed in the Michigan statute. [52] The Hospital next relies upon Bryant-Bruce v. Vanderbilt University Inc., 974 F. Supp. 1127 (M.D. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Collins v. McKinney green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Doe Ex Rel Roe v. Madison Center Hospital green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Shenefield v. Barrette green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Antonio Hughley v. State of Indiana, The Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Miller Ex Rel. Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| McGill v. Ling green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Eads v. Community Hospital green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| H.D. v. BHC Meadows Hospital, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Rodgers v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Decatur green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Burke v. Capello green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Seaton v. United States Rubber Co. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Cavens v. Zaberdac green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Collins v. Day green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Faulk v. Northwest Radiologists, P.C. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| DeMoss v. Hamilton green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Aldrich v. Coda green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Wong v. Tabor green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Schneider v. Wilson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Knoblett v. Kinman green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Nichols v. Indiana State Highway Department green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Toth v. Lenk green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Carmichael v. Silbert green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Nahmias v. Trustees of Indiana University green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.