46 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barner v. Gormangreen2 sentences2015This Court has held that in a medical-malpractice claim, “expert testimony must be used.” Posey v. Burrow, 93 So.3d 905, 907 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Burner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1992)). 2015This Court has held that in a medical-malpractice claim, .“expert testimony must be used.” Posey v. Burrow, 93 So.3d 905, 907 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1992)). | 8 | 8 |
Posey v. Burrowgreen2 sentences2017This Court has held that in a medical-malpractice claim, “expert testimony must be used.” Posey v. Burrow, 93 So.3d 905, 907 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2015This Court has held that in a medical-malpractice claim, “expert testimony must be used.” Posey v. Burrow, 93 So.3d 905, 907 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Burner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1992)). | 3 | 3 |
Estate of Northrop v. Huttogreen2 sentences2011Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (Miss.2009) (citing Earner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 808-09 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 42. 2011Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 753 (¶ 41) (Miss.2011) (quoting Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (¶ 9) (Miss.2009)). | 3 | 3 |
Hubbard v. Wansleygreen2 sentences2020The language of Murphy’s complaint also refers to Dr. Margaitis’s actions as “medical care.” In its order granting the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the circuit court outlines the general rule applicable to medical-malpractice suits and cites to medical-malpractice caselaw, such as the familiar case Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So. 2d 951 (Miss. 2007). 2015A medical-malpractice claim requires that the plaintiffs prove there was “a duty by the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; a failure to conform to the required standard; and an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach of such duty by the defendant.” Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956-57 (¶ 12) (Miss.2007). | 2 | 3 |
Johnson v. Pacegreen2 sentences2018Id. at 70 (¶ 12). ¶ 13. 2014“A plaintiff in a medical-malpractice case has the burden of proving ‘(1) the existence of a duty by the defendant to conform to a specific standard of conduct for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of injury; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the breach of such duty by the defendant.’ ” Johnson v. Pace, 122 So.3d 66, 68 (¶ 8) (Miss.2013) (quoting Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956-957 (¶ 12) (Miss.2007)). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. MEA, Inc.green2 sentences2016Also well established is our precedent that in a medical-malpractice claim, the plaintiff cannot survive a motion for summary judgment “without medical-expert testimony.” Jones v. MEA Inc., 160 So. 3d 241, 246 (¶19) (Miss. 2016Also well established is our precedent that in a medical-malpractice claim, the plaintiff cannot survive a motion for summary judgment “without medical-expert testimony.” Jones v. MEA, Inc., 160 So.3d 241, 246 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2015) (citations. omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Cleveland v. Hamilgreen2 sentences2015E.g., Cleveland v. Hamil, 119 So.3d 1020, 1023 (¶ 11) (Miss.2013); Univ. of Miss. 2014E.g., Cleveland v. Hamil, 119 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (¶11) (Miss. 2013); Univ. of Miss. | 2 | 2 |
Bowie v. Montfort Jones Memorial Hosp.green2 sentences2006In Bowie v. Montfort Jones Memorial Hospital, 861 So.2d 1037, 1043 (Miss.2003), the plaintiffs failed to designate *592 an expert for a medical malpractice claim. 2005In Bowie v. Monfort Jones Memorial Hospital, 861 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (Miss. 2003), the plaintiffs failed to designate an expert for a medical malpractice claim. | 2 | 2 |
Powell v. METHODIST HEALTH CAREgreen2 sentences2005This Court has stated that "where the matter at issue is not within the scope of a layperson's common knowledge negligence can be proven in a medical malpractice action only where the plaintiff presents medical testimony establishing that the defendant physician failed to use ordinary skill and care." Powell v. Methodist Health Care-Jackson Hosps., 876 So.2d 347, 348 (Miss. 2004) (emphasis added & citations omitted). 2004This Court has stated that “where the matter at issue is not within the scope of a layperson’s common knowledge negligence can be proven in a medical malpractice action only where the plaintiff presents medical testimony establishing that the defendant physician failed to use ordinary skill and care.” Powell v. Methodist Health Care-Jackson Hosps., 876 So. 2d 347, 348 (Miss. 2004) (emphasis added & citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Johnson v. Graceland Care Center of Oxford, LLCgreen2 sentences2018In Truddle, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the plaintiff’s failure to “plead[] . . . [or] create a genuine issue of material fact as to any wrongful act committed by the defendant that caused [the decedent] to commit suicide.” Id. at 695 (¶8). 2010The supreme court considered: whether a trial court may properly grant a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as to the statute of limitations on a medical-malpractice claim when the complaint alleges the victim was of unsound mind, and did *222 not regain soundness of mind prior to death; and whether all torts alleged against a nursing home which arise from the care of its patients are subsumed in the medical-malpractice cause of action.” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Khambraya Stanley v. Scott Petroleum Corporationgreen1 sentence2026However, when the plaintiff has made a timely motion, denial of the motion can be an abuse of discretion, particularly when the “request for a continuance [is] reasonable and consistent with Rule 56(f)’s purpose of preventing a premature grant of summary judgment[.]” Stanley v. Scott Petroleum Corp., 184 So. 3d 940, 943 (¶7) (Miss. 2016) (reversing a denial of a motion for a continuance as an abuse of discretion). ¶50. | 1 | 1 |
McGee v. River Region Medical Centergreen1 sentence2024Id. at 577 (¶4). | 1 | 1 |
Dianne Truddle v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc.green1 sentence2017In Truddle , the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the plaintiff's failure to "plead[ ] ... [or] create a genuine issue of material fact as to any wrongful act committed by the defendant that caused [the decedent] to commit suicide." Id. at 695 (¶ 8). | 1 | 1 |
Potter v. Hoppergreen1 sentence2016We have held that a medical malpractice claim “must fail” in the absence of “expert medical testimony that articulates the duty of care a physician owes to a particular patient under the circumstances and identifies the particular point that the physician breached that duty and caused injury to the plaintiff.” Potter v. Hopper, 907 So.2d 376, 380 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corp. of Houston, Inc.green1 sentence2015Id. at 1076 (¶¶ 22-23). ¶ 13. | 1 | 1 |
Scales v. Lackey Memorial Hosp.green1 sentence2014By filing a medical-malpractice claim, Davis knew “from the very moment the suit [was] filed that an expert witness [would] be needed to survive summary judgment.” Scales, 988 So.2d at 436 (¶ 23) (quoting Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So.2d 229, 232 (¶ 10) (Miss.2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2014By filing a medical-malpractice claim, Davis knew “from the very moment the suit [was] filed that an expert witness [would] be needed to survive summary judgment.” Scales, 988 So.2d at 436 (¶ 23) (quoting Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So.2d 229, 232 (¶ 10) (Miss.2004)). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. UNIVERSITY HOSPITALSgreen1 sentence2012Hospitals & Clinics-Holmes Cnty., 942 So.2d 301, 303 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (The plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence the required elements of a medical-malpractice claim.). . | 1 | 1 |
ST. MARY MEDICAL CENTER v. Bakewellgreen1 sentence2011Ctr. v. Bakewell, 938 N.E.2d 820, 822 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (finding plaintiffs claim that her injury was caused by the hospital’s negligent maintenance of its shower could proceed as an ordinary premises-liability claim, although originally brought as a medical-malpractice claim). ¶ 40. | 1 | 1 |
Patterson Ex Rel. Estate of Coleman v. Tibbsgreen1 sentence2011Patterson v. Tibbs, 60 So.3d 742, 753 (¶ 41) (Miss.2011) (quoting Estate of Northrop v. Hutto, 9 So.3d 381, 384 (¶ 9) (Miss.2009)). | 1 | 1 |
| Pitalo v. GPCH-GP, INC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beaman v. Heltonred | 1 | 1 |
| Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. Systemgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bickham v. Grantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCarty v. Mladineogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-DESOTO
green
2 sentences2009This Court determined that subsection was clear and, therefore, "[r]egardless of Goldstrike's joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred." Adams, 965 So.2d at 656 . [6] Other than joining the rebuttal brief filed by AFLAC. 2009This Court determined that subsection was clear and, therefore, "[r]e-gardless of Goldstrike's joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred.” Adams, 965 So.2d at 656 . . | 2 | 2007–2009 |
Day v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2003Id. at 809-11 . 1997Id. at 809-11 . | 2 | 1997–2003 |
State Ex Rel. Wilfong v. SCHAEPER-KOETTER
green
2 sentences2000Wilfong, 933 S.W.2d at 409-10 . ¶ 19. 1998Wilfong, 933 S.W.2d at 409-10 . ¶19. | 2 | 1998–2000 |
Christopher Pollan v. Andrew Wartak
green
1 sentence2024In WCU’s words, “[i]t was not clear from the outset of the litigation whether the medical malpractice or general negligence statute of limitations applied.” In support of its argument, WCU relies on Pollan v. Wartak, 240 So. 3d 1185 (Miss. 2017), which held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding the defendants had not waived their statute of limitations defense because the defendants needed to conduct discovery to develop that defense. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Nielsen v. Barnett
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kelley v. Frederic
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Premier Medical Group of Mississippi, LLC v. Janice Phelps
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 843 .The parties exchanged discovery. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Read v. Southern Pine Elec. Power Ass'n
green
2 sentences2018Citing Read , supra , which did not involve a medical-malpractice claim, Coleman provided the doctrine's elements and said that, when they are met, "a rebuttable presumption of negligence is raised." Id. 2018Citing Read , supra , which did not involve a medical-malpractice claim, Coleman provided the doctrine's elements and said that, when they are met, "a rebuttable presumption of negligence is raised." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jeff Cahn v. Copac, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 348 . 2018Id. at 348 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nelson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence2010The circuit court also “found the statute of limitations had expired for the following reasons: (1) failure to give written notice sixty days before filing a medical malpractice claim, (2) failure to include an attorney certificate with the claim, and (3) ineffective service of process.” Id. at (¶ 5). ¶ 7. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Kilgore v. Barnes green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.