medical malpractice claim in Washington

2006Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 96 Wn.2d 85 , 633 P.2d 1329 (1981) (applying the discovery rule in an action involving illegal discharge of pollutants); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660 , 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice claim), superseded by statute, RCW 4.16.360, as recognized in Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn.

2006The Court of Appeals said that Taylor was decided five years before the discovery rule was adopted in Ruth, 75 Wn.2d 660 (a medical malpractice claim arising out of a sponge left in the plaintiff’s body after surgery), and Ruth explicitly overruled Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn.2d 675 , 277 P.2d 724 (1954), on which the court relied in Taylor .

2025Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 86-87, 419 P.3d 819 (2018); former RCW 7.70.040.

2025Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 86-87, 419 P.3d 819 (2018); former RCW 7.70.040.

2016Id. at 429-30 .

2016Id. at 429-30 .

2025Young, 112 Wn.2d at 228 .

2025Young, 112 Wn.2d at 228 .

2014Estate ofDormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC, 177 Wn.

2014Estate of Dormaier v. Columbia Basin Anesthesia, PLLC, 177 Wn.

2006The Court of Appeals said that Taylor was decided five years before the discovery rule was adopted in Ruth, 75 Wn.2d 660 (a medical malpractice claim arising out of a sponge left in the plaintiff’s body after surgery), and Ruth explicitly overruled Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn.2d 675 , 277 P.2d 724 (1954), on which the court relied in Taylor .

2006The Court of Appeals said that Taylor was decided five years before the discovery rule was adopted in Ruth, 75 Wn.2d 660 (a medical malpractice claim arising out of a sponge left in the plaintiff’s body after surgery), and Ruth explicitly overruled Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn.2d 675 , 277 P.2d 724 (1954), on which the court relied in Taylor .

2006Co. v. Dep't of Ecology, 96 Wash.2d 85 , 633 P.2d 1329 (1981) (applying the discovery rule in an action involving illegal discharge of pollutants); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660 , 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice claim) superseded by statute, RCW 4.16.360, as recognized in Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wash.App. 560, 563 , 610 P.2d 925 (1980). ¶ 80 The majority's decision to impose the discovery rule into the contractual setting extends tort principles beyond their rightful boundaries.

2006Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 96 Wn.2d 85 , 633 P.2d 1329 (1981) (applying the discovery rule in an action involving illegal discharge of pollutants); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660 , 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice claim), superseded by statute, RCW 4.16.360, as recognized in Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn.

2006Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 96 Wn.2d 85 , 633 P.2d 1329 (1981) (applying the discovery rule in an action involving illegal discharge of pollutants); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660 , 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice claim), superseded by statute, RCW 4.16.360, as recognized in Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn.

2006Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 96 Wn.2d 85 , 633 P.2d 1329 (1981) (applying the discovery rule in an action involving illegal discharge of pollutants); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wn.2d 660 , 453 P.2d 631 (1969) (applying the discovery rule in a medical malpractice claim), superseded by statute, RCW 4.16.360, as recognized in Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wn.

1973Our Supreme Court, in Swanson v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Co., 190 Wash. 35 , 66 P.2d 842 (1937), rejected an opportunity to settle the issue of whether or not an unliquidated claim sounding in tort may be levied upon and sold under execution.

1973Our Supreme Court, in Swanson v. Olympic Peninsula Motor Coach Co., 190 Wash. 35 , 66 P.2d 842 (1937), rejected an opportunity to settle the issue of whether or not an unliquidated claim sounding in tort may be levied upon and sold under execution.

2025The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim Under CR 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment is required to file and serve opposing affidavits “not later than 11 calendar days before the hearing.” In addition, “CR 56(e) requires that evidence offered in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment be in the form of sworn affidavits or declarations made under penalty of perjury.” Young Soo Kim, 174 Wn.

2025App. 72, 84 , 180 P.3d 874 (2008); RAP 10.3(a)(4)-(6).

2025CLAIM AGAINST YAGER As an initial matter, while Millett appeals from the order that dismissed the medical malpractice claim against both OMC and Yager, Millet only argues that the claim against OMC was dismissed erroneously, writing little about service on Yager.1 “We do not address issues that a party neither raises appropriately nor discusses meaningfully with citations to authority.” Saviano v. Westport Amusements, Inc., 144 Wn.

2023Cortez-Kloehn v. Morrison, 162 Wn.

2022App. 73, 86 , 361 P.3d 245 (2015). 26 Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 102 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001). 27 Id. 28 Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 86, 419 P.3d 819 (2018). 29 Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn.

2022We review an order granting summary judgment de novo.26 Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 27 A genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable person to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.28 First, in a medical malpractice claim based on medical negligence, a “defendant moving for summary judgment can meet its initial burden by showing that the plaintiff lacks competent expert testimony.”29 “The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produc

2022App. 73, 86 , 361 P.3d 245 (2015). 26 Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 102 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001). 27 Id. 28 Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 86, 419 P.3d 819 (2018). 29 Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn.

2022App. 73, 86 , 361 P.3d 245 (2015). 26 Berger v. Sonneland, 144 Wn.2d 91, 102 , 26 P.3d 257 (2001). 27 Id. 28 Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79 , 86, 419 P.3d 819 (2018). 29 Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70 Wn.

2019In Paetsch, the Supreme Court noted that at common law, a plaintiff could not assert a medical malpractice claim absent a physician-patient relationship. 182 Wn.2d at 850 .

2019Khung Thi Lam, 127 Wn. App. at 669 .

2016Co., 141 Wn.2d 55, 68 , 1 P.3d 1167 (2000). *898 ¶43 In a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show that the health care provider violated the relevant standard of care.

2016Co., 141 Wn.2d 55, 68 , 1 P.3d 1167 (2000). *898 ¶43 In a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show that the health care provider violated the relevant standard of care.

2013John Hosp., 241 Mich. App. 64, 76 , 614 N.W.2d 666 (2000) (concluding the plaintiff was not required to plead the lost chance doctrine because it was not a separate theory of recovery from the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim alleging wrongful death). ¶45 Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded respondents did not have to plead a lost chance of survival as a separate cause of action because it was part of their wrongful death claim based on medical negligence. 11 In sum, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on a medical patient’s lost chance of survival.

2013John Hosp., 241 Mich. App. 64, 76 , 614 N.W.2d 666 (2000) (concluding the plaintiff was not required to plead the lost chance doctrine because it was not a separate theory of recovery from the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim alleging wrongful death). ¶45 Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded respondents did not have to plead a lost chance of survival as a separate cause of action because it was part of their wrongful death claim based on medical negligence. 11 In sum, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on a medical patient’s lost chance of survival.

2011In Shellenbarger, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment of a medical malpractice claim of negligent failure to diagnose and treat lung disease from asbestos exposure in its early stages. 101 Wn.

2011In Shellenbarger, the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment of a medical malpractice claim of negligent *495 failure to diagnose and treat lung disease from asbestos exposure in its early stages. 101 Wash.App. at 342 , 3 P.3d 211 .

2006Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 ; Cunningham, 126 Wash.App. at 230 , 108 P.3d 147 (following the analysis of Hamilton ). ¶ 8 Kendall argues that the superior court correctly applied judicial estoppel to the medical malpractice claim against him and correctly declined to rule on the motion to substitute the trustee as the real party in interest.

2006Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 ; Cunningham, 126 Wash.App. at 230 , 108 P.3d 147 (following the analysis of Hamilton ). ¶ 8 Kendall argues that the superior court correctly applied judicial estoppel to the medical malpractice claim against him and correctly declined to rule on the motion to substitute the trustee as the real party in interest.

2006Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 784 ; Cunningham, 126 Wash.App. at 230 , 108 P.3d 147 (following the analysis of Hamilton ). ¶ 8 Kendall argues that the superior court correctly applied judicial estoppel to the medical malpractice claim against him and correctly declined to rule on the motion to substitute the trustee as the real party in interest.

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1988Herberg v. Swartz, 89 Wn.2d 916 , 578 P.2d 17 (1978). 3 The cases relied upon by it are distinguishable because either the defendant did not initiate the contact, Lewis v. Curry College, 89 Wn.2d 565 , 573 P.2d 1312 (1978) , or there was no contact other than the injury occurring in Washington. *698 See Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wn.2d 875 , 425 P.2d 647 (1967) (where Oregon residents sued an Oregon car dealer for injuries sustained in Washington); Hogan v. Johnson, supra (a medical malpractice claim arose from services performed in California and the plaintiff-patient moved to Washin

1985Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn.2d 609 , 664 P.2d 474 (1983).

1985Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wn.2d 609 , 664 P.2d 474 (1983).

1983In 1974, we broke with the traditional medical malpractice rule in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn.2d 514 , 519 P.2d 981 , 67 A.L.R.3d 175 (1974).

1983In 1974, we broke with the traditional medical malpractice rule in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn.2d 514 , 519 P.2d 981 , 67 A.L.R.3d 175 (1974).

1980Hosp., 92 Wn.2d 507 , 598 P.2d 1358 (1979), in which the court construed a statute that limited the time for bringing a medical malpractice claim against a physician to within "one year of the time the patient . . . discovered . . . that the injury or condition was caused by said act ..." RCW 4.16.350(3).

1980Hosp., 92 Wn.2d 507 , 598 P.2d 1358 (1979), in which the court construed a statute that limited the time for bringing a medical malpractice claim against a physician to within "one year of the time the patient . . . discovered . . . that the injury or condition was caused by said act ..." RCW 4.16.350(3).