medical malpractice claim in New York

2020To succeed on a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must ultimately show that the defendant had "deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury" ( James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d 540, 545 [2013]; accord Majid v Cheon-Lee , 147 AD3d 66, 69 [2016]; Frank v Smith , 127 AD3d 1301, 1302 [2015]).

2018"Ordinarily, a plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim must demonstrate that the doctor deviated from acceptable medical practice, and that such deviation was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury" ( James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d 540, 545 [2013]).

2025Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 537 [2006]).

2024A municipality acquires "actual knowledge" when it learns of the essential facts forming the basis of the claim, not merely the occurrence of an incident or an arrest ( see Williams v. Nassau County Medical Center , 6 NY3d 531 [2006][possession of hospital records did not confer actual knowledge of the facts constituting a medical malpractice claim]).

2021Plaintiff does not meaningfully dispute that, to the extent her claim is based on first responders' alleged improper treatment of the decedent, such treatment involves specialized medical knowledge and bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment, and therefore a medical malpractice framework should be applied ( see generally Weiner v Lenox Hill Hosp. , 88 NY2d 784, 787-788 [1996]; Rabinovich v Maimonides Med.

2021Plaintiff does not meaningfully dispute that, to the extent her claim is based on first responders' alleged improper treatment of the decedent, such treatment involves specialized medical knowledge and bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment, and therefore a medical malpractice framework should be applied ( see generally Weiner v Lenox Hill Hosp. , 88 NY2d 784, 787-788 [1996]; Rabinovich v Maimonides Med.

2022"The statute is tolled until after a plaintiff's last treatment, however, 'when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint'" ( Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d at 519, quoting McDermott v Torre , 56 NY2d 399, 405 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "'Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment fro

1995The Statute of Limitations on a medical malpractice claim is tolled when "there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the * * * act, omission or failure [complained of].” (CPLR 214-a.) The policy underlying the doctrine "seeks to maintain the physician-patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be maintained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure” (McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 408 ; see, Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151 ).

2025As Defendants correctly argue in their opposition, the continuous doctrine requires a three-pronged showing that "(1) the patient 'continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period'; (2) the course of treatment was 'for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim'; and (3) the treatment is 'continuous'" ( Hillary v Gerstein, 178 AD3d 674, 678 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 111-112 [2d Dept 2009]).

2025As Defendants correctly argue in their opposition, the continuous doctrine requires a three-pronged showing that "(1) the patient 'continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period'; (2) the course of treatment was 'for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim'; and (3) the treatment is 'continuous'" ( Hillary v Gerstein, 178 AD3d 674 , 678 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Gomez v Katz, 61 AD3d 108, 111-112 [2d Dept 2009]).

2024In fact, in a case directly involving treatment of a sacral pressure ulcer which progressed from Stage III to Stage IV, the Second Department held that a registered nurse "was not a medical doctor and lacked the qualifications to render a medical opinion as to the relevant standard of care, and whether the defendants deviated from such standard" ( Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1001 [2d Dept 2016]), citing Elliot v Long Is.

2024In fact, in a case directly involving treatment of a sacral pressure ulcer which progressed from Stage III to Stage IV, the Second Department held that a registered nurse "was not a medical doctor and lacked the qualifications to render a medical opinion as to the relevant standard of care, and whether the defendants deviated from such standard" ( Novick v South Nassau Communities Hosp., 136 AD3d 999, 1001 [2d Dept 2016]), citing Elliot v Long Is.

2024Further, plaintiff does not allege injury resulting from fraud separate and distinct from the injury alleged in the medical malpractice claim ( see Atton v Bier , 12 AD3d 240, 241 [1st Dept 2004]).

2015In this action for, among other things, fraud, plaintiff Vincent Cracolici alleges that defendants knowingly and fraudulently concealed the existence of medical malpractice committed by Dr. Simon Barkagan, in the performance of urological surgery in August 1995, and that, as a result, he failed to commence a medical malpractice claim within the statutory time period. *415 Plaintiffs complaint was properly dismissed since he fails to allege the existence of any material misrepresentation on which he justifiably relied, and resulting damages that are separate and distinct from those caused by th

2019Generally, a medical malpractice claim accrues on the date of the alleged malpractice, but the statute of limitations is tolled "until the end of the course of continuous treatment" ( Kelly v State of New York , 110 AD2d 1062, 1062 [4th Dept 1985]; see generally CPLR 214-a; Borgia v City of New York , 12 NY2d 151, 155 [1962]).

1995The Statute of Limitations on a medical malpractice claim is tolled when "there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the * * * act, omission or failure [complained of].” (CPLR 214-a.) The policy underlying the doctrine "seeks to maintain the physician-patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be maintained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure” (McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 408 ; see, Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151 ).

2015Since the statute of limitations governing a medical malpractice claim is 2V2 years, the services provided in 2006 fall beyond the limitations period unless, as plaintiff contends, there was a continuous course of treatment provided by Clift (see CPLR 214-a; Nykorchuck v *1282 Henriques, 78 NY2d 255, 258 [1991]).

2003A medical malpractice claim generally accrues on the date of the alleged wrongful act or omission, and is governed by the 21/2-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214-a; Nykorchuck v Henriques, 78 NY2d 255 [1991]).

2014“To establish proximate cause, a ‘plaintiff must generally show that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury’ ” (Pomeroy v Buccina, 289 AD2d 944, 945 [2001], quoting Derdiarian v Felix Contr.

2014“To establish proximate cause, a ‘plaintiff must generally show that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury’ ” (Pomeroy v Buccina, 289 AD2d 944, 945 [2001], quoting Derdiarian v Felix Contr.

2026A defendant must "present factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut <span>[*2]</span>the claim of malpractice" (<i>Marshall v Rosenberg</i>, 196 AD3d 817, 818 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; <i>see Cole v Champlain Val.

2025"A movant seeking dismissal of a medical malpractice claim bears the initial burden of presenting factual proof, generally consisting of affidavits, deposition testimony and medical records, to rebut the claim of malpractice by establishing that they complied with the accepted standard of care or did not cause any injury to the patient" ( Naylor v Ellis Hosp. , 235 AD3d 1130 , 1131 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Marshall v Rosenberg , 196 AD3d 817, 818 [3d Dept 2021]).

2026"Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period; (2) the course of treatment was for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim; and (3) the treatment is continuous" ( Proano v Gutman , 211 AD3d 978, 981-982 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hall v Bolognese , 210 AD3d 958, 962).

2026"Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period; (2) the course of treatment was for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim; and (3) the treatment is continuous" ( Proano v Gutman , 211 AD3d 978, 981-982 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hall v Bolognese , 210 AD3d 958, 962 ).

2024A medical malpractice claim "accrues on the date when the alleged original negligent act or omission occurred" ( Ortiz v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 187 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Young v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 NY2d 291, 295 [1998]).

2024A medical malpractice claim "accrues on the date when the alleged original negligent act or omission occurred" ( Ortiz v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 187 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Young v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 NY2d 291, 295 [1998]).

2024A medical malpractice claim "accrues on the date when the alleged original negligent act or omission occurred" ( Ortiz v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 187 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Young v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 NY2d 291, 295 [1998]).

2024A medical malpractice claim "accrues on the date when the alleged original negligent act or omission occurred" ( Ortiz v New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation, 187 AD3d 929, 930 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Young v New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 91 NY2d 291, 295 [1998]).

2023The type of ambulance provided by defendant "bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment," and thus plaintiffs' claims must be viewed within a medical malpractice framework ( Scott v Uljanov , 74 NY2d 673, 675 [1989]; see Xenias v Mount Sinai Health Sys.

2023The type of ambulance provided by defendant "bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment," and thus plaintiffs' claims must be viewed within a medical malpractice framework ( Scott v Uljanov , 74 NY2d 673, 675 [1989]; see Xenias v Mount Sinai Health Sys.

2021The trial court properly found that the evidence so preponderated in favor of plaintiff that the verdict in favor of Dr. Radna, that the particular surgical procedure employed by him on the spine of Lassina Diarra was not a deviation from good and acceptable medical care, could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence (CPLR 4404[a]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; McDermott v Coffee Beanery, Ltd. , 9 AD3d 195, 206 [1st Dept 2004]).

2021The trial court properly found that the evidence so preponderated in favor of plaintiff that the verdict in favor of Dr. Radna, that the particular surgical procedure employed by him on the spine of Lassina Diarra was not a deviation from good and acceptable medical care, could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence (CPLR 4404[a]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; McDermott v Coffee Beanery, Ltd. , 9 AD3d 195, 206 [1st Dept 2004]).

2021The trial court properly found that the evidence so preponderated in favor of plaintiff that the verdict in favor of Dr. Radna, that the particular surgical procedure employed by him on the spine of Lassina Diarra was not a deviation from good and acceptable medical care, could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence (CPLR 4404[a]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; McDermott v Coffee Beanery, Ltd. , 9 AD3d 195, 206 [1st Dept 2004]).

2021The trial court properly found that the evidence so preponderated in favor of plaintiff that the verdict in favor of Dr. Radna, that the particular surgical procedure employed by him on the spine of Lassina Diarra was not a deviation from good and acceptable medical care, could not have been reached by any fair interpretation of the evidence (CPLR 4404[a]; see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets , 86 NY2d 744 [1995]; McDermott v Coffee Beanery, Ltd. , 9 AD3d 195, 206 [1st Dept 2004]).

2020Accordingly, the medical malpractice claim should be reinstated ( see Foster-Sturrup v Long , 95 AD3d 726, 728-729 [1st Dept 2012].

2017Further, defendants argued, the assertion that they should have performed a cerebral angiography before plaintiff’s hemorrhage did not support the medical malpractice claim, because the bleed had already occurred and any subsequent testing would not have changed the course of plaintiff’s health (see Foster-Sturrup v Long, 95 AD3d 726, 727-728 [1st Dept 2012]).

2019Instead, plaintiffs contend that the expert witness affidavit that they submitted in opposition to defendants' motion raised a question of fact as to whether Pedersen departed from the standard of care by improperly placing certain hardware through Yerich's L3-L4 facet joints. [FN1] To rebut defendants' prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim, plaintiffs had to come forward with proof that could establish a deviation from accepted medical practice and that such alleged deviation was the proximate cause of Yerich's injuries, so as to demon

2019Upon review, we conclude that the burden that O'Shea places on a plaintiff opposing a summary judgment motion with respect to a medical malpractice claim is inconsistent with the law applicable to summary judgment motions in general ( see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , [*2] 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Mills v Niagara Frontier Transp.

2018A medical malpractice claim generally accrues on the date of the alleged wrongful act, omission or failure and is governed by a 2½ year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214-a; Davis v City of New York , 38 NY2d 257, 259 [1975]).

1999Accordingly, it is held that the “foreign object” toll is not applicable to the claims of Chisolm as against codefendants, Guttman and Kessler. (2) The “Continuous Treatment” Toll of the Statute of Limitations “A medical malpractice claim generally accrues on the date of the alleged wrongful act or omission and is governed by a 2V2-year Statute of Limitations (Davis v City of New York, 38 NY2d 257, 259 ; CPLR 214-a).

2022"The statute is tolled until after a plaintiff's last treatment, however, 'when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint'" ( Massie v Crawford , 78 NY2d at 519, quoting McDermott v Torre , 56 NY2d 399, 405 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "'Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment fro

2000Once a defendant demonstrates that the Statute of Limitations on a medical malpractice claim has run, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that he or she received continuous treatment in order to avail himself or herself of the tolling pro vision of CPLR 214-a (see, Massie v Crawford, 78 NY2d 516, 519 ).

2026"Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period; (2) the course of treatment was for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim; and (3) the treatment is continuous" ( Proano v Gutman , 211 AD3d 978, 981-982 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hall v Bolognese , 210 AD3d 958, 962).

2026"Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment from the defendant physician during the relevant period; (2) the course of treatment was for the same conditions or complaints underlying the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim; and (3) the treatment is continuous" ( Proano v Gutman , 211 AD3d 978, 981-982 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Hall v Bolognese , 210 AD3d 958, 962 ).

2022"A medical malpractice action 'must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure'" ( Wright v Southampton Hosp. , 187 AD3d 1242, 1244 , quoting CPLR 214-a). "'Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment fro

2022"A medical malpractice action 'must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure'" ( Wright v Southampton Hosp. , 187 AD3d 1242, 1244 , quoting CPLR 214-a). "'Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the end of the course of treatment if three conditions are met: (1) the patient continued to seek, and in fact obtained, an actual course of treatment fro