medical malpractice claim in Georgia

2018See Goodman v. Satilla Health Svcs. , 290 Ga. App. 6 , 9, 658 S.E.2d 792 (2008) (applying tolling provision of OCGA § 9-3-92 to dispute as to whether the statute of limitation had run on an estate's medical malpractice claim).

2018See Goodman v. Satilla Health Svcs. , 290 Ga. App. 6 , 9, 658 S.E.2d 792 (2008) (applying tolling provision of OCGA § 9-3-92 to dispute as to whether the statute of limitation had run on an estate's medical malpractice claim).

2015A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 19 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 9 the injury she claims to have sustained during surgery—both in terms of how she singularly pleaded the claim20 and as a matter of fact.21 And as our Supreme Court has explained, “the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim . . . begins on the dat

2008(Footnote omitted.) Id. at 669 (1); see also Kaminer, 282 Ga. at 834 (1) (“the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim no longer commences upon the occurrence of a negligent act or omission on the part of the physician,” but “on the date of the patient’s injury”) (citation omitted). (b) Harris seeks to forestall this conclusion by arguing that her development of inner ear damage on June 18, 2002, amounted to a “new injury” such that the statute would begin to run only at the appearance of that new injury.

2024VI (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”). 9 Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 735 (2) (a); see Taylor v. Devereux Found., Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 59 (B) (III) ( 885 SE2d 671 ) (2023) (“[T]he claim that was restricted by the statute—a claim for non-economic damages in a tort case involving medical negligence—was within the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury in Nevertheless, the appellants maintain the $350,000 cap for noneconomic damages in OCGA § 51-13-1 survives in some form and applies here because Nestlehutt involved only a medical-malpractice clai

2024VI (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”). 9 Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 735 (2) (a); see Taylor v. Devereux Found., Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 59 (B) (III) ( 885 SE2d 671 ) (2023) (“[T]he claim that was restricted by the statute—a claim for non-economic damages in a tort case involving medical negligence—was within the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury in Nevertheless, the appellants maintain the $350,000 cap for noneconomic damages in OCGA § 51-13-1 survives in some form and applies here because Nestlehutt involved only a medical-malpractice clai

2014The alleged “negligent or wrongful act or omission” – Jones’s misdiagnosis due to his inaccurate interpretation of an ultrasound – occurred in June 2006, triggering at 4 Lyon v. Schramm, 291 Ga. App. 48, 49 ( 661 SE2d 178 ) (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted), aff’d, Schramm v. Lyon, 285 Ga. 72 ( 673 SE2d 241 ) (2009). 5 Also, the Johnsons have set forth no argument contesting the dismissal of Count Three, seeking punitive damages. 5 that time the medical malpractice statute of repose.6 Given that the Johnsons filed their complaint in 2012, the medical malpractice claim (as set out in C

2014The alleged “negligent or wrongful act or omission” – Jones’s misdiagnosis due to his inaccurate interpretation of an ultrasound – occurred in June 2006, triggering at 4 Lyon v. Schramm, 291 Ga. App. 48, 49 ( 661 SE2d 178 ) (2008) (citations and punctuation omitted), aff’d, Schramm v. Lyon, 285 Ga. 72 ( 673 SE2d 241 ) (2009). 5 Also, the Johnsons have set forth no argument contesting the dismissal of Count Three, seeking punitive damages. 5 that time the medical malpractice statute of repose.6 Given that the Johnsons filed their complaint in 2012, the medical malpractice claim (as set out in C

2015This Court found that any duty on the part of the physicians to provide such notice “arose in the context of a medical malpractice claim,” and, in fact, presented a classic medical malpractice claim.6 Id. at 288 (4) (a).

2015This Court found that any duty on the part of the physicians to provide such notice “arose in the context of a medical malpractice claim,” and, in fact, presented a classic medical malpractice claim. 6 Id. at 288 (4) (a).

2014See also Kennestone Hospital v. Hopson, [ 273 Ga. 145, 148 ( 538 SE2d 742 ) (2000)], where we observed that “the purpose of the privilege is to encourage the patient to talk freely without fear of disclosure and embarrassment, thus enabling the psychiatrist to render effective treatment of the patient’s emotional or mental disorders.” Since “the mental health of our citizenry . . . is a public good of transcendent importance,” the privilege serves the public interest “by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or 2 Compare, for exam

2014See also Kennestone Hospital v. Hopson, [ 273 Ga. 145, 148 ( 538 SE2d 742 ) (2000)], where we observed that “the purpose of the privilege is to encourage the patient to talk freely without fear of disclosure and embarrassment, thus enabling the psychiatrist to render effective treatment of the patient’s emotional or mental disorders.” Since “the mental health of our citizenry . . . is a public good of transcendent importance,” the privilege serves the public interest “by facilitating the provision of appropriate treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or 2 Compare, for exam

2012See Roberson v. Northrup, 302 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 691 SE2d 547 ) (2010).

2012See Roberson v. Northrup, 302 Ga. App. 405, 406 ( 691 SE2d 547 ) (2010).

2009Next, we look to the specific claims against each of the doctors. "[T]here are three essential elements [in a medical malpractice claim]: (1) the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; (2) the breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this failure be the proximate cause of the injury sustained." Hawkins v. Greenberg, 166 Ga. App. 574, 575 , 304 S.E.2d 922 (1983).

2009Next, we look to the specific claims against each of the doctors. "[T]here are three essential elements [in a medical malpractice claim]: (1) the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; (2) the breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this failure be the proximate cause of the injury sustained." Hawkins v. Greenberg, 166 Ga. App. 574, 575 , 304 S.E.2d 922 (1983).

2015See Lee , id. at 588 (III) (declining to apply the impact rule where a parent physically injured in an automobile collision sought to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of her child in the collision); Bruscato v. O’Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 457-458 (1) ( 705 SE2d 275 ) (2010) (declining to apply the impact rule to a medical malpractice claim).

2015See Lee , id. at 588 (III) (declining to apply the impact rule where a parent physically injured in an automobile collision sought to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of her child in the collision); Bruscato v. O’Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 457-458 (1) ( 705 SE2d 275 ) (2010) (declining to apply the impact rule to a medical malpractice claim).

2014The Johnsons contend that the trial court erred in striking Count Two, complaining that the trial court failed to broadly construe the allegations in their 6 Kaminer v. Canas, 282 Ga. 830, 834 (1) ( 653 SE2d 691 ) (2007) (holding that the statute of repose began running when plaintiff’s doctors first failed to diagnose and treat the medical condition); Lyon, 291 Ga. App. at 49 (noting that “the statute of repose begins to run when an act of negligence is committed”); Christian v. Atha, 267 Ga. App. 186, 187 ( 598 SE2d 895 ) (2004) (“Because the statute of repose is unrelated to the accrual of

1994Likewise, Wright, supra, held that the expiration of the medical malpractice statute of repose bars renewal of a claim under OCGA § 9-2-61.

1992This change in the statutory language was apparently intended to cure the constitutional deficiency noted in such cases as Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56 , supra, and Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 , supra. The question as to whether the 1985 amendment also altered the substance of the 1976 law as applied after the Shessel and Clark decisions appears to have been answered by our decision in Whitaker v. Zirkle, 188 Ga. App. 706, 707 (1) ( 374 SE2d 106 ) which, in reference to the 1976 statute, states that: “At the time [plaintiff] Zirkle’s cancer was diagnosed [in May or June 1985], Georgia law pe

1992This change in the statutory language was apparently intended to cure the constitutional deficiency noted in such cases as Shessel v. Stroup, 253 Ga. 56 , supra, and Clark v. Singer, 250 Ga. 470 , supra. The question as to whether the 1985 amendment also altered the substance of the 1976 law as applied after the Shessel and Clark decisions appears to have been answered by our decision in Whitaker v. Zirkle, 188 Ga. App. 706, 707 (1) ( 374 SE2d 106 ) which, in reference to the 1976 statute, states that: "At the time [plaintiff] Zirkle's cancer was diagnosed [in May or June 1985], Georgia law pe

2025In order to recover for a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; (2) the breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this failure be the 4 proximate cause of the injury sustained.” Zwiren v. Thompson, 276 Ga. 498, 499 ( 578 SE2d 862 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025In order to recover for a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship; (2) the breach of that duty by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care; and (3) that this failure be the 4 proximate cause of the injury sustained.” Zwiren v. Thompson, 276 Ga. 498, 499 ( 578 SE2d 862 ) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024Nail v. State, 301 Ga. App. 7 7, 8 ( 686 SE2d 483 ) (2009).

2024Nail v. State, 301 Ga. App. 7 7, 8 ( 686 SE2d 483 ) (2009).

2024VI (“The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind all other courts as precedents.”). 9 Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. at 735 (2) (a); see Taylor v. Devereux Found., Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 59 (B) (III) ( 885 SE2d 671 ) (2023) (“[T]he claim that was restricted by the statute—a claim for non-economic damages in a tort case involving medical negligence—was within the scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury in Nevertheless, the appellants maintain the $350,000 cap for noneconomic damages in OCGA § 51-13-1 survives in some form and applies here because Nestlehutt involved only a medical-malpractice clai

2022Hosp. of Emory Univ. v. Yerby, 258 Ga. 720, 721-722 (3) ( 373 SE2d 749 ) (1988) (reversing the trial court’s denial of a motion to disqualify counsel where the current medical malpractice claim was “of the same general subject matter” as the prior medical malpractice claims that the attorney defended on the hospital’s behalf and “[grew] out of an event that occurred during the time of such representation”).

2020Cf. Swint, 348 Ga. App. at 207 (2) (reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant doctor when the plaintiff’s expert testified that, in his professional opinion, there was a “high probability” that the defendant doctor’s breach of the standard of care caused the plaintiff’s injuries).

2020Further, the appellants challenge the trial court’s finding that their non-party fault defense fails for a medical-malpractice claim); Grantham v. Amin, 221 Ga. App. 458, 458-59 ( 471 SE2d 525 ) (1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant doctor when the plaintiff’s expert testified that the doctor’s alleged negligence “could have been a significant contributing cause” to the patient’s death); see also Edokpolor, 347 Ga. App. at 287 (1) (explaining that “[t]here can be no recovery where there is no showing to any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injuries could h

2020Further, the appellants challenge the trial court’s finding that their non-party fault defense fails for a medical-malpractice claim); Grantham v. Amin, 221 Ga. App. 458, 458-59 ( 471 SE2d 525 ) (1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant doctor when the plaintiff’s expert testified that the doctor’s alleged negligence “could have been a significant contributing cause” to the patient’s death); see also Edokpolor, 347 Ga. App. at 287 (1) (explaining that “[t]here can be no recovery where there is no showing to any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injuries could h

2020Further, the appellants challenge the trial court’s finding that their non-party fault defense fails for a medical-malpractice claim); Grantham v. Amin, 221 Ga. App. 458, 458-59 ( 471 SE2d 525 ) (1996) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant doctor when the plaintiff’s expert testified that the doctor’s alleged negligence “could have been a significant contributing cause” to the patient’s death); see also Edokpolor, 347 Ga. App. at 287 (1) (explaining that “[t]here can be no recovery where there is no showing to any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injuries could h

2016See, e.g., Nathans, supra, 282 Ga. at 809 (2) (requirement of filing proper medical expert affidavit with complaint in medical malpractice cases is a procedural one, which does not affect substantive right of action for medical malpractice).

2016See, e.g., Nathans, supra, 282 Ga. at 809 (2) (requirement of filing proper medical expert affidavit with complaint in medical malpractice cases is a procedural one, which does not affect substantive right of action for medical malpractice).

2016Auth. of City of Bainbridge, 278 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 629 SE2d 472 ) (2006) (noting the 13 requirement for an expert’s affidavit to bring a medical malpractice claim).

2016Auth. of City of Bainbridge, 278 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1) ( 629 SE2d 472 ) (2006) (noting the 13 requirement for an expert’s affidavit to bring a medical malpractice claim).

2015A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 19 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 9 the injury she claims to have sustained during surgery—both in terms of how she singularly pleaded the claim20 and as a matter of fact.21 And as our Supreme Court has explained, “the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim . . . begins on the dat

2015See Lee , id. at 588 (III) (declining to apply the impact rule where a parent physically injured in an automobile collision sought to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of her child in the collision); Bruscato v. O’Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 457-458 (1) ( 705 SE2d 275 ) (2010) (declining to apply the impact rule to a medical malpractice claim).

2015See Lee, 272 Ga. at 588 (III) (declining to apply the impact rule where a parent physically injured in an automobile collision sought to recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing the death of her child in the collision); Bruscato v. O’Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 457-458 (1) ( 705 SE2d 275 ) (2010) (declining to apply the impact rule to a medical malpractice claim).

2015A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 19 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 9 the injury she claims to have sustained during surgery—both in terms of how she singularly pleaded the claim20 and as a matter of fact.21 And as our Supreme Court has explained, “the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim . . . begins on the dat

2015A summary judgment may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damage.”). 19 See OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) (“[A]n action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.”). 9 the injury she claims to have sustained during surgery—both in terms of how she singularly pleaded the claim20 and as a matter of fact.21 And as our Supreme Court has explained, “the statute of limitations on a medical malpractice claim . . . begins on the dat