medical malpractice claim in Connecticut

2007The trial court recognized that, to prevail in a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove, ordinarily through expert testimony: ‘(1) the requisite standard of care, (2) a deviation from the standard of care and (3) a causal connection between the deviation and the claimed injury.’ The court held that, while expert testimony might not be necessary to establish the defendant’s negligence under these circumstances, such testimony would be necessary to establish causation because the average layperson . . . could not determine, ‘without the aid of expert testimony that if the child had

2005Generally, because the requirements for proper medical diagnosis and treatment are not within the common knowledge of laypersons, “the plaintiff must present expert testimony in support of a medical malpractice claim . . . .” Id.

2009Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 567 , 864 A.2d 1 (2005).

2008Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 567 , 864 A.2d 1 (2005). *89 In proving the requisite standard of care for treatment in which it is alleged that the decedent’s injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, the plaintiff “shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider.

2001In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated CUTPA "by committing immoral, unscrupulous, unethical, and oppressive behavior . . . as set forth in Paragraph 12 of the First Count." (Complaint, Count two, ¶ 14.) The Supreme Court, in Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 17 , determined whether an action labeled as a CUTPA claim was indeed a valid CUTPA claim or whether it was a medical malpractice claim.

2000Accordingly, within this framework, we must review the plaintiffs allegations of CUTPA violations and look to the underlying nature of the claim to determine whether it is really a medical malpractice claim recast as a CUTPA claim.” Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 38 , 699 A.2d 964 (1997).

2001They are: (1) the defendant must have a duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct for the plaintiff's protection; (2) the defendant must have failed to measure up to that standard; (3) the plaintiff must suffer actual injury; and (4) the defendant's conduct must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury." LaBieniec v. Baker , 11 Conn. App. 199 , 202-03 , 526 A.2d 1341 (1987) In this case, a medical malpractice claim is not an appropriate cause of action against the defendants because James Santiago was not a patient of the defendants.

2001They are: (1) the defendant must have a duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct for the plaintiff's protection; (2) the defendant must have failed to measure up to that standard; (3) the plaintiff must suffer actual injury; and (4) the defendant's conduct must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury." LaBieniec v. Baker , 11 Conn. App. 199 , 202-03 , 526 A.2d 1341 (1987) In this case, a medical malpractice claim is not an appropriate cause of action against the defendants because James Santiago was not a patient of the defendants.

2000Disclosure of medical risks is part of the standard of care for provision of medical services Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377 , 385 (1990); Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., 191 Conn. 282 , 292 (1983).

1996Negligence is the breach of the duty of care owed to another individual; CT Page 2895-Z Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377 , 382 , quoting from Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301 , 304 ; medical malpractice is also a breach of the duty of care owed to another.

1996Negligence is the breach of the duty of care owed to another individual; CT Page 2895-Z Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377 , 382 , quoting from Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301 , 304 ; medical malpractice is also a breach of the duty of care owed to another.

1996Negligence is the breach of the duty of care owed to another individual; Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377 , 382 , quoting from Urban v. CT Page 3490 Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301 , 304 ; medical malpractice is also a breach of the duty of care owed to another.

2012Generally, the plaintiff must present expert testimony in support of a medical malpractice claim because the requirements for proper medical diagnosis and treatment are not within the common knowledge of laypersons.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Camel, 283 Conn. 475, 484 , 927 A.2d 880 (2007); see also Cavallaro v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, 92 Conn. App. 59, 74-75 , 882 A.2d 1254 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 926 , 888 A.2d 93 (2005); Amsden v. Fischer, 62 Conn. App. 323, 331 , 771 A.2d 233 (2001) (expert testimony generally required to establish both standard of care and causatio

2012Generally, the plaintiff must present expert testimony in support of a medical malpractice claim because the requirements for proper medical diagnosis and treatment are not within the common knowledge of laypersons.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Camel, 283 Conn. 475, 484 , 927 A.2d 880 (2007); see also Cavallaro v. Hospital of Saint Raphael, 92 Conn. App. 59, 74-75 , 882 A.2d 1254 , cert. denied, 276 Conn. 926 , 888 A.2d 93 (2005); Amsden v. Fischer, 62 Conn. App. 323, 331 , 771 A.2d 233 (2001) (expert testimony generally required to establish both standard of care and causatio

2005See Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, 262 Conn. 255 (plaintiffs claim that hospital negligently discharged patient after administering medication was medical malpractice claim); Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 573-76 , 265 A.2d 70 (1969) (plaintiffs claim that physician negligently permitted elderly patient to dress herself was medical malpractice claim). *565 B The plaintiff next argues that the trial court improperly determined that his claim that the defendant negligently and recklessly refused to treat or to readmit the decedent, despite his obvious symptoms of an adverse reaction

2005See Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Assn., supra, 262 Conn. 255 (plaintiffs claim that hospital negligently discharged patient after administering medication was medical malpractice claim); Levett v. Etkind, 158 Conn. 567, 573-76 , 265 A.2d 70 (1969) (plaintiffs claim that physician negligently permitted elderly patient to dress herself was medical malpractice claim). *565 B The plaintiff next argues that the trial court improperly determined that his claim that the defendant negligently and recklessly refused to treat or to readmit the decedent, despite his obvious symptoms of an adverse reaction

2004See Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 192 Conn. 735 (complaint sounded in negligence because “gravamen of the suit was the alleged failure by the defendant to exercise the requisite standard of care”); Rumbin v. Baez, 52 Conn. App. 487, 491-92 , 727 A.2d 744 (1999) (claim “essentially a medical malpractice claim clothed in the language of contract” because there was “no allegation of a breach of a contractual duty”); DiMaggio v. Makover, 13 Conn. App. 321, 323 , 536 A.2d 595 (1988) (complaint sounded in malpractice and was “absolutely barren of any allegation that the defendant breached any contractua

2004See Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 192 Conn. 735 (complaint sounded in negligence because “gravamen of the suit was the alleged failure by the defendant to exercise the requisite standard of care”); Rumbin v. Baez, 52 Conn. App. 487, 491-92 , 727 A.2d 744 (1999) (claim “essentially a medical malpractice claim clothed in the language of contract” because there was “no allegation of a breach of a contractual duty”); DiMaggio v. Makover, 13 Conn. App. 321, 323 , 536 A.2d 595 (1988) (complaint sounded in malpractice and was “absolutely barren of any allegation that the defendant breached any contractua

2004See Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 192 Conn. 735 (complaint sounded in negligence because “gravamen of the suit was the alleged failure by the defendant to exercise the requisite standard of care”); Rumbin v. Baez, 52 Conn. App. 487, 491-92 , 727 A.2d 744 (1999) (claim “essentially a medical malpractice claim clothed in the language of contract” because there was “no allegation of a breach of a contractual duty”); DiMaggio v. Makover, 13 Conn. App. 321, 323 , 536 A.2d 595 (1988) (complaint sounded in malpractice and was “absolutely barren of any allegation that the defendant breached any contractua

2004See Barnes v. Schlein, supra, 192 Conn. 735 (complaint sounded in negligence because “gravamen of the suit was the alleged failure by the defendant to exercise the requisite standard of care”); Rumbin v. Baez, 52 Conn. App. 487, 491-92 , 727 A.2d 744 (1999) (claim “essentially a medical malpractice claim clothed in the language of contract” because there was “no allegation of a breach of a contractual duty”); DiMaggio v. Makover, 13 Conn. App. 321, 323 , 536 A.2d 595 (1988) (complaint sounded in malpractice and was “absolutely barren of any allegation that the defendant breached any contractua

2002A medical malpractice claim "arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship. . . ." Trimel v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center , 61 Conn. App. 353 , 358 , 764 A.2d 203 (2001).

2002A medical malpractice claim "arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship." Trimel v. Lawrence Memorial Hospital Rehabilitation Center , 61 Conn. App. 353 , 358 (2001).

2023The state is incorrect, however, that count two of the complaint cannot also be read to allege a medical malpractice claim on behalf of Escobar-Santana. ‘‘Under modern pleading practice, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and tech- nically.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority, 327 Conn. 338, 372 , 174 A.3d 137 (2017).

2023The state is incorrect, however, that count two of the complaint cannot also be read to allege a medical malpractice claim on behalf of Escobar-Santana. ‘‘Under modern pleading practice, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and tech- nically.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Housing Authority, 327 Conn. 338, 372 , 174 A.3d 137 (2017).

2023Tulisano. 12 General Statutes § 52-184c (a) further defines such actions, providing in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death . . . in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider . . . the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. . . .’’ 13 The state relies on Maloney v. Conroy,

2023Tulisano. 12 General Statutes § 52-184c (a) further defines such actions, providing in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]n any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death . . . in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider . . . the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. . . .’’ 13 The state relies on Maloney v. Conroy,

2023Moreover, ‘‘[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . including those facts neces- sarily implied from the allegations . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giannoni v. Commissioner of Transportation, 322 Conn. 344, 349 , 141 A.3d 784 (2016).

2023Moreover, ‘‘[i]n ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . including those facts neces- sarily implied from the allegations . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giannoni v. Commissioner of Transportation, 322 Conn. 344, 349 , 141 A.3d 784 (2016).

2023In borderline cases, we have indicated that, to ascer- tain whether a claim qualifies as a medical malpractice claim, we ask the following three questions: (1) are the defendants being ‘‘sued in their capacities as medical professionals,’’ (2) is the alleged negligence ‘‘of a spe- cialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship,’’ and (3) is the alleged negligence ‘‘substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment’’ and does it ‘‘[involve] the exercise of medical judgment?’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 335

2023In borderline cases, we have indicated that, to ascer- tain whether a claim qualifies as a medical malpractice claim, we ask the following three questions: (1) are the defendants being ‘‘sued in their capacities as medical professionals,’’ (2) is the alleged negligence ‘‘of a spe- cialized medical nature that arises out of the medical professional-patient relationship,’’ and (3) is the alleged negligence ‘‘substantially related to medical diagnosis or treatment’’ and does it ‘‘[involve] the exercise of medical judgment?’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 335

2022The state contends that the term ‘‘claim’’ in § 4-160b (a) must be construed consistently with the common- law prohibition on double recovery, which precludes a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single loss.8 We agree with the state that the plaintiff may not recover double damages for the death of the decedent under ‘‘the simple and time-honored maxim that [a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for his just damages for the same injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 71 , 557 A.2d 540 (1989).

2022The state contends that the term ‘‘claim’’ in § 4-160b (a) must be construed consistently with the common- law prohibition on double recovery, which precludes a plaintiff from recovering twice for a single loss.8 We agree with the state that the plaintiff may not recover double damages for the death of the decedent under ‘‘the simple and time-honored maxim that [a] plaintiff may be compensated only once for his just damages for the same injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67, 71 , 557 A.2d 540 (1989).

2022Penney Co., 58 Conn. App. 225, 230 , 753 A.2d 404 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 925 , 761 A.2d 751 (2000). 14 Our law has recognized that, under some circumstances, a defendant medical provider can provide the evidence necessary with respect to the elements of a medical malpractice claim.

2022Penney Co., 58 Conn. App. 225, 230 , 753 A.2d 404 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 925 , 761 A.2d 751 (2000). 14 Our law has recognized that, under some circumstances, a defendant medical provider can provide the evidence necessary with respect to the elements of a medical malpractice claim.

2022Penney Co., 58 Conn. App. 225, 230 , 753 A.2d 404 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 925 , 761 A.2d 751 (2000). 14 Our law has recognized that, under some circumstances, a defendant medical provider can provide the evidence necessary with respect to the elements of a medical malpractice claim.

2022Penney Co., 58 Conn. App. 225, 230 , 753 A.2d 404 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 925 , 761 A.2d 751 (2000). 14 Our law has recognized that, under some circumstances, a defendant medical provider can provide the evidence necessary with respect to the elements of a medical malpractice claim.

2022As we explained in Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96 , 856 A.2d 335 (2004), ‘‘chapter 53 pertains exclusively to claims for monetary damages against the state, and, therefore, any reference to the word ‘claim’ in chapter 53 must be read to refer to claims for monetary damages’’ against the state.

2022As we explained in Bloom v. Gershon, 271 Conn. 96 , 856 A.2d 335 (2004), ‘‘chapter 53 pertains exclusively to claims for monetary damages against the state, and, therefore, any reference to the word ‘claim’ in chapter 53 must be read to refer to claims for monetary damages’’ against the state.