suggested presumption in Illinois

1996Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 , 60 L.

1996Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 , 60 L.

2014Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 166 .

2014Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 166 .

2008Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264-65 .

2008Calles, 224 Ill. 2d at 264-65 .

2007Defendant also contends the trial court should have instructed the jury consistent with the suggested instruction in People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972): "Your verdict must be unanimous.

2007Defendant also contends the trial court should have instructed the jury consistent with the suggested instruction in People v. Prim, 53 Ill. 2d 62, 75-76 , 289 N.E.2d 601 (1972): "Your verdict must be unanimous.

2000Nevertheless, we noted that the defendant's reliance on Queen for this proposition was questionable and that "the utility of the defendant's suggested rule of automatic reversal is doubtful." Gibson, 136 Ill.2d at 380 , 144 Ill.Dec. 759 , 556 N.E.2d 226 .

2000Nevertheless, we noted that the defendant’s reliance on Queen for this proposition was questionable and that “the utility of the defendant’s suggested rule of automatic reversal is doubtful.” Gibson, 136 Ill. 2d at 380 .

1998We do not agree with either the suggested analysis or conclusion." Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d at 80 , 46 Ill.Dec. 156 , 413 N.E.2d 1269 .

1998We do not agree with either the suggested analysis or conclusion." Chrastka, 83 Ill.2d at 80 , 46 Ill.Dec. 156 , 413 N.E.2d 1269 .

2023Nevertheless, a comment of this nature does not constitute second-prong plain error (McIntyre, 2022 IL App (2d) 200535, ¶ 12 ), and our supreme court has upheld jury waivers even where the trial court suggested the waiver was irrevocable (People v. Tooles, 177 Ill. 2d 462, 471 (1997)). ¶ 38 Defendant’s bench trial proceeded on February 22, 2022.

2022Sweigart, 2013 IL App (2d) 110885, ¶ 19 ; Velez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101325, ¶ 30 . -10- 1-20-0274 With a permissive presumption, the fact finder is free to accept or reject the suggested presumption.

2022Sweigart, 2013 IL App (2d) 110885, ¶ 19 ; Velez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101325, ¶ 30 . -10- 1-20-0274 With a permissive presumption, the fact finder is free to accept or reject the suggested presumption.

2021Id.

2020Miller, 2015 IL App (2d) 140530 .

2015Thus, the trial court is “allowed to deviate from the suggested instruction and format only where necessary to conform to unusual facts or new law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288, ¶ 40 . - 28 - 2015 IL App (2d) 120171 ¶ 73 Nevertheless, the purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence, and, therefore, the instructions should not be misleading or confusing.

2015Whether an instruction is correct depends on whether “ordinary persons acting as jurors would fail to understand them.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187-88 .

2015Thus, the trial court is “allowed to deviate from the suggested instruction and format only where necessary to conform to unusual facts or new law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Anderson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103288, ¶ 40 . - 28 - 2015 IL App (2d) 120171 ¶ 73 Nevertheless, the purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the correct principles of law applicable to the evidence, and, therefore, the instructions should not be misleading or confusing.

2002"With a permissive presumption, the fact finder `is free to accept or reject the suggested presumption.'" Watts, 181 Ill.2d at 142 , 229 Ill.Dec. 542 , 692 N.E.2d 315 , quoting Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 99 , 136 Ill.Dec. 111 , 544 N.E.2d 797 .

2002"With a permissive presumption, the fact finder `is free to accept or reject the suggested presumption.'" Watts, 181 Ill.2d at 142 , 229 Ill.Dec. 542 , 692 N.E.2d 315 , quoting Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 99 , 136 Ill.Dec. 111 , 544 N.E.2d 797 .

1994The Bush court offered a suggested instruction: "[A]n entry into a dwelling [is] defined as unauthorized, even when initially invited, when the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible has, at the time of entry, an intent to commit criminal acts within the dwelling.” People v. Bush (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 248, 257 , 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1365 .

1994The Bush court offered a suggested instruction: "[A]n entry into a dwelling [is] defined as unauthorized, even when initially invited, when the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible has, at the time of entry, an intent to commit criminal acts within the dwelling.” People v. Bush (1993), 157 Ill. 2d 248, 257 , 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1365 .

1993Joyce II, 234 Ill.

1991Defendant, relying on Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary (1971), 401 U.S. 560 , 28 L.

1991Defendant, relying on Whiteley v. Warden of Wyoming State Penitentiary (1971), 401 U.S. 560 , 28 L.

1981In the garnishment action it might be permitted to raise the question of coverage (Wold v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co. (1933), 269 Ill.

1978For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 295 .) We n

1978For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." ( People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 295 .) We n

1969Therefore, the suggested doctrine of estoppel as against the municipality would not apply (Dumond v. City of Mattoon, 60 Ill App2d 83, 89, 207 NE2d 320 ).

1908In North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Louis, 138 Ill. 9 , we said: ‘There may be evidence which, standing by itself, establishes a certain state of facts, but the evidence does not preponderate in favor of any given state of facts unless it is sufficient to outweigh all testimony introduced in opposition thereto.’ ” In the case at bar not only was there no evidence offered tending, in the slightest degree, to establish or suggest suicide or self-inflicted injuries, but moreover, in the exercise of a discretion undoubtedly vested in him (Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570 -2; Mayer v. Brensinger, 18

1908In North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Louis, 138 Ill. 9 , we said: ‘There may be evidence which, standing by itself, establishes a certain state of facts, but the evidence does not preponderate in favor of any given state of facts unless it is sufficient to outweigh all testimony introduced in opposition thereto.’ ” In the case at bar not only was there no evidence offered tending, in the slightest degree, to establish or suggest suicide or self-inflicted injuries, but moreover, in the exercise of a discretion undoubtedly vested in him (Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570 -2; Mayer v. Brensinger, 18

1908In North Chicago Street Railway Co. v. Louis, 138 Ill. 9 , we said: ‘There may be evidence which, standing by itself, establishes a certain state of facts, but the evidence does not preponderate in favor of any given state of facts unless it is sufficient to outweigh all testimony introduced in opposition thereto.’ ” In the case at bar not only was there no evidence offered tending, in the slightest degree, to establish or suggest suicide or self-inflicted injuries, but moreover, in the exercise of a discretion undoubtedly vested in him (Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570 -2; Mayer v. Brensinger, 18