45 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1899–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, J., Apltgreen2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809 , 819-20 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s jury instruction was inadequate and created - 11 - J-S19036-24 reversible error despite fact that it conformed to the suggested standard jury instruction); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 186 -87 & n.4 (counsel was ineffective for failure to object to standard jury instruction that misstated mens rea of offense). 2022It first asserted the DAO could not appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311, which permits the Commonwealth to “appeal as of right from an settled principle that the suggested standard jury instructions “are not binding and do not alter the discretion afforded trial courts in crafting jury instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are guides only.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014). [J-76-2021] - 14 order that does not end the entire case where [it] certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Prosdocimogreen2 sentences2023See 18 Pa.C.S. §2502(b); 18 Pa.C.S. § 903; Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 578 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 (Pa. 1990) (holding that where “the jury charge closely tracked the language of the suggested standard jury instructions for the crimes of, inter alia, second- degree murder, it was “accurate, adequate, and sufficiently clear to inform the jury of the law applicable to the case”). 2016(Crim) § 15.2502A (2005). ~ Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 578 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. 1990) (holding that a jury charge that closely tracked the language of the suggested standard jury instructions was accurate, adequate, and 19 .. sufficiently clear to inform the jury of the law applicable to the case). | 2 | 2 |
Gorman v. Costellogreen2 sentences2023This Court agreed, stating the trial court had failed to provide a complete definition of factual cause, such that the jury lacked “an essential tool needed to make an informed decision based on correct and complete legal principles relevant to its verdict on the issue of damages.” Id. at 1213 (internal citations omitted). 2014Gorman, supra, at 1213 . | 1 | 2 |
Jeter v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green2 sentences2023Although the court’s language did not mirror that set forth in SSJI § 13.20, the suggested standard jury instructions are not mandatory.6 See Jeter, supra. Further, this case is distinguishable from the fundamental error at issue in Gorman because it does not involve a situation where the court provided an incomplete definition for a relevant legal principle. 2004Jeter v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 716 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa.Super.1998). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Geathersgreen1 sentence2025See Geathers, supra. When read as a whole, the court’s instructions, which were in parity with the suggested standard jury instructions, accurately conveyed what the Commonwealth was required to prove for Appellant to be found guilty of second-degree murder and that all elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2025See Collins, 810 A.2d at 702-03 . -8- J-S18022-25 Additionally, the suggested standard jury instruction for involuntary intoxication published by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute suggests that the defense, should it exist in this Commonwealth, would follow the same contours as other jurisdictions where involuntary intoxication mirrors the jurisdiction’s test for legal insanity. | 1 | 1 |
Regis Insurance v. All American Rathskeller, Inc.green1 sentence2025See Regis Insurance Co. v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 976 A.2d 1157 , 1161 n. 6 (Pa. Super. 2009) (explaining that a Superior Court panel lacked power to disregard and overrule a binding prior decision). - 41 - J-A18007-25 should not provide “anything other than the suggested standard civil jury instructions,” which do not include an instruction on the crashworthiness doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2023This issue is related to a a question question posed by the jury jury during during the course of deliberations, where they they requested the the statutory definition for "Deadly Weapon." Weapon." It's well-settled that suggested suggested standard jury jury instructions themselves are not binding. 157Suggested binding.' Suggested standard jury jury instructions do not alter the discretion afford to judges in crafting trial judges crafting jury jury instructions; the instructions are guides only."' The only, The trial courts of Pennsylvania Pennsylvania "are invested with broad discretion in 2023This issue is related to a a question question posed by the jury jury during during the course of deliberations, where they they requested the the statutory definition for "Deadly Weapon." Weapon." It's well-settled that suggested suggested standard jury jury instructions themselves are not binding. 157Suggested binding.' Suggested standard jury jury instructions do not alter the discretion afford to judges in crafting trial judges crafting jury jury instructions; the instructions are guides only."' The only, The trial courts of Pennsylvania Pennsylvania "are invested with broad discretion in | 1 | 1 |
Whitton v. H. A. Gable Co.green1 sentence2021Pa.S.$.C.J,1 13.180- Plaintiff's Comparative Negligence, 5 FILED 1/21/2020 1:44 PM,Clerk of Judicial Records, Civil Division, Lehigh County, PA FILED 12/6/2018 8:05 AM, Clerk of Judicial RexordsCCpghBivisiqayteahigh County, PA 2017-C-2213 Ishi W Once the court concluded the RULWA was not applicable, ultimately adopting Silfies’ position, any allegation of error by Silfics for not making that decision earlier in the trial was harmless, Whitton v, HA, Gable Co., 200 A. 644, 646 (Pa,1938),4 Nonetheless, Silfies claims the jury was confused by allowing into evidence testimony conceming the City’s | 1 | 1 |
Lockhart v. Listgreen1 sentence2020See N.T., 1/9/19, at 167. -5- J-A10014-20 particular case so as to enable the jury to comprehend the questions it must decide.” Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 329 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Lockhart, supra at 1179 ). | 1 | 1 |
Drew v. Workgreen1 sentence2020See N.T., 1/9/19, at 167. -5- J-A10014-20 particular case so as to enable the jury to comprehend the questions it must decide.” Drew v. Work, 95 A.3d 324, 329 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Lockhart, supra at 1179 ). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Caldwellgreen1 sentence2018Further, Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to take into consideration certain mitigating and rehabilitative factors in imposing a sentence outside the aggravated range of the Sentencing Guidelines raises a substantial question.8 See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (holding that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an ____________________________________________ 8 The suggested standard range for furnishing a controlled substance to confined persons and criminal conspiracy to furnish a controlled substance to confined persons was t | 1 | 1 |
Bellevue Builders Supply, Inc. v. Audubon Quality Homes, Inc.green1 sentence2017In view of the fact that conferral of a benefit upon [the debtor] would have been sufficient consideration for the guarantee had it been given prior to execution thereof, the suggested defense [(“that because the stated benefit flowed to [the debtor], as opposed to the individual guarantors, it cannot constitute valid consideration for the guarantee”)] is palpably meritless[.] 623 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (citations omitted). - 23 - J-A15016-17 & J-A15017-17 Here, the Decedents stated in writing that the Guaranty was based on the consideration of a large sum of money that was advanced by the Corporatio | 1 | 1 |
Garza v. Stephensgreen1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591 , 607 n.9 (Pa. 2014) (declining to “critique the subtleties of the language in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions” in the absence of a claim that those instructions violate the appellant’s constitutional or other legal rights), cert. denied, Towles v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1494 (2015); Trill, supra (finding the “distinction between ‘may’ and ‘will’ … to be specious[]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Towles, J., Aplt.green1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591 , 607 n.9 (Pa. 2014) (declining to “critique the subtleties of the language in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions” in the absence of a claim that those instructions violate the appellant’s constitutional or other legal rights), cert. denied, Towles v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1494 (2015); Trill, supra (finding the “distinction between ‘may’ and ‘will’ … to be specious[]”). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Riveragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Del Giornogreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Adoption of A.M.R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Yostgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Linwood Gray, United States of America v. Harry L. Staleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Werner v. Quality Service Oil Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoffman v. Memorial Osteopathic Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pierce v. Penmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Feld v. Merriamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sulecki v. Southeast National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Smoyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Duvalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Tate
green
2 sentences1986As recognized in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A.2d 1382 (1981), a balancing process is required which should attempt to maximize each side's enjoyment of the respective rights claimed. 1986As recognized in Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158 , 432 A.2d 1382 (1981), a balancing process is required which should attempt to maximize each side's enjoyment of the respective rights claimed. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Anthony Bruno v. Ross E. Herold, M.D., Director of Dannemora State Hospital, Dannemora, Newyork
green
2 sentences1972Bruno v. Herold, 408 F. 2d 125 (2nd Cir. 1969) (Judge WATERMAN, dissenting); see also Note, 54 Cal. L. 1972Bruno v. Herold, 408 F. 2d 125 (2nd Cir. 1969) (Judge Waterman, dissenting) ; see also Note, 54 Cal. L. | 2 | 1972–1972 |
Commonwealth v. Heller
green
1 sentence2026Our Supreme Court has considered the subcommittee’s notes when reviewing jury instruction challenges, expressly noting that the subcommittee members have “undoubtedly spent countless hours discussing, drafting, debating, and redrafting the model instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625 , 639, 642 (Pa. 2022) (considering the subcommittee note to a suggested standard criminal jury instruction in determining the propriety of a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” instruction given by the trial court); see also Pownall, 278 A.3d at 896 n.11 (stating the subcommittee note supported the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Jordan
green
1 sentence2026Our Supreme Court has considered the subcommittee’s notes when reviewing jury instruction challenges, expressly noting that the subcommittee members have “undoubtedly spent countless hours discussing, drafting, debating, and redrafting the model instructions[.]” Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625 , 639, 642 (Pa. 2022) (considering the subcommittee note to a suggested standard criminal jury instruction in determining the propriety of a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” instruction given by the trial court); see also Pownall, 278 A.3d at 896 n.11 (stating the subcommittee note supported the | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Kerrigan
green
1 sentence2025See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b); Kerrigan, supra. As discussed in our analysis of Appellant’s earlier appellate issues, Appellant had notice and was aware of the second-degree murder charge, with robbery as the predicate offense, at the time the criminal indictment was amended. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Voytko
green
1 sentence2024In Voytko, the appellant had “found his wife in an act of ____________________________________________ 3 The following cautionary language precedes the suggested instruction: “[Heat of Passion: to be given only if the facts of record support].” Pa. SSJI (Crim) 15.2503A. - 10 - J-A20028-24 adultery with (the victim), had physically fought with (the victim), had argued with his wife, had been deserted by his wife, and finally, had found her in (the victim’s) company, returning from a date, at 5:00 a.m.” Id. at 23 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Com. v. Raymond, E.
green
2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809 , 819-20 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s jury instruction was inadequate and created - 11 - J-S19036-24 reversible error despite fact that it conformed to the suggested standard jury instruction); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 186 -87 & n.4 (counsel was ineffective for failure to object to standard jury instruction that misstated mens rea of offense). 2024Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809 , 819-20 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s jury instruction was inadequate and created - 11 - J-S19036-24 reversible error despite fact that it conformed to the suggested standard jury instruction); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 186 -87 & n.4 (counsel was ineffective for failure to object to standard jury instruction that misstated mens rea of offense). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2024Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809 , 819-20 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s jury instruction was inadequate and created - 11 - J-S19036-24 reversible error despite fact that it conformed to the suggested standard jury instruction); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 186 -87 & n.4 (counsel was ineffective for failure to object to standard jury instruction that misstated mens rea of offense). 2024Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 108 A.3d 821, 845 (Pa. 2014); Commonwealth v. Raymond, 233 A.3d 809 , 819-20 & n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (trial court’s jury instruction was inadequate and created - 11 - J-S19036-24 reversible error despite fact that it conformed to the suggested standard jury instruction); Nichols, 692 A.2d at 186 -87 & n.4 (counsel was ineffective for failure to object to standard jury instruction that misstated mens rea of offense). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ford v. Jeffries
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Whitmore
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 1038 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Davenport
red
2 sentences2017The optional language provides that the length of delay between arrest and arraignment should be considered in determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. 24 This time period (between arrest and arraignment) has legal relevance as this Court previously held in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), that if a defendant was not arraigned within six hours after his arrest, the statements made after his arrest were inadmissible at trial. 2017The optional language provides that the length of delay between arrest and arraignment should be considered in determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. 24 This time period (between arrest and arraignment) has legal relevance as this Court previously held in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), that if a defendant was not arraigned within six hours after his arrest, the statements made after his arrest were inadmissible at trial. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Perez
green
2 sentences2017The optional language provides that the length of delay between arrest and arraignment should be considered in determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. 24 This time period (between arrest and arraignment) has legal relevance as this Court previously held in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), that if a defendant was not arraigned within six hours after his arrest, the statements made after his arrest were inadmissible at trial. 2017The optional language provides that the length of delay between arrest and arraignment should be considered in determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. 24 This time period (between arrest and arraignment) has legal relevance as this Court previously held in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278 , 370 A.2d 301 (1977), overruled by Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), that if a defendant was not arraigned within six hours after his arrest, the statements made after his arrest were inadmissible at trial. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Trill
green
1 sentence2016See Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591 , 607 n.9 (Pa. 2014) (declining to “critique the subtleties of the language in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions” in the absence of a claim that those instructions violate the appellant’s constitutional or other legal rights), cert. denied, Towles v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1494 (2015); Trill, supra (finding the “distinction between ‘may’ and ‘will’ … to be specious[]”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Miller
green
1 sentence2016As stated supra “[c]omments by a prosecutor constitute reversible error only where their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 746 A.2d at 601–02. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Commonwealth v. Manley
green
1 sentence2016The trial judge did instruct the jury thoroughly upon the general subject of credibility in accordance with the suggested instruction for witness credibility. … We believe that, under the fact of this case, this was sufficient to permit the jury to ascertain the truthfulness of the testimony offered by the minor complaining witness as well as of others who testified in this matter.”) - 16 - J-S60034-16 “The decision to declare a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the court and will not be reversed absent a ‘flagrant abuse of discretion.’” Commonwealth v. Manley, 985 A.2d 256 , 266–67 ( | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Trivigno green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Commonwealth v. Liebel green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Spotz green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Bavusa green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Commonwealth v. Small green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Iko v. Sizer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., Inc. red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Commonwealth v. Pounds green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Commonwealth v. Willis green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Rice v. Shuman green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| United States v. Brewer green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Commonwealth v. Shaffer green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Levesque green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| National Education Ass'n of Shawnee Mission, Inc. v. Board of Education red | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Commonwealth v. Youngblood green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Folger v. Pittsburgh Railways Co. neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Martin & Monroe v. Berens green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Clarke v. Allen neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.