suggested factors in New Jersey

2003If, on the other hand, the judge is convinced that the defendant can not or has not made such a voluntary and intelligent waiver, the judge has the discretion to raise that defense sua sponte. [ Ibid. (quoting Frendak, supra, 408 A. 2d at 380-81 ).] Although we found the procedures set forth in Frendak "largely persuasive," we expressed some reservations concerning the scope of the suggested hearing: [The hearing] should not be converted into a second competency hearing, which would be the case if Frendak were followed in its entirety.

2003If, on the other hand, the judge is convinced that the defendant can not or has not made such a voluntary and intelligent waiver, the judge has the discretion to raise that defense sua sponte. [ Ibid. (quoting Frendak, supra, 408 A. 2d at 380-81 ).] Although we found the procedures set forth in Frendak "largely persuasive," we expressed some reservations concerning the scope of the suggested hearing: [The hearing] should not be converted into a second competency hearing, which would be the case if Frendak were followed in its entirety.

2008In Loigman, supra, in which the Court was called upon to "balance the citizen's right of access to official information with the government's need for confidentiality in the conduct of law enforcement investigations," 102 N.J. at 101 , 505 A. 2d 958 , the Court suggested factors a trial court should consider in performing its balancing function: (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance

2008In Loigman, supra, in which the Court was called upon to "balance the citizen's right of access to official information with the government's need for confidentiality in the conduct of law enforcement investigations," 102 N.J. at 101 , 505 A. 2d 958 , the Court suggested factors a trial court should consider in performing its balancing function: (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discouraging citizens from providing information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether they did so in reliance

2003Id. at 535-36 , 780 A.2d at 544 .

2003Id. at 535-36 , 780 A.2d at 544 .

2003If, on the other hand, the judge is convinced that the defendant can not or has not made such a voluntary and intelligent waiver, the judge has the discretion to raise that defense sua sponte. [ Ibid. (quoting Frendak, supra, 408 A. 2d at 380-81 ).] Although we found the procedures set forth in Frendak "largely persuasive," we expressed some reservations concerning the scope of the suggested hearing: [The hearing] should not be converted into a second competency hearing, which would be the case if Frendak were followed in its entirety.

2003Frendak speaks of a defendant's "capab[ility] of rationally deciding to reject the defense." Referring to Faretta [ v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)] and [ North Carolina ] v. Alford [ 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)] supra, in which the Supreme Court permitted defendants to waive constitutional rights only after the trial judge had assured himself that the accused was capable of making a voluntary and intelligent choice, Frendak emphasizes *1188 that the trial judge must seek the same type of assurance when a defendant chooses to reject an

2003Frendak speaks of a defendant's "capab[ility] of rationally deciding to reject the defense." Referring to Faretta [ v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)] and [ North Carolina ] v. Alford [ 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)] supra, in which the Supreme Court permitted defendants to waive constitutional rights only after the trial judge had assured himself that the accused was capable of making a voluntary and intelligent choice, Frendak emphasizes *1188 that the trial judge must seek the same type of assurance when a defendant chooses to reject an

2003Frendak speaks of a defendant's "capab[ility] of rationally deciding to reject the defense." Referring to Faretta [ v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)] and [ North Carolina ] v. Alford [ 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)] supra, in which the Supreme Court permitted defendants to waive constitutional rights only after the trial judge had assured himself that the accused was capable of making a voluntary and intelligent choice, Frendak emphasizes *1188 that the trial judge must seek the same type of assurance when a defendant chooses to reject an

2003Frendak speaks of a defendant's "capab[ility] of rationally deciding to reject the defense." Referring to Faretta [ v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)] and [ North Carolina ] v. Alford [ 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)] supra, in which the Supreme Court permitted defendants to waive constitutional rights only after the trial judge had assured himself that the accused was capable of making a voluntary and intelligent choice, Frendak emphasizes *1188 that the trial judge must seek the same type of assurance when a defendant chooses to reject an

1995See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685, 687-688 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1962); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa.Super. 543 , 421 A. 2d 333, 335 (1980), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 459 A. 2d 744 , 501 Pa. 47 (1983).

1995See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583 , 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 , 364 P. 2d 685, 687-688 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 , 82 S.Ct. 603 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1962); Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa.Super. 543 , 421 A. 2d 333, 335 (1980), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 459 A. 2d 744 , 501 Pa. 47 (1983).

1976The case of Roper v. Beto, supra , is directly in point on all the phases of the identification involved herein.

1961Modernizing a service station was permitted in Lane v. Bigelow, 135 N.J.L. 195 ( E. & A. 1946).

1950Nor was the suggested doctrine applied in the O'Connor case itself, which changed the previous construction that had been placed on these statutes by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Atlantic Coast Electric Railway Company v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 92 N.J.L. 168 ( E. & A. 1918), despite the fact that the dissenting opinion in the O'Connor case specifically called attention (at p. 270) to the legislative acquiescence for many years in the earlier construction of the statutes under consideration.