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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Coppockgreen2 sentences2015American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22, Compendium of Professional Responsibility-Rules and Standards (2012); see Coppock, 432 Md. at 648 , 69 A.3d at 1103 . 2015American Bar Association, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, § 9.22, Compendium of Professional Responsibility-Rules and Standards (2012); see Coppock, 432 Md. at 648 , 69 A.3d at 1103 . | 2 | 2 |
Ross v. Hoffmangreen2 sentences1992Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-175 , 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977). 1992Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174-175 , 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Mayor of Baltimore v. Zellgreen2 sentences1979Though the State points out that this Court previously has recognized the existence of a discretion in the trial court to permit the introduction of evidence concerning the employment posture of an expert because such evidence is frequently a useful factor in evaluating the credibility of the expert witness’s testimony, City of Baltimore v. Zell, 279 Md. 23, 28 , 367 A. 2d 14, 17 (1977), that decision arose in a civil context and does not provide a persuasive basis for employing a waiver of the attorney-client privilege in criminal causes. 5 *524 An additional consequence of the State’s sugges 1979Though the State points out that this Court previously has recognized the existence of a discretion in the trial court to permit the introduction of evidence concerning the employment posture of an expert because such evidence is frequently a useful factor in evaluating the credibility of the expert witness’s testimony, City of Baltimore v. Zell, 279 Md. 23, 28 , 367 A. 2d 14, 17 (1977), that decision arose in a civil context and does not provide a persuasive basis for employing a waiver of the attorney-client privilege in criminal causes. 5 *524 An additional consequence of the State’s sugges | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boswell v. Boswell
green
2 sentences2000Maryland Rule 2-522(a) provides that, “[i]n a contested court trial, the judge, before or at the time judgment is entered, shall dictate into the record or prepare and file in the action a brief statement of the reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages.” In Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567, 573 , 606 A.2d 257 (1992), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule “applies to a final judgment in every non-jury action, whether legal or equitable in nature.” In Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 223 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998), the Court suggested that the rule requires the trial co 2000Maryland Rule 2-522(a) provides that, “[i]n a contested court trial, the judge, before or at the time judgment is entered, shall dictate into the record or prepare and file in the action a brief statement of the reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages.” In Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567, 573 , 606 A.2d 257 (1992), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule “applies to a final judgment in every non-jury action, whether legal or equitable in nature.” In Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 223 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998), the Court suggested that the rule requires the trial co | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Kirchner v. Caughey
green
2 sentences2000Maryland Rule 2-522(a) provides that, “[i]n a contested court trial, the judge, before or at the time judgment is entered, shall dictate into the record or prepare and file in the action a brief statement of the reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages.” In Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567, 573 , 606 A.2d 257 (1992), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule “applies to a final judgment in every non-jury action, whether legal or equitable in nature.” In Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 223 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998), the Court suggested that the rule requires the trial co 2000Maryland Rule 2-522(a) provides that, “[i]n a contested court trial, the judge, before or at the time judgment is entered, shall dictate into the record or prepare and file in the action a brief statement of the reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages.” In Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567, 573 , 606 A.2d 257 (1992), the Court of Appeals reasoned that the rule “applies to a final judgment in every non-jury action, whether legal or equitable in nature.” In Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 223 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998), the Court suggested that the rule requires the trial co | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Boswell v. Boswell
green
2 sentences2000(Citing Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md.App. 1, 31 , 701 A.2d 1153 (1997), aff'd, 352 Md. 204 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998)). 2000(Citing Boswell v. Boswell, 118 Md.App. 1, 31 , 701 A.2d 1153 (1997), aff'd, 352 Md. 204 , 721 A.2d 662 (1998)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Pratt
green
2 sentences1997It answered the question by commenting, “An additional consequence of the State’s suggested waiver rule, if adopted by us, is that the defense, in essence, would be required to assist the prosecution in discharging its burden of proof.” Id. at 524 , 398 A.2d 421 . 1997It answered the question by commenting, “An additional consequence of the State’s suggested waiver rule, if adopted by us, is that the defense, in essence, would be required to assist the prosecution in discharging its burden of proof.” Id. at 524 , 398 A.2d 421 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Garozynski v. Daniel
green
2 sentences1984Affirming the trial court’s refusal to grant the suggested instruction, the Court of Appeals said, “if he went further to the left than was required to avoid the pedestrians and could not get back in time to prevent striking the car in which the plaintiff was riding, then he was responsible for the injuries he caused.” The Court held that the case was properly submitted to the jury on appropriate instructions as to negligence. *495 The earlier case of Garozynski v. Daniel, 190 Md. 1 , 57 A.2d 339 (1947), involved a defendant who said he swerved to avoid a man who jumped out between two cars an 1984Affirming the trial court’s refusal to grant the suggested instruction, the Court of Appeals said, “if he went further to the left than was required to avoid the pedestrians and could not get back in time to prevent striking the car in which the plaintiff was riding, then he was responsible for the injuries he caused.” The Court held that the case was properly submitted to the jury on appropriate instructions as to negligence. *495 The earlier case of Garozynski v. Daniel, 190 Md. 1 , 57 A.2d 339 (1947), involved a defendant who said he swerved to avoid a man who jumped out between two cars an | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Daihl v. County Board of Appeals
green
2 sentences1974Nor does our holding disturb the rule that, while there is a strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning or rezoning, reclassifications may be upheld if there is strong evidence of original mistake * * *.” [Italics supplied] In Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157, 165 , 265 A. 2d 227, 231 , the Court of Appeals, although rejecting reclassification, made clear that original mistake will be determined by viewing the totality of the evidence after giving recognition to the strong presumption of correctness attaching to original zoning, citing Dill v. Jobar, supra, and Overt 1974Nor does our holding disturb the rule that, while there is a strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning or rezoning, reclassifications may be upheld if there is strong evidence of original mistake * * *.” [Italics supplied] In Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157, 165 , 265 A. 2d 227, 231 , the Court of Appeals, although rejecting reclassification, made clear that original mistake will be determined by viewing the totality of the evidence after giving recognition to the strong presumption of correctness attaching to original zoning, citing Dill v. Jobar, supra, and Overt | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Overton v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences1974Nor does our holding disturb the rule that, while there is a strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning or rezoning, reclassifications may be upheld if there is strong evidence of original mistake * * *.” [Italics supplied] In Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157, 165 , 265 A. 2d 227, 231 , the Court of Appeals, although rejecting reclassification, made clear that original mistake will be determined by viewing the totality of the evidence after giving recognition to the strong presumption of correctness attaching to original zoning, citing Dill v. Jobar, supra, and Overt 1974Nor does our holding disturb the rule that, while there is a strong presumption of the correctness of original zoning or rezoning, reclassifications may be upheld if there is strong evidence of original mistake * * *.” [Italics supplied] In Daihl v. County Board of Appeals, 258 Md. 157, 165 , 265 A. 2d 227, 231 , the Court of Appeals, although rejecting reclassification, made clear that original mistake will be determined by viewing the totality of the evidence after giving recognition to the strong presumption of correctness attaching to original zoning, citing Dill v. Jobar, supra, and Overt | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.