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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1959–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Steinberggreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 864 A.2d 120 , 122 n. 3 (D.C.2004) ("We express no opinion as to the appropriateness of the Cater standard, for we would impose the fitness requirement whether we were applying Cater or our own earlier case law on the issue.”); In re Mabry, 851 A.2d 1276 , 1278 n. 1 (D.C.2004) (accepting Board's recommendation of a public censure, to which Bar Counsel did not object, and hence not reaching the arguments addressed to the Cater standard for imposing a fitness requirement for reinstatement in the event we chose to suspend respondent). 22 . | 1 | 1 |
Butler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1 |
In Re WNWgreen2 sentences1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. 1989Id. 475 U.S. at 174 , 106 S.Ct. at 998 . | 1 | 1 |
Banks v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Watts v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982See id. at 18. 9 .In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706 (1976) (en banc) we recognized an exception to this rule when we said “When a witness ... affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier statement is to be considered ‘not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but as affirmative evidence.’” Id. at 711-12 n.ll, *550 quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 960 , 85 S.Ct. 647 , 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). 1982See id. at 18. 9 .In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706 (1976) (en banc) we recognized an exception to this rule when we said “When a witness ... affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier statement is to be considered ‘not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but as affirmative evidence.’” Id. at 711-12 n.ll, *550 quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 960 , 85 S.Ct. 647 , 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Borelligreen1 sentence1982See id. at 18. 9 .In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706 (1976) (en banc) we recognized an exception to this rule when we said “When a witness ... affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier statement is to be considered ‘not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but as affirmative evidence.’” Id. at 711-12 n.ll, *550 quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 960 , 85 S.Ct. 647 , 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See id. at 18. 9 .In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706 (1976) (en banc) we recognized an exception to this rule when we said “When a witness ... affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier statement is to be considered ‘not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but as affirmative evidence.’” Id. at 711-12 n.ll, *550 quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 960 , 85 S.Ct. 647 , 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Illinois High School Ass'ngreen1 sentence1982See id. at 18. 9 .In Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 362 A.2d 706 (1976) (en banc) we recognized an exception to this rule when we said “When a witness ... affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier statement is to be considered ‘not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but as affirmative evidence.’” Id. at 711-12 n.ll, *550 quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir. 1964), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 960 , 85 S.Ct. 647 , 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Madden v. Killingergreen1 sentence1959B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton, Ky.1952, 247 S.W.2d 34 ; see Madden v. Killinger, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 205 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Mabry
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., In re Steinberg, 864 A.2d 120 , 122 n. 3 (D.C.2004) ("We express no opinion as to the appropriateness of the Cater standard, for we would impose the fitness requirement whether we were applying Cater or our own earlier case law on the issue.”); In re Mabry, 851 A.2d 1276 , 1278 n. 1 (D.C.2004) (accepting Board's recommendation of a public censure, to which Bar Counsel did not object, and hence not reaching the arguments addressed to the Cater standard for imposing a fitness requirement for reinstatement in the event we chose to suspend respondent). 22 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2003In a footnote, the Court suggested that the standard for applying the public safety exception is “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or. the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . 2003In a footnote, the Court suggested that the standard for applying the public safety exception is “an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or. the public from any immediate danger associated with the weapon.” Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 2626 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Thornton v. United States
green
2 sentences1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. 1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Dancy v. Texas
green
1 sentence1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Banks v. United States
green
1 sentence1989Banks v. United States, 516 A.2d 524, 529 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 485 , 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987); Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844, 852-53 (D.C.1980) (en banc); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 434 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 , 97 S.Ct. 644 , 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976); In re W.N.W., 343 A.2d 55, 58 (D.C.1975). [3] At the same time, the Court suggested that defense counsel should proceed cautiously in concluding that his client wishes to present perjured testimony. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Nix v. Whiteside
green
2 sentences1989Id. 475 U.S. at 174 , 106 S.Ct. at 998 . 1989Id. 475 U.S. at 174 , 106 S.Ct. at 998 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Giglio v. United States
green
2 sentences1983The suggested test is whether "the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury." Id. 1983The suggested test is whether “the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.” Id. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton
green
1 sentence1959B-Line Cab Co. v. Hampton, Ky.1952, 247 S.W.2d 34 ; see Madden v. Killinger, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 205 . | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.