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11 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Speaksgreen1 sentence2017Defense counsel failed to make an offer of proof which might have helped clarify the issue. ‘To preserve a claim that evidence was improperly excluded, the proponent of the evidence must attempt to present the evidence at trial, and if an objection is sustained, the proponent must then make an offer of proof.’ State v. Speaks, 298 S.W.3d 70, 85 (Mo. App. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nicklassongreen1 sentence2005As the trial court observed, “A defendant has a right, through the process of voir dire, to discover bias or prejudice on the part of prospective jurors.” State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 *619 S.Ct. 549, 142 L.Ed.2d 457 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1981Jackson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo.App.1976). 1981Jackson v. State, 537 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Mo.App.1976). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1979See State v. Johnson, supra. Appellant contends the court committed plain and reversible error under Rule 27.20(c) by Instruction No. 6 on burglary, first degree, “insofar as the said instruction was given in improper form and [thus] * * * was prejudicial and denied appellant a fair trial.” Instruction No. 6 was in form MAI-CR 7.20, but it omitted the converse paragraph: “However, if you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the foregoing, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense.” The suggested error was cured in this case under Rule | 1 | 1 |
State v. Knoxgreen1 sentence1979State v. Knox, 529 S.W.2d 455, 463 (Mo.App.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Morrow
green
1 sentence2006The trial court found that defense counsel’s questions did not give venirepersons a “full and complete definition of murder first degree.” It found that the questions “invade[d] the province of the court” and were an “improper attempt to instruct the jury on what the law is.” The trial court suggested that defense counsel ask, “Can you give life without probation and parole if you find him guilty of first degree murder[?],” rather than attempt to define first degree murder. 3.Permissible Voir Dire Questions In State v. Morrow, this Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the trial court err | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Lockhart v. United States
green
1 sentence2005As the trial court observed, “A defendant has a right, through the process of voir dire, to discover bias or prejudice on the part of prospective jurors.” State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 608 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1021 , 119 *619 S.Ct. 549, 142 L.Ed.2d 457 (1998). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Griffith v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1987Batson has been held to be retroactive, see Griffith v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). . § 16. 1987Batson has been held to be retroactive, see Griffith v. Kentucky, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). . § 16. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1979Cf. MAI-CR 3.74, effective January 1, 1979, suggested for submission under State v. Anderson, 515 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. banc 1974). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corporation
green
1 sentence1978In Reckert v. Roco Petroleum Corporation, 411 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.1966), the court suggested that the instruction submitting a question of furnishing a defective service station hoist submit the defect in terms of “likely to” puncture certain gasoline tanks. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Mleczko
green
2 sentences1970Citing People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153 , 81 N.E.2d 65 , defendant contends that the testimony was damaging and prejudicially erroneous; that defendant’s silence was especially harmful in view of the store owner’s identification of defendant both at the scene of the crime and at the police station. 1970Citing People v. Mleczko, 298 N.Y. 153 , 81 N.E.2d 65 , defendant contends that the testimony was damaging and prejudicially erroneous; that defendant’s silence was especially harmful in view of the store owner’s identification of defendant both at the scene of the crime and at the police station. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Crestview of Ohio, Inc. v. Donahue
neutral
2 sentences1969If the suggested factors are not sufficient to distinguish the cases granting tax immunity the cases denying the exemption, while recognizing, as in Missouri, a broader concept or perhaps more accurately a concept adapted to changed conditions, emphasize certain significant factors not mentioned or minimized in the cases extending the meaning of “used exclusively * * * for purposes purely charitable.” In the Ohio case mentioned earlier two factors were noted, one “that property partly or incidentally used for private residence is nonexempt as not used exclusively for charitable purposes” and t 1969If the suggested factors are not sufficient to distinguish the cases granting tax immunity the cases denying the exemption, while recognizing, as in Missouri, a broader concept or perhaps more accurately a concept adapted to changed conditions, emphasize certain significant factors not mentioned or minimized in the cases extending the meaning of “used exclusively * * * for purposes purely charitable.” In the Ohio case mentioned earlier two factors were noted, one “that property partly or incidentally used for private residence is nonexempt as not used exclusively for charitable purposes” and t | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Coney v. Rockford Life Insurance
green
1 sentence1969If the suggested factors are not sufficient to distinguish the cases granting tax immunity the cases denying the exemption, while recognizing, as in Missouri, a broader concept or perhaps more accurately a concept adapted to changed conditions, emphasize certain significant factors not mentioned or minimized in the cases extending the meaning of “used exclusively * * * for purposes purely charitable.” In the Ohio case mentioned earlier two factors were noted, one “that property partly or incidentally used for private residence is nonexempt as not used exclusively for charitable purposes” and t | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School District
red
1 sentence1969In the Texas case mentioned above, 426 S. W.2d 943 , a broader concept of “charitable” was recognized and as in the Missouri cases it was conceded that the fact of paying guests and the furnishing of incidental services, even a beauty shop, a canteen and visitors’ facilities, did not destroy the character of the facility. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Gaffner v. Alexander
green
1 sentence1960Gaffner v. Alexander, Mo., 331 S.W.2d 622, 628 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.