suggested test in Oregon

2016At one point in the opinion, the court suggested that the test under both state and federal constitutions is offense-specific. 296 Or at 95 .

2016At one point in the opinion, the court suggested that the test under both state and federal constitutions is offense-specific. 296 Or at 95 .

2024And this was no narrow conclusion; the Court suggested that this rule would ordinarily apply when “an expert relays an absent lab analyst’s statements as part of offering his opinion.” Id. {¶28} The facts of Smith help to illustrate the point.

2021According to the state, in its brief- ing before the trial court on the issue, “the Oregon Supreme Court decision in Hightower merely requires that [the trial court judge] state on the record that balancing of the com- peting interests has occurred.” The trial court agreed with the state’s suggested analysis, explaining that if it had “conducted the explicit exercise of discretion expected by Cite as 368 Or 378 (2021) 383 the Supreme Court[,] it would have decided a denial of self- representation was justified” based on concerns about defen- dant’s continued trial disruption.

2018In Steenson , this court suggested that the rule against appeal of a voluntary nonsuit might not apply "[i]f the plaintiff takes a nonsuit because of a ruling which precludes recovery ." Steenson , 236 Or. at 417 , 385 P.2d 738 (emphasis added).

2018In Steenson , this court suggested that the rule against appeal of a voluntary nonsuit might not apply "[i]f the plaintiff takes a nonsuit because of a ruling which precludes recovery ." Steenson , 236 Or. at 417 , 385 P.2d 738 (emphasis added).

1992The trial court created instead a fourth question that, when read with the jury instructions as a whole, was remarkably similar to this court's suggested instruction set forth in Wagner II, supra, 309 Or. at 19, 786 P.2d 93 , an opinion issued over five months after defendant's trial in this case.

1992The trial court created instead a fourth question that, when read with the jury instructions as a whole, was remarkably similar to this court's suggested instruction set forth in Wagner II, supra, 309 Or. at 19, 786 P.2d 93 , an opinion issued over five months after defendant's trial in this case.

1987This case is governed by our decisions in In re Thomas, 294 Or 505 , 659 P2d 960 (1983), where a lawyer took *570 unearned fees from estates and conservatorships without prior court approval, and In re Pierson, 280 Or 513 , 571 P2d 907 (1977).

1987This case is governed by our decisions in In re Thomas, 294 Or 505 , 659 P2d 960 (1983), where a lawyer took *570 unearned fees from estates and conservatorships without prior court approval, and In re Pierson, 280 Or 513 , 571 P2d 907 (1977).

1987This case is governed by our decisions in In re Thomas, 294 Or 505 , 659 P2d 960 (1983), where a lawyer took *570 unearned fees from estates and conservatorships without prior court approval, and In re Pierson, 280 Or 513 , 571 P2d 907 (1977).

1987This case is governed by our decisions in In re Thomas, 294 Or 505 , 659 P2d 960 (1983), where a lawyer took *570 unearned fees from estates and conservatorships without prior court approval, and In re Pierson, 280 Or 513 , 571 P2d 907 (1977).

1987The sanction in this case is discussed infra at 17. 17 The accused’s suggested test is similar to one developed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Johnson, 322 NW2d 616 (Minn 1982).

1980The court there nonetheless added, by way of dicta: "It should not be assumed that whatever is found on the premises described in the warrant necessarily falls within the proper scope of the search; rather, it is necessary to examine why a person’s belongings happen to be on the premises. '[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 352 , 88 S Ct 507, 511 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), and the protective boundary established by requiring a search warrant should encompass those extensions of a person which he reasonably seeks to preserve as private, regardl

1980The court there nonetheless added, by way of dicta: "It should not be assumed that whatever is found on the premises described in the warrant necessarily falls within the proper scope of the search; rather, it is necessary to examine why a person’s belongings happen to be on the premises. '[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ Katz v. United States, 389 US 347, 352 , 88 S Ct 507, 511 , 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), and the protective boundary established by requiring a search warrant should encompass those extensions of a person which he reasonably seeks to preserve as private, regardl

1962To adopt the suggested rule of the Restatement so far, at least, as the operation of automobiles by minors is concerned, may be an innovation on the law of Oregon, but if so it is one that is justified by “the circumstances of contemporary life”, Dellwo v. Pearson, supra. We may agree that, as the new Hampshire court said in the Charb ornean case in respect to their statute, when the legislature of this state provided that a license to operate an automobile shall not be issued to any person under the age of 16 years, ORS 482.110, it did not undertake to deal with the rule of care.

1944It may be assumed that the commission — being composed of capable and conscientious officials — would administer the act equitably under such rule of guidance but, after all, the constitutionality of a statute ‘ ‘must be determined by what can be done under it and not by what actually takes place”: Bell v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 157 Or. 653 , 74 P. (2d) 55 .

1944It may be assumed that the commission — being composed of capable and conscientious officials — would administer the act equitably under such rule of guidance but, after all, the constitutionality of a statute ‘ ‘must be determined by what can be done under it and not by what actually takes place”: Bell v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 157 Or. 653 , 74 P. (2d) 55 .