suggested instruction in Texas

1940The suggested instruction is an improvement over that made in Southern Ice & Utilities Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex. 82 , 95 S.W.2d 956 , in that it is not subject to the construction that it in effect withdraws the instruction as to burden of proof which is correctly placed on plaintiff by the form of the question.” The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1938It is not necessary, of course, that the jury be instructed to answer the question by a single affirmative or a single ‘negative, and is suggested that it is conducive to certainty that the answer will be expressed in accordance with the actual finding made, to instruct the jury that in the event its finding is in the affirmative the form of the answer should be, Tt was not an unavoidable accident’; and that ‘otherwise, the answer should be “no.” ’ * * * The suggested instruction is an improvement over that made in Southern Ice & Utilities Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex, 82, 95 S.W.2d 956 , in tha

1980In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the court suggested that a rule banning political buttons or bumper stickers might be impermissible, but did not reach this issue. 413 U.S. at 617 , 622 .

1980In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (l973), the court suggested that a rule banning political buttons or bumper stickers might be impermissible, but did . not reach this issue. 413 U.S. at 617, 622.

1940The suggested instruction is an improvement over that made in Southern Ice & Utilities Co. v. Richardson, 128 Tex. 82 , 95 S.W.2d 956 , in that it is not subject to the construction that it in effect withdraws the instruction as to burden of proof which is correctly placed on plaintiff by the form of the question.” The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1938The suggested instruction is an improvement over that made in.Southern Ice & Utilities Co. v. Richardson, 128 Texas 82 , 95 S. W. (2d) 956 , in that it is not subject to the construction that it in effect withdraws the instruction as to burden of proof which is correctly placed on plaintiff by the form of the question. 3 The second question is whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit deceased’s wife, Maria Giun, to state in her testimony her version of what the engineer said in conversation *552 with her through an interpreter at the scene of the accident shortly after it occurred.

2019Further, an instruction defining “unlawful force” consistent with appellant’s suggestion would not be a neutral statement of the law regarding the statutorily undefined term of “unlawful force.” Moreover, it would have impinged on the jury’s fact-finding authority by “improperly tell[ing] the jury how to consider certain evidence before it.” See Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 214 .

2014It would be highly prejudicial to show something that no one understands. [The State]: Actually, Your Honor, if you could turn to Page 10 in [Peralto v. State, 338 S.W.3d 598 , 604–05 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.)]— the Court specifically addressed that issue that Defense Counsel is laying, and gives the Court a suggested instruction regarding the fact that an official transcription and translation of the interview will be provided to them at a later date, which is the State’s intention.

2014Suggested factors in the trial court’s determination of reliability include: (1) the extent to which the underlying scientific theory and technique are accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community, if such a community can be ascertained; (2) the qualifications of the experts testifying; (3) the existence of literature supporting or rejecting the underlying scientific theory and technique; (4) the potential rate of error of the technique; (5) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; (6) the clarity with which the underlying scientific theory and technique

2000Although in reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court did not adopt en toto the reasoning of the dissent, it did set out many of the same suggested factors for determining public utility status, including 1) “an obligation to afford its facilities to the public generally upon demand,” and 2) in “large measure an independence and freedom from business competition” by a) a monopoly status or b) a franchise from the State placing it in the position of a public utility. 137 F.2d at 217 .

1998Id. at 132 .

1993Appellants also cite Loomis v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 123 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1938, writ ref’d), for the proposition that mere nonuse of property even for a long time is not abandonment or *762 desire to cease operating.

1992Broddus , 693 S.W.2d at 461 ; Shallhorn v. State , 671 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1984), aff'd 732 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim.

1992Broddus , 693 S.W.2d at 461 ; Shallhorn v. State , 671 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1984), aff'd 732 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim.

1992Broddus , 693 S.W.2d at 461 ; Shallhorn v. State , 671 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1984), aff'd 732 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim.

1988Rose, 752 S.W.2d at 554 .

1987This instruction is very similar to the suggested instruction submitted in Stone, 703 S.W.2d at 654 .

1983The suggested standard of review is premised on Judge Norvell's authoritative opinion in Hoey v. Solt, 236 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ) which pronounces the legal test for negligence as a matter of law as follows: If reasonable minds can differ as to the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the undisputed evidence, then the case is one for the jury.

1983The suggested standard of review is premised on Judge Norvell’s authoritative opinion in Hoey v. Solt, 236 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ) which pronounces the legal test for negligence as a matter of law as follows: If reasonable minds can differ as to the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the undisputed evidence, then the case is one for the jury.

1957App., 219 S.W. 2d 144 , writ refused, N.R.E., in which rescission was allowed but a recovery of damages against an innocent principal was disallowed.

1957The suggested rule was adopted and applied in Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. Willis, Tex.Civ.App., 219 S.W.2d 144 , writ refused, N.R.E., in which rescission was allowed but a recovery of damages against an innocent principal was disallowed.

1953Of course it was the court’s duty to determine as a matter of law that the facts adduced on behalf of • cross-plaintiffs reflected testimony of the described quality [as set out in above requested instruction]; if so, the issue became a matter for the jury’s determination under the usual preponderance of evidence.” Perry v. Long, supra, 222 S.W.2d at page 465 .