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15 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collins v. Rizkanagreen2 sentences1997See, also, Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 69-70 , 652 N.E.2d at 657-658 , wherein we adopted the suggested analysis set forth in footnote eight of the Painter decision, including the suggested analysis of the clarity element of the tort of wrongful discharge. 1997See, also, Collins, 73 Ohio St.3d at 69-70 , 652 N.E.2d at 657-658 , wherein we adopted the suggested analysis set forth in footnote eight of the Painter decision, including the suggested analysis of the clarity element of the tort of wrongful discharge. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Howardgreen1 sentence2016Howard, 42 Ohio St.3d at 25 (although opining the American Bar Association’s suggested instruction was not the preferable approach, the Court noted it would not disapprove of its use). | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Foundationgreen2 sentences2012See Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 130 Ohio App.3d 262, 281 , 719 N.E.2d 1052 (8th Dist.1998). 2012See Watkins v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 130 Ohio App.3d 262, 281 , 719 N.E.2d 1052 (8th Dist.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Dutton v. Evansgreen1 sentence1981Dutton, supra, at 87, 89 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Kinneygreen2 sentences2016But see Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 78 , 728 N.E.2d 1052 (2000) (recognizing that mitigating factors may justify a lesser sanction in some cases involving attorney dishonesty). {¶ 15} In accordance with this suggested presumption and in light of Paris’s repeated and unwelcome solicitation of his client, his failure to appear for her sentencing hearing after she rebuffed his advances, his failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the absence of additional mitigating evidence, the board recommends that we suspend Paris from the practice of law for six month 2016But see Dayton Bar Assn. v. Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 78 , 728 N.E.2d 1052 (2000) (recognizing that mitigating factors may justify a lesser sanction in some cases involving attorney dishonesty). {¶ 15} In accordance with this suggested presumption and in light of Paris’s repeated and unwelcome solicitation of his client, his failure to appear for her sentencing hearing after she rebuffed his advances, his failure to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the absence of additional mitigating evidence, the board recommends that we suspend Paris from the practice of law for six month | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Painter v. Graley
green
2 sentences1997In determining whether appellant has a viable common-law cause of action under Greeley and its progeny for tortious wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, we reaffirm the following suggested analysis set forth in Painter, supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 , fn. 8: “In reviewing future cases, Ohio courts may find useful the analysis of Villanova Law Professor H. 1997In determining whether appellant has a viable common-law cause of action under Greeley and its progeny for tortious wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, we reaffirm the following suggested analysis set forth in Painter, supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 384 , 639 N.E.2d at 57 , fn. 8: “In reviewing future cases, Ohio courts may find useful the analysis of Villanova Law Professor H. | 3 | 1995–1997 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1998State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29 , 676 N.E.2d 82, 96 . 1998State v. Taylor (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 15, 29 , 676 N.E.2d 82, 96 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.
green
2 sentences1997Furthermore, in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 103 , 19 OBR 261, 263, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 , we recognized that the employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio is not “without any defined limits.” In Mers , we specifically cited Section 660(c), Title 29, U.S.Code as one example of the type of laws forbidding retaliatory discharge. 1997Furthermore, in Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 103 , 19 OBR 261, 263, 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 , we recognized that the employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio is not “without any defined limits.” In Mers , we specifically cited Section 660(c), Title 29, U.S.Code as one example of the type of laws forbidding retaliatory discharge. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2026It was not until the trial court suggested that defense counsel amend Dr. Wiens’s report to include the information she gleaned from viewing the original slide that defense counsel indicated he would abandon the entire line of questioning. {¶41} This exchange strongly suggests that defense counsel’s actions were the product of something other than “sound trial strategy.” See Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d at 100 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences2005In Hudson , the Court suggested that the factors considered in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 , 83 S.Ct. 554 (1963), serve as "useful guideposts" in determining whether a sanction amounts to either a civil remedy or criminal penalty. 2005In Hudson , the Court suggested that the factors considered in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 , 83 S.Ct. 554 (1963), serve as "useful guideposts" in determining whether a sanction amounts to either a civil remedy or criminal penalty. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Goff
green
2 sentences2005But the reasonable-doubt instruction given followed the suggested instruction in State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123 , 132, 694 N.E.2d 916 . 2005But the reasonable-doubt instruction given followed the suggested instruction in State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123 , 132, 694 N.E.2d 916 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Preston v. Murty
green
2 sentences1994In Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 334 , 512 N.E.2d 1174 , at the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined "actual malice” necessary for an award of punitive damages as: "(1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.” (Emphasis sic.) 4 . 1 Ohio Jury Instructions (1993), Section 23.70, Subsection 9, the suggested instruction on attorney fees in these circumstances, reads: “If you decide th 1994In Preston v. Murty (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 334 , 512 N.E.2d 1174 , at the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio defined "actual malice” necessary for an award of punitive damages as: "(1) that state of mind under which a person’s conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.” (Emphasis sic.) 4 . 1 Ohio Jury Instructions (1993), Section 23.70, Subsection 9, the suggested instruction on attorney fees in these circumstances, reads: “If you decide th | 1 | 1994–1994 |
O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp.
green
1 sentence1983In the very recent case (April 13, 1983) of O’Stricker v. Jim, Walter Corp., 4 Ohio St. 3d 84, at 90 , the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted and defined the discovery rule as applied to the accrual of bodily injury actions under R.C. 2305.10: “When an injury does not manifest itself immediately, the cause of action, arises upon the date on which the plaintiff is informed by competent medical authority that he has been injured, or upon the date on which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he should have become aware that he had been injured, whichever date occurs first.” Obviously, O’Stricker | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Muzzy
green
1 sentence1970It is separate and distinct from a criminal action on a charge of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. * * # Effectual revocation is not dependent upon conviction of the criminal charge related to the suggested test. * * * The purpose of the suspension or revocation is to protect the public and not to punish the licensee. * * *” And in the case of State v. Muzzy, supra ( 124 Vt. 222 ), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus provide: “1. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.