34 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilkersongreen2 sentences2013The court, in addition to finding that a defendant is a “dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high,” must also make a finding that consecutive sentencing is “necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct by the defendant and that the consecutive sentences must reasonably relate to the severity of the offenses committed.” See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn. 1995). 2013The Petitioner also claims on appeal that “trial counsel failed to adequately inform [him] of the factors involving consecutive [versus] concurrent sentencing.” Specifically, he asserts that trial counsel did not discuss the seven factors found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) for imposing consecutive sentences or discuss the two-prong findings of State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), required for the dangerous offender criterion. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Oodygreen2 sentences2008See id. 1998State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Electroplating, Inc.green2 sentences2021On June 15, 2020, the trial court entered an extensive sentencing memorandum in which it analyzed in detail the seven factors required to be considered and weighed for -5- judicial diversion as set forth in State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. 2014Thus, our prior caselaw, which pursuant to Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 228-29 , essentially required the “automatic reversal” of any judicial diversion decision in which a trial court failed to expressly articulate and consider any one of the seven factors established in Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958-59 , appears to have been trumped by our duty to conduct an independent review of the record when faced with procedural deficiencies in a judge’s sentencing soliloquy. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Mickensgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Mickens, 123 S.W.3d 355, 394 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ashbygreen1 sentence2021State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). - 16 - A trial court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that any one or more of the seven factors listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) applies, including the three factors that the trial court found in this case: the Defendant was an offender whose record of criminal activity was extensive; the Defendant was a dangerous offender whose behavior indicated little or no regard for human life and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life was hig | 1 | 1 |
State v. Talleygreen1 sentence2020Talley, 307 S.W.3d at 731 (internal citations and quotations omitted). - 20 - The trial court also considered the federal authority on this issue. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 978 S.W.2d 558, 566-67 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bise
green
2 sentences2018Id. § 40-35-115(b)(2). 2014“So long as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as provided by statute, a sentence imposed by the trial court within the appropriate range should be upheld.” Id. -4- Additionally, the trial court may order multiple sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that one or more of the seven factors listed in the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) apply, including that the defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive, or that the defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while o | 9 | 2014–2018 |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Pollard
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2019Pollard, 432 S.W.3d at 860 . | 3 | 2019–2019 |
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudle
green
2 sentences2014Id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). 2013Id. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (6). | 2 | 2013–2014 |
United States v. John M. Haydel, Jr., A/K/A \Ice Cream\" and \"Mugsy\""
green
2 sentences2010After observing that the federal and state constitutions afforded privacy protections to the *731 resident of a hotel or motel room, this Court recognized a totality of the circumstances test, applying the seven factors developed in United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir.1981), but also carved out an exception, holding that when a defendant disclaims any interest in the object of a governmental search, the expectation of privacy is lost. 2010These seven Haydel factors are the following: (1) property ownership; (2) whether the defendant has a posse ssory inte rest in the property seized; (3) whether the defendant has a possesso ry interest in the place searched; (4) whether the defendant has "a right to exclude others from that place"; (5) whether the defendant has "exhibited a subjective expec tation th at it would remain free from governmental invasion"; (6) whether the de fenda nt "took norm al prec aution s to m aintain his privacy"; and (7) -6 - whether the defendant was "legitimately o n the pre mises ." Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Washington
green
1 sentence2025Because the trial court adequately considered the seven factors outlined in Electroplating and Parker, it was permitted to consider the factors outlined in Washington, 866 S.W.2d at 951 , including the attitude of law enforcement. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Clapp v. State
green
1 sentence2020Id. § 40-35-115(b)(2). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Carter
green
1 sentence2016Id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2015Id. § 40-35-115(b)(1), (2). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Parker
green
1 sentence2014Thus, our prior caselaw, which pursuant to Electroplating, 990 S.W.2d at 228-29 , essentially required the “automatic reversal” of any judicial diversion decision in which a trial court failed to expressly articulate and consider any one of the seven factors established in Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958-59 , appears to have been trumped by our duty to conduct an independent review of the record when faced with procedural deficiencies in a judge’s sentencing soliloquy. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Flemming
green
1 sentence2014Id. § 40-35-115(b)(4). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Ross
green
1 sentence2010Ross, 49 S.W.3d at 840-42 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.