seven factors in California

2015If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the . . . scheme is ‗ ―so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State‘s] intention‖ to deem it ―civil.‖ ‘ [Citation.] Because we ‗ordinarily defer to the legislature‘s stated intent‘ [citation], ‗ ―only the clearest proof‖ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,‘ [citations].‖ (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. 84, 92 .) 23 ―In analyzing the effects of the [legislative] [a]ct,

2015If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the . . . scheme is ‘ “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.” ’ [Citation.] Because we ‘ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent,’ [citation], ‘ “only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,’ [citations].” (Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. 84, 92 .) “In analyzing the effects of the [legislative] [a]ct, we

2026(McDaniel, at p. 244.) The court noted that neither the RJA nor Young mandates any particular type of “specific facts,” and courts should instead evaluate whether the proffered facts are relevant to allegations of racial bias and establish a minimally plausible basis “to grant discovery—a low threshold.” (McDaniel, at p. 244.) 11 If a defendant makes a threshold plausible justification showing to grant discovery, the trial court must then consider and balance the seven factors listed in Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1118 .

2026(McDaniel, at p. 244.) The court noted that neither the RJA nor Young mandates any particular type of “specific facts,” and courts should instead evaluate whether the proffered facts are relevant to allegations of racial bias and establish a minimally plausible basis “to grant discovery—a low threshold.” (McDaniel, at p. 244.) 11 If a defendant makes a threshold plausible justification showing to grant discovery, the trial court must then consider and balance the seven factors listed in Alhambra, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d 1118 .

2020Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1351, 362 .) In making this determination, courts consider the following seven factors: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and 25 deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether there is a rational alternative purpose, and (7) whether it appears excessive in relat

2018The purpose of PEPRA was, in part, “‘to reset overly generous and unsustainable pension formulas for both current and future workers.’” ( Marin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681- 682, quoting Little Hoover Com., Public Pensions for Retirement Security (Feb. 2011), p. 53.) Stated another way, PEPRA was enacted “in an attempt to curb what were seen as pervasive abuses in public pension systems throughout California, . . .” (Alameda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 .) “Only the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the 17 Legislature’s stated intent and render a nominally civil statute penal fo

2018"Nothing in Family Code section 3011 defines what the court's statement of reasons must contain except that it include the court's reasons for the custody award in light of allegations of ... abuse." ( A.G. v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1284-1285, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 .) The purpose of the statement of reasons is to permit meaningful review by the appellate court. ( Williams , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 815 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 ; but see Jaime G ., supra , 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 .) The court in Jaime G . recently held that section 3011, subdivision (e)(1),

2018"Nothing in Family Code section 3011 defines what the court's statement of reasons must contain except that it include the court's reasons for the custody award in light of allegations of ... abuse." ( A.G. v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1284-1285, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 .) The purpose of the statement of reasons is to permit meaningful review by the appellate court. ( Williams , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 815 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 ; but see Jaime G ., supra , 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 .) The court in Jaime G . recently held that section 3011, subdivision (e)(1),

2018"Nothing in Family Code section 3011 defines what the court's statement of reasons must contain except that it include the court's reasons for the custody award in light of allegations of ... abuse." ( A.G. v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1284-1285, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 .) The purpose of the statement of reasons is to permit meaningful review by the appellate court. ( Williams , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 815 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 ; but see Jaime G ., supra , 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 .) The court in Jaime G . recently held that section 3011, subdivision (e)(1),

2018"Nothing in Family Code section 3011 defines what the court's statement of reasons must contain except that it include the court's reasons for the custody award in light of allegations of ... abuse." ( A.G. v. C.S. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1269 , 1284-1285, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 .) The purpose of the statement of reasons is to permit meaningful review by the appellate court. ( Williams , supra , 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 815 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 923 ; but see Jaime G ., supra , 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 806-807, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 .) The court in Jaime G . recently held that section 3011, subdivision (e)(1),

2022“Because the traditional weighing process using the seven factors set forth in [Rowland] ‘has already been done by courts over the centuries in formulating that “no duty to aid” rule’ in the context of liability for nonfeasance, it is not necessary to engage in the weighing process in a particular case. [Citation.]” (Seo, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1203 .) The threshold question is whether the claims against Shelter Clean are based on malfeasance or nonfeasance.

2009“Because the traditional weighing process using the seven factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 ], ‘has already been done by courts over the centuries in formulating the “no duty to aid” rule’ in the context of liability for nonfeasance, it is not necessary to engage in the weighing process in a particular case. [Citation.]” (Seo, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1203 .) The common law does recognize, however, that a special relationship of the type that gives rise to a duty to take affirmative action to protect another may be created b

2021(Id. at pp. 581–582.) The reasoning of Martinez is undermined by the court’s reliance upon a case, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 (Keller), that has since been disapproved by the court that wrote it, finding it went “far beyond the Lent test” and was inconsistent with subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)3 The Martinez 3 As described in Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at page 66 , Keller “went far beyond the Lent test to list a total of seven factors we would require to uphold a probation condition, including what we deemed a con

2021(Id. at pp. 581–582.) The reasoning of Martinez is undermined by the court’s reliance upon a case, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 (Keller), that has since been disapproved by the court that wrote it, finding it went “far beyond the Lent test” and was inconsistent with subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)3 The Martinez 3 As described in Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at page 66 , Keller “went far beyond the Lent test to list a total of seven factors we would require to uphold a probation condition, including what we deemed a con

2021(Id. at pp. 581–582.) The reasoning of Martinez is undermined by the court’s reliance upon a case, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 (Keller), that has since been disapproved by the court that wrote it, finding it went “far beyond the Lent test” and was inconsistent with subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)3 The Martinez 3 As described in Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at page 66 , Keller “went far beyond the Lent test to list a total of seven factors we would require to uphold a probation condition, including what we deemed a con

2021(Id. at pp. 581–582.) The reasoning of Martinez is undermined by the court’s reliance upon a case, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 (Keller), that has since been disapproved by the court that wrote it, finding it went “far beyond the Lent test” and was inconsistent with subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)3 The Martinez 3 As described in Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at page 66 , Keller “went far beyond the Lent test to list a total of seven factors we would require to uphold a probation condition, including what we deemed a con

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2020In the process, we include additional relevant case citations to those set forth in Alhambra and Hoffstadt on Criminal Discovery: (1) Has the defendant carried his burden of showing a “ ‘plausible justification’ ” for acquiring documents from a third party (Kling v. Superior Court of Ventura County (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1068, 1075 (Kling); Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 , 817–818 (Hill) [discovery context]; Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 804 (Joe Z.) [discovery context]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 (Ballard) [discovery context]; see also, e.g., F

2018The purpose of PEPRA was, in part, “‘to reset overly generous and unsustainable pension formulas for both current and future workers.’” ( Marin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681- 682, quoting Little Hoover Com., Public Pensions for Retirement Security (Feb. 2011), p. 53.) Stated another way, PEPRA was enacted “in an attempt to curb what were seen as pervasive abuses in public pension systems throughout California, . . .” (Alameda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 .) “Only the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the 17 Legislature’s stated intent and render a nominally civil statute penal fo

2018The purpose of PEPRA was, in part, “‘to reset overly generous and unsustainable pension formulas for both current and future workers.’” ( Marin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681- 682, quoting Little Hoover Com., Public Pensions for Retirement Security (Feb. 2011), p. 53.) Stated another way, PEPRA was enacted “in an attempt to curb what were seen as pervasive abuses in public pension systems throughout California, . . .” (Alameda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 .) “Only the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the 19 Legislature’s stated intent and render a nominally civil statute penal fo

2018The purpose of PEPRA was, in part, “‘to reset overly generous and unsustainable pension formulas for both current and future workers.’” ( Marin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681- 682, quoting Little Hoover Com., Public Pensions for Retirement Security (Feb. 2011), p. 53.) Stated another way, PEPRA was enacted “in an attempt to curb what were seen as pervasive abuses in public pension systems throughout California, . . .” (Alameda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 .) “Only the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the 17 Legislature’s stated intent and render a nominally civil statute penal fo

2018The purpose of PEPRA was, in part, “‘to reset overly generous and unsustainable pension formulas for both current and future workers.’” ( Marin, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681- 682, quoting Little Hoover Com., Public Pensions for Retirement Security (Feb. 2011), p. 53.) Stated another way, PEPRA was enacted “in an attempt to curb what were seen as pervasive abuses in public pension systems throughout California, . . .” (Alameda, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 75 .) “Only the ‘clearest proof’ will suffice to override the 19 Legislature’s stated intent and render a nominally civil statute penal fo

2022(Cabral, at p. 773.) To determine whether policy considerations support an exception to or limitation of the general duty of care, courts look to the following seven factors identified by our Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland): “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conseq

2022(Cabral, at p. 773.) To determine whether policy considerations support an exception to or limitation of the general duty of care, courts look to the following seven factors identified by our Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland): “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conseq

2022(Cabral, at p. 773.) To determine whether policy considerations support an exception to or limitation of the general duty of care, courts look to the following seven factors identified by our Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland): “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conseq

2022(Cabral, at p. 773.) To determine whether policy considerations support an exception to or limitation of the general duty of care, courts look to the following seven factors identified by our Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland): “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and conseq

2021(Id. at pp. 581–582.) The reasoning of Martinez is undermined by the court’s reliance upon a case, People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827 (Keller), that has since been disapproved by the court that wrote it, finding it went “far beyond the Lent test” and was inconsistent with subsequent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. ( Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)3 The Martinez 3 As described in Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at page 66 , Keller “went far beyond the Lent test to list a total of seven factors we would require to uphold a probation condition, including what we deemed a con

2020Additionally, an ex post facto argument quite similar to the District’s was rejected in Bishop of Oakland, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 1155 , which considered a 2002 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 providing a one-year revival period for claims of liability for failure to take 12 reasonable steps to prevent childhood sexual abuse that had expired under the prior statute of limitations.

2020(Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez (1963) 372 U.S. 144 , 168–169; Bishop of Oakland, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1162–1163.) Its contention that six of the seven factors “weigh in favor of a finding of unconstitutionality,” is directed at the treble damages provision.

2013Once again, the trial court is presumed to have considered those factors (People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 ); defendant bears the burden of clearly showing the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or irrational; absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives; and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 ).

2013Once again, the trial court is presumed to have considered those factors (People v. Pearson (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 740, 749 ); defendant bears the burden of clearly showing the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or irrational; absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives; and the trial court’s decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377 ).

2013Hernandez cites the following seven factors to be considered in determining when consent is voluntary: (1) physical domination of the defendant; (2) implied threats; (3) lack of a specific statement that consent can be withheld; (4) presence or absence of a consent form; (5) whether Miranda (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 ) warnings were given; (6) physical acquiescence without a verbal response; and, (7) the defendant’s age, education, intelligence, and knowledge of the law.

2010(Castellanos, supra , 21 Cal.4th at p. 795 , fn. 5.) In her separate opinion, Justice Kennard stressed "the Mendoza-Martinez factors are a central part of the second prong of the intent/effect test, and criticized the majority for its truncated analysis of those factors. ( Id. at p. 802 (conc. dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) The Smith court stated: "In analyzing the effects of the Act we refer to the seven factors noted in [Mendoza-Martinez] , as a useful framework.