18 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2020The court went on to analyze the seven factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), for determining whether an act has a punitive effect and concluded the effect of the Notice Law was not punitive so as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent. 2017Defendant argues that we should disregard this precedent and look to Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), which sets forth the following seven factors to determine whether an ostensibly civil statute has a punitive effect: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether the sanction historically has been regarded as punishment, (3) whether the sanction applies only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether operation of the sanction promotes retribution and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crim | 2 | 5 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2013Consiglio, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 33 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (applying same seven Kennedy factors used in double jeopardy analysis to ex post facto analysis)). 2013Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (applying same seven Kennedy factors used in double jeopardy analysis to ex post facto analysis). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Fredericksgreen2 sentences2017Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶ 58 (applying Mendoza-Martinez factors). ¶ 28 Defendant contends that, applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we should find that the registration requirement is a punishment and that the Act therefore violates the ex post facto clauses by retroactively imposing the registration requirement upon him for a crime (attempted criminal sexual assault) committed more than 30 years ago. 2017Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶ 58 (applying Mendoza-Martinez factors). ¶ 28 Defendant contends that, applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, we should find that the registration requirement is a punishment and that the Act therefore violates the ex post facto clauses by retroactively imposing the registration requirement upon him for a crime (attempted criminal sexual assault) committed more than 30 years ago. | 2 | 2 |
Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hospitalgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Case v. Galesburg Cottage Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 207, 212-13 (2007) (setting forth factors). | 1 | 1 |
Behrmann v. National Heritage Foundation, Inc.green1 sentence2020Seaside Engineering, 780 F. 3d at 1079 (citing Behrmann v. National Heritage Foundation, 663 F. 3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011)). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 776546green1 sentence2020See Seaside Engineering, 780 F. 3d at 1079 . ¶ 36 A seven-factor test guides a bankruptcy court when deciding whether a nondebtor release from a creditor’s claim is appropriate: “ ‘[W]hen the following seven factors are present, the bankruptcy court may enjoin a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor: (1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190218-U against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate; (2) The non-deb | 1 | 1 |
SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc. (In Re Seaside Engineering & Surveying, Inc.)green2 sentences2020See Seaside Engineering, 780 F. 3d at 1079 . ¶ 36 A seven-factor test guides a bankruptcy court when deciding whether a nondebtor release from a creditor’s claim is appropriate: “ ‘[W]hen the following seven factors are present, the bankruptcy court may enjoin a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor: (1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190218-U against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate; (2) The non-deb 2020See Seaside Engineering, 780 F. 3d at 1079 . ¶ 36 A seven-factor test guides a bankruptcy court when deciding whether a nondebtor release from a creditor’s claim is appropriate: “ ‘[W]hen the following seven factors are present, the bankruptcy court may enjoin a non-consenting creditor’s claims against a non-debtor: (1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party, usually an indemnity relationship, such that a suit -9- 2020 IL App (2d) 190218-U against the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate; (2) The non-deb | 1 | 1 |
Consiglio v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulationgreen2 sentences2013Consiglio, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 29 . ¶ 22 Taken together, the seven factors do not weigh in favor of concluding that the statute has a punitive effect sufficient to overcome its lack of punitive intent. 2013Consiglio, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 33 (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (applying same seven Kennedy factors used in double jeopardy analysis to ex post facto analysis)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Segal v. Sacco
green
2 sentences2007The supreme court in Segal identified the following seven factors a court must consider when determining whether to grant a Rule 103(b) motion: “(1) the length of time used to obtain service of process; (2) the activities of plaintiff; (3) plaintiffs knowledge of defendant’s location; (4) the ease with which defendant’s whereabouts could have been ascertained; (5) actual knowledge on the part of the defendant of pendency of the action ***; (6) special circumstances which would affect plaintiff’s efforts; and (7) actual service on defendant.” Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 287 . 2007The supreme court in Segal identified the following seven factors a court must consider when determining whether to grant a Rule 103(b) motion: "(1) the length of time used to obtain service of process; (2) the activities of plaintiff; (3) plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's location; (4) the ease with which defendant's whereabouts could have been ascertained; (5) actual knowledge on the part of the defendant of pendency of the action***; (6) special circumstances which would affect plaintiff's efforts; and (7) actual service on defendant." Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 287 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Frances K.
green
2 sentences2002The dissent pointed out that the language in section 2-107.1(a)(4)(D) had been amended-from "`That the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm'" to "`That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.'" Frances K., 322 Ill. 2002The dissent pointed out that the language in section 2 — 107.1(a)(4)(D) had been amended — from “ ‘That the benefits of the psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm’ ” to “ ‘That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.’ ” Frances K., 322 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Malchow
green
1 sentence2020Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 421-24 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence2012Davis I, 231 Ill. 2d at 361 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes
green
1 sentence2003Illinois courts have applied two tests to determine whether an employer has a near-permanent relationship with its customers: the nature-of-the-business test, which considers the general characteristics of a business; and the seven-factors test, established in Agrimerica, Inc. v. Mathes, 199 Ill. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Rafael Santana and Francis Fuentes
green
2 sentences2000The seven factors listed above, as well as other tests devised, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration’s guidelines, described in a footnote in Santana ( 6 F.3d at 6 n.8), are a good place to start in drug cases, but each case must be judged on its own facts. 2000The seven factors listed above, as well as other tests devised, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration's guidelines, described in a footnote in Santana ( 6 F.3d at 6 n.8), are a good place to start in drug cases, but each case must be judged on its own facts. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.