seven factors in New Jersey

2021In Burnett, this Court adopted the following seven privacy factors outlined in Doe to assess whether disclosure pursuant to OPRA was appropriate in light of the privacy concerns: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,

2017After applying the seven factors outlined in Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 427 , 968 A.2d 1161 (2009) (adopting factors announced in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995), to analyze OPRA), the court held that OPRA’s privacy exemption barred release of relief applications, names of applicants, and amounts paid through the Association’s financial assistance programs.

2021In Burnett, this Court adopted the following seven privacy factors outlined in Doe to assess whether disclosure pursuant to OPRA was appropriate in light of the privacy concerns: (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy,

2017After applying the seven factors outlined in Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 427 , 968 A.2d 1161 (2009) (adopting factors announced in Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 , 662 A.2d 367 (1995), to analyze OPRA), the court held that OPRA’s privacy exemption barred release of relief applications, names of applicants, and amounts paid through the Association’s financial assistance programs.

2014Judge Skillman focused on two of the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661 (1963), which should be considered in determining whether a statute is punitive in effect.

2014Judge Skillman focused on two of the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661 (1963), which should be considered in determining whether a statute is punitive in effect.

2026Pursuant to his finding that DOBI proved counts two and three, he concluded that Robert acted 7 Kimmelman established that an agency assessing civil penalties should consider the following seven factors: good faith or bad faith; the ability to pay; the amount of profits obtained from the illegal activity; injury to the public; duration of the illegal activity or conspiracy; existence of criminal actions; and past violations. 108 N.J. at 137-39 .

2019The Commissioner also analyzed the seven factors that must be considered in determining the reasonableness of civil penalties under the Act pursuant to Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 137-39 (1987): (1) the defendant's good or bad faith; (2) defendant's ability to pay; (3) the amount of profits defendant obtained from the illegal activity; (4) the injury to the public; (5) duration of the conspiracy; (6) the existence of criminal or treble damages actions; and (7) past violations.

2017The court then balanced the six factors set forth in Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 , 505 A.2d 958 (1986), and determined that the common law did not require disclosure.

2017The court then balanced the six factors set forth in Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 , 505 A.2d 958 (1986), and determined that the common law did not require disclosure.

2026Secondly, the court must determine "whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 - 29(a)(1) to -29(a)([7]),[3] to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to 3 The seven factors are: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment[,] and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parentin

2026When harassment is the alleged predicate act, the court must find not only that the underlying conduct occurred but also that the defendant acted with the "purpose to harass." See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 ; State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576-77 (1997).

2026When harassment is the alleged predicate act, the court must find not only that the underlying conduct occurred but also that the defendant acted with the "purpose to harass." See J.D., 207 N.J. at 478 ; State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576-77 (1997).

2025Cole . . . and Spaeth [v. Srinivasan, 403 N.J.

2015Commrs., 61 N.J. 366, 374 (1972) (applying identical language in pre-OPRA Right to Know Law).

2014Super. at 347 - 48 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 154 N.J. 187, 197-98 (1998)).

2008However, the legislative objective in requiring the Attorney General to adopt guidelines regarding the waiver of juvenile delinquency complaints to adult court was "to ensure the uniform application of *958 [ N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26] throughout the State." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26f; see J.M., supra, 182 N.J. at 419 , 866 A. 2d 178 .

2008However, the legislative objective in requiring the Attorney General to adopt guidelines regarding the waiver of juvenile delinquency complaints to adult court was "to ensure the uniform application of *958 [ N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26] throughout the State." N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26f; see J.M., supra, 182 N.J. at 419 , 866 A. 2d 178 .

2007Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6(2) (1971) (articulating seven factors to be considered in all choice of law decisions); Restatement, supra, § 145(1) comment b (noting that in tort law, three of the factors of section 6(2) are relatively insignificant); see also Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122 , 733 A. 2d 1133 (identifying the seven factors in section 6 of the Restatement ).

2007Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 6(2) (1971) (articulating seven factors to be considered in all choice of law decisions); Restatement, supra, § 145(1) comment b (noting that in tort law, three of the factors of section 6(2) are relatively insignificant); see also Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122 , 733 A. 2d 1133 (identifying the seven factors in section 6 of the Restatement ).

1995The Court pursued the inquiry on that basis, simply noting that the District Court and the Court of Appeals had pursued an analysis based explicitly on the seven factors of the MendozctrMartinez “test.” The most it could say for Mendoza-Martinez was that “this list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of similar questions and provides some guidance in the present case.” Id. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. at 2641 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 750 (emphasis added).

1995The Court pursued the inquiry on that basis, simply noting that the District Court and the Court of Appeals had pursued an analysis based explicitly on the seven factors of the MendozctrMartinez “test.” The most it could say for Mendoza-Martinez was that “this list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of similar questions and provides some guidance in the present case.” Id. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. at 2641 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 750 (emphasis added).

1988Dugan, supra, 92 N.J. at 435 ; Stern, supra, 66 N.J. at 345 ; Green, supra, 85 N.J. at 15 ; Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 96, 97 ; Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412 (1988).

1988Dugan, supra, 92 N.J. at 435 ; Stern, supra, 66 N.J. at 345 ; Green, supra, 85 N.J. at 15 ; Portee, supra, 84 N.J. at 96, 97 ; Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412 (1988).