12 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2017In determining whether a statute is punitive in effect, Scruggs correctly recognizes at the outset that our analysis is guided by the seven factors as set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 2017In determining whether a statute is punitive in effect, Scruggs correctly recognizes at the outset that our analysis is guided 17 No. 2014AP2981-CR by the seven factors as set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jamal L. Williamsgreen2 sentences2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. 2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences2008When making its determination, the circuit court should take into account the following seven factors adopted from United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967): (1) the prior opportunity the witness had to observe the alleged criminal activity; (2) the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the accused's actual description; (3) any identification of another person prior to the lineup; (4) any identification by picture of the accused prior to the lineup; (5) failure to identify the accused on a prior occasion; (6) the lapse of time between the alleged crime and t 1997After examining the seven factors set forth in Wade , we conclude that the State has not demon strated by clear and convincing evidence, as Wade requires, that the in-court identification had an origin independent of the lineup or was " 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’" Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Fawcettgreen1 sentence2022See Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 251-54 (examining whether the “charging period set forth in this case is reasonable” such that the defendant was “adequately informed of the charges against him.”); see also Kempainen, 361 Wis. 2d 450, ¶¶24, 32-41 (agreeing with the Fawcett court’s use of the “reasonableness” test and applying the seven factors to determine whether the notice prong of Holesome 7 No. 2021AP174-CR was satisfied); Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶¶35-36, 42-53 (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brian S. Kempainengreen1 sentence2022See Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 251-54 (examining whether the “charging period set forth in this case is reasonable” such that the defendant was “adequately informed of the charges against him.”); see also Kempainen, 361 Wis. 2d 450, ¶¶24, 32-41 (agreeing with the Fawcett court’s use of the “reasonableness” test and applying the seven factors to determine whether the notice prong of Holesome 7 No. 2021AP174-CR was satisfied); Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶¶35-36, 42-53 (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Joel M. Hurleygreen1 sentence2022See Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d at 251-54 (examining whether the “charging period set forth in this case is reasonable” such that the defendant was “adequately informed of the charges against him.”); see also Kempainen, 361 Wis. 2d 450, ¶¶24, 32-41 (agreeing with the Fawcett court’s use of the “reasonableness” test and applying the seven factors to determine whether the notice prong of Holesome 7 No. 2021AP174-CR was satisfied); Hurley, 361 Wis. 2d 529, ¶¶35-36, 42-53 (same). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bolstadgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. 2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. | 1 | 1 |
State v. James R. Huntgreen2 sentences2018Because of the strength of the State's case, we are not surprised that the jury came to the only reasonable conclusion: Monahan was driving at the time of the crash; this factor weighs in favor of the State. *** ¶ 62 Applying the relevant circumstances of Monahan's case to these factors leads to the conclusion that the erroneous exclusion of the GPS data was harmless; that is, the State has met its burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Monahan] guilty absent the error." Hunt , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , ¶ 26, 851 N.W.2d 434 (quoting Harvey , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 2018Because of the strength of the State's case, we are not surprised that the jury came to the only reasonable conclusion: Monahan was driving at the time of the crash; this factor weighs in favor of the State. *** ¶ 62 Applying the relevant circumstances of Monahan's case to these factors leads to the conclusion that the erroneous exclusion of the GPS data was harmless; that is, the State has met its burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Monahan] guilty absent the error." Hunt , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , ¶ 26, 851 N.W.2d 434 (quoting Harvey , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eddie Lee Anthonygreen2 sentences2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. 2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rachelgreen2 sentences2017Id.; see also Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶ 33 . 2017Id.; see also Rachel, 254 Wis. 2d 215, ¶33 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. 2021"Only the 'clearest proof' will 'override [the statute's primary function] and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 661, ¶30 (quoting Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100 ). ¶30 Seven factors, referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors, guide our analysis of whether a sanction is punitive in effect. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Radaj
green
2 sentences2018Among the seven factors are (1) whether the surcharge promotes the traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; and (2) whether the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative, non- punitive purpose assigned to the sanction.4 ¶62 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when Williams was sentenced (and still in effect today), circuit courts are required to impose upon defendants a surcharge of 1 State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50 , 363 Wis. 2d 633 , 866 N.W.2d 758 . 2 See majority op., ¶38. 3 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶39 , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , 891 N.W.2d 786 . 2018Among the seven factors are (1) whether the surcharge promotes the traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; and (2) whether the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative, non- punitive purpose assigned to the sanction.4 ¶62 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when Williams was sentenced (and still in effect today), circuit courts are required to impose upon defendants a surcharge of 1 State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50 , 363 Wis. 2d 633 , 866 N.W.2d 758 . 2 See majority op., ¶38. 3 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶39 , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , 891 N.W.2d 786 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs
green
2 sentences2018Among the seven factors are (1) whether the surcharge promotes the traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; and (2) whether the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative, non- punitive purpose assigned to the sanction.4 ¶62 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when Williams was sentenced (and still in effect today), circuit courts are required to impose upon defendants a surcharge of 1 State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50 , 363 Wis. 2d 633 , 866 N.W.2d 758 . 2 See majority op., ¶38. 3 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶39 , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , 891 N.W.2d 786 . 2018Among the seven factors are (1) whether the surcharge promotes the traditional aims of punishment——retribution and deterrence; and (2) whether the sanction is excessive in relation to the alternative, non- punitive purpose assigned to the sanction.4 ¶62 Under the mandatory DNA surcharge statute in effect when Williams was sentenced (and still in effect today), circuit courts are required to impose upon defendants a surcharge of 1 State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50 , 363 Wis. 2d 633 , 866 N.W.2d 758 . 2 See majority op., ¶38. 3 State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, ¶39 , 373 Wis. 2d 312 , 891 N.W.2d 786 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Maday
green
2 sentences2002The combined effect of the procedural and substantive safeguards we discuss is that a sexual assault complainant will be subject to a psychological examination only when (1) the State insists on using a Maday expert to present Jensen evidence and (2) the defendant prevails under the seven factors of Maday , which specifically recognize and account for the intrusive nature of the examination. [7] On remand, if Rizzo receives a new trial because the circuit court determines that he was entitled to a psychological examination under Maday , the court may or may not need to revisit the treatment re 2002The combined effect of the procedural and substantive safeguards we discuss is that a sexual assault complainant will be subject to a psychological examination only when (1) the State insists on using a Maday expert to present Jensen evidence and (2) the defendant prevails under the seven factors of Maday , which specifically recognize and account for the intrusive nature of the examination. [7] On remand, if Rizzo receives a new trial because the circuit court determines that he was entitled to a psychological examination under Maday , the court may or may not need to revisit the treatment re | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2003In fact, on cross-examination, Dr. Ackerman essentially conceded that he could assess the delayed reporting aspects of the case without conducting a personal interview. 4 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it found that Rizzo had not demonstrated a compelling need for a psychological examination of D.F. 5 *918 By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 242 , 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988) (holding that expert testimony that a child sexual assault complainant's behavior was consistent with the common behaviors of kno 2003In fact, on cross-examination, Dr. Ackerman essentially conceded that he could assess the delayed reporting aspects of the case without conducting a personal interview. 4 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it found that Rizzo had not demonstrated a compelling need for a psychological examination of D.F. 5 *918 By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed. 1 State v. Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d 240, 242 , 432 N.W.2d 913 (1988) (holding that expert testimony that a child sexual assault complainant's behavior was consistent with the common behaviors of kno | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Grant
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. 2018See State v. Bolstad , 124 Wis. 2d 576 , 589-90, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985) ; see also State v. Anthony , 2015 WI 20 , ¶ 104, 361 Wis. 2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 ; State v. Grant , 139 Wis. 2d 45 , 77, 406 N.W.2d 744 (1987) *907 (Day, J., concurring) (describing the underlying rationale of the harmless error test to be "eliminating prejudicial error but not becoming bogged down in endless formulas for determining harmless error."). ¶ 64 Factors four and five weigh in favor of Monahan, as the excluded GPS data would have bolstered Monahan's theory of defense that R.C. was driving. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Harvey
green
2 sentences2018Because of the strength of the State's case, we are not surprised that the jury came to the only reasonable conclusion: Monahan was driving at the time of the crash; this factor weighs in favor of the State. *** ¶ 62 Applying the relevant circumstances of Monahan's case to these factors leads to the conclusion that the erroneous exclusion of the GPS data was harmless; that is, the State has met its burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Monahan] guilty absent the error." Hunt , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , ¶ 26, 851 N.W.2d 434 (quoting Harvey , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , 2018Because of the strength of the State's case, we are not surprised that the jury came to the only reasonable conclusion: Monahan was driving at the time of the crash; this factor weighs in favor of the State. *** ¶ 62 Applying the relevant circumstances of Monahan's case to these factors leads to the conclusion that the erroneous exclusion of the GPS data was harmless; that is, the State has met its burden to prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [Monahan] guilty absent the error." Hunt , 360 Wis. 2d 576 , ¶ 26, 851 N.W.2d 434 (quoting Harvey , 254 Wis. 2d 442 , | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Holesome v. State
green
2 sentences2015First, we hold that in child sexual assault cases courts may apply the seven factors outlined in Fawcett , and may consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint and information "states an offense to which [the defendant can] plead and prepare a defense." Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102 , 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968). 2015First, we hold that in child sexual assault cases courts may apply the seven factors outlined in Fawcett , and may consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint and information "states an offense to which [the defendant can] plead and prepare a defense." Holesome v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 95, 102 , 161 N.W.2d 283 (1968). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Morris
green
1 sentence2015The seven factors considered by the court were taken from a New York case, People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256 (N.Y. 1984). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. McMorris
green
2 sentences2008State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 168 , 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 ). ¶ 39. 2008State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 168 , 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997) (citing Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 ). ¶ 39. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Rizzo
green
1 sentence2003Rizzo I, 250 Wis. 2d 407, ¶ 43 . ¶ 18. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences2002Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 245 -46 n.1. [5] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60 . [6] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360-61 ; majority op. at ¶ 16. [7] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357 . [8] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357 . [9] In a separate case also announced today, State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19 , ___ Wis. 2d ___, 640 N.W.2d 112 , this court concludes that expert testimony comparing a child sexual assault victim's reporting behavior to the common reporting behavior of child sexual assault victims e.g., delayed and progressive disclosure, confusion about the timing and physical details of the assaultis admissible under Jens 2002Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 245 -46 n.1. [5] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60 . [6] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 360-61 ; majority op. at ¶ 16. [7] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357 . [8] Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357 . [9] In a separate case also announced today, State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19 , ___ Wis. 2d ___, 640 N.W.2d 112 , this court concludes that expert testimony comparing a child sexual assault victim's reporting behavior to the common reporting behavior of child sexual assault victims e.g., delayed and progressive disclosure, confusion about the timing and physical details of the assaultis admissible under Jens | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.