seven factors in Florida

2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it

2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it

2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it

2008Under Hudson , the first step in the analysis is to ascertain the legislature's intent, and then to determine the effect of the statute under the following seven factors: (1) "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter "; (4) "whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it

2023However, "a parent's ability to participate in a placement process is purely statutory in nature and is secondary to the court's duty to determine the best interests of the child." J.G. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 270 So. 3d 523 , 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). [W]hen considering a motion to transfer custody of a dependent child who is under the supervision of the Department, the trial court must consider the wishes of the natural parent or parents, if their parental rights have not been terminated, and weigh those wishes with the other seven factors articulated in section 63.082(6)(e), along with "

2010In D.N. v. State, 855 So.2d 258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court adopted from McKay v. State, 504 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the following seven factors to consider in determining whether the denial of a motion for continuance was error due to lack of adequate time to prepare a defense when a defendant seeks to change counsel prior to trial: (1) the time actually available for preparation; (2) the likelihood of prejudice from the denial; (3) the defendant’s role in shortening preparation time; (4) the complexity of the case; (5) the availability of discovery; (6) the adequacy of coun

1998See, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.Supp. 1372, 1378 (D.Alaska 1994); State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 175 , 829 P.2d 1217 (1992); State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 681 , 923 P.2d 1024, 1033 (1996).

1998See, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.Supp. 1372, 1378 (D.Alaska 1994); State v. Noble, 171 Ariz. 171, 175 , 829 P.2d 1217 (1992); State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 681 , 923 P.2d 1024, 1033 (1996).

1996United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), was decided under the federal statute and did not discuss the above factors.

1996United States v. Ursery, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), was decided under the federal statute and did not discuss the above factors.

1996However, this decision does not preclude our future consideration of other factual circumstances, notwithstanding State v. Moretti, 681 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), whether under the seven factors recited in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), a forfeiture pursuant to section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1995), could constitute double jeopardy.

1996However, this decision does not preclude our future consideration of other factual circumstances, notwithstanding State v. Moretti, 681 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), whether under the seven factors recited in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), a forfeiture pursuant to section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1995), could constitute double jeopardy.

1996However, this decision does not preclude our future consideration of other factual circumstances, notwithstanding State v. Moretti, 681 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), whether under the seven factors recited in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), a forfeiture pursuant to section 932.703, Florida Statutes (1995), could constitute double jeopardy.

1994See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 622 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Moreno v. Moreno, 606 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

1993Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201-02 .

1989In Rhoditis , the court held that the traditional seven factors adopted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 , 73 S.Ct. 921 , 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953) for determining whether a given shipowner is a Jones Act employer were neither exclusive nor decisive. [4] Instead, the court said, the issue must be considered "in light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction." Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309 , 90 S.Ct. at 1734 , 26 L.Ed.2d at 256 .

1989In Rhoditis , the court held that the traditional seven factors adopted in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 , 73 S.Ct. 921 , 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953) for determining whether a given shipowner is a Jones Act employer were neither exclusive nor decisive. [4] Instead, the court said, the issue must be considered "in light of the national interest served by the assertion of Jones Act jurisdiction." Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309 , 90 S.Ct. at 1734 , 26 L.Ed.2d at 256 .

1988In its final order, the school board adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact but disagreed with the conclusion of law, as it was entitled to do, Siess v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 468 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), that the *296 existence of "good cause" is to be determined within the seven factors enumerated in section 231.36(4)(c).

1988In Diaz v. State, 513 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1061 , 98 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1988), the court considered the adequacy of notice afforded defense counsel regarding the state's intention to call a state prisoner, Gajus, as a witness.

1988In Diaz v. State, 513 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1061 , 98 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1988), the court considered the adequacy of notice afforded defense counsel regarding the state's intention to call a state prisoner, Gajus, as a witness.

1987We find that the Commission’s assignment of the racing dates is based upon a deliberate application of the seven factors required for such a determination, see Gulfstream Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Hialeah, Inc., 453 So.2d 812 (Fla.1984), and that the Commission’s findings of fact are supported by competent and substantial evidence.

1984Seven defendants are, therefore, left as party appellees on this appeal: Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Nicolet Industries, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; and Keene Corporation. [5] For cases following, in substance, the above-stated discovery rule, see: Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.1980) (meat wrapper's syndrome); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1980) (nitroglycerin exposure); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1100-02 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U

1984Seven defendants are, therefore, left as party appellees on this appeal: Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Nicolet Industries, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; and Keene Corporation. [5] For cases following, in substance, the above-stated discovery rule, see: Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.1980) (meat wrapper's syndrome); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1980) (nitroglycerin exposure); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1100-02 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U

1984Seven defendants are, therefore, left as party appellees on this appeal: Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Nicolet Industries, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; and Keene Corporation. [5] For cases following, in substance, the above-stated discovery rule, see: Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.1980) (meat wrapper's syndrome); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1980) (nitroglycerin exposure); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1100-02 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U

1984Seven defendants are, therefore, left as party appellees on this appeal: Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation; Owens-Illinois, Inc.; Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.; Pittsburgh Corning Corporation; Nicolet Industries, Inc.; Fibreboard Corporation; and Keene Corporation. [5] For cases following, in substance, the above-stated discovery rule, see: Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.1980) (meat wrapper's syndrome); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1980) (nitroglycerin exposure); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1100-02 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U