seven factors (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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seven factors in Pennsylvania

48 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1982–2024 14 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (13)

CaseFollowedCited
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen
scotus · 1963 · cited in 36 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2024
2 sentences

2024As a predicate to Appellant’s other constitutional challenges, we also directed the trial court on remand to consider whether the registration and notification requirements applicable to sexual offenders constituted criminal punishment, and in doing so, to address five of the seven factors, 8 discussed more fully below, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), to determine the punitive nature of legislation: (1) whether the requirements involve an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether they have been historically regarded as

2024Whether [SORNA II] is unconstitutional for violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution[?] Metzler’s Brief at 7.5 The constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. ____________________________________________ so, to address five of the seven factors set in Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , (1963).

1436
Commonwealth v. Perezgreen
pasuperct · 2014 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2015
2 sentences

2015See id. at 759-60 (holding that the balancing of the seven factors provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), does not show that the provisions of SORNA are sufficiently punitive to overcome the General Assembly’s categorization of them as non- punitive).

2014See id. at 759-60 (holding that the balancing of the seven factors provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), does not show that the provisions of SORNA are sufficiently punitive to overcome the General Assembly’s categorization of them as non- punitive).

23
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen
· 2013 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th

2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th

22
Smith v. Doegreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2003–2017
2 sentences

2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”).

2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”).

15
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen
pa · 2003 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2020
2 sentences

2020The second step involves applying the seven factors set forth in Williams 11, 832 A.2d at 973 citing Kennedy v. Mendoza - Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes to play only on finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -retribution and deterrence; (5) whether behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which i t may rationally be connected is as

2020Having so determined, the OAJC turned its attention to the second aspect of the Mendoza-Martinez test, and evaluated the seven factors designed to aid a court in analyzing whether a “statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 971 .

13
Commonwealth v. Abrahamgreen
pa · 2012 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2022
2 sentences

2022The proper method “for determining whether a statute is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s intention to Identify the scheme as civil’ ts to consider the factors listed. in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct, 554 , 9 L.ed.2d 644 (1963).° Commonwealth v. Butler, — A.3d —, 2020 WL 1466299 , No! 25 WAP 2018 (Pa. March 26, 2020) (holding that newly enacted fifetime registration, notification, and counseling (RNC) requirements applicable to felons adjudicated sexually violent predators (SVPs) were not punitive); 10 accora Commonwealth v. Abraham, 619 Pa. 293, 306-9 , 62 A.3d 343 , 351-53

2022The proper method “for determining whether a statute is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s intention to Identify the scheme as civil’ ts to consider the factors listed. in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct, 554 , 9 L.ed.2d 644 (1963).° Commonwealth v. Butler, — A.3d —, 2020 WL 1466299 , No! 25 WAP 2018 (Pa. March 26, 2020) (holding that newly enacted fifetime registration, notification, and counseling (RNC) requirements applicable to felons adjudicated sexually violent predators (SVPs) were not punitive); 10 accora Commonwealth v. Abraham, 619 Pa. 293, 306-9 , 62 A.3d 343 , 351-53

12
Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.red
pa · 2017 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020See, e.g., Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218 (SORNA requirements have punitive effect under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) factors8 and thus SORNA’s retroactive application constitutes ex post facto violation).9 8 In Mendoza-Martinez, the United States Supreme Court listed the following seven factors as a framework for determining whether a statutory sanction is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s expressed intention to identify the scheme as civil or regulatory: “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a

2020We reasoned these statutory requirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint upon offenders due to the onerous in-person reporting requirements and further found such requirements were akin to probation while the publication provisions and online registry were similar to public shaming, both historical forms of punishment. 164 A.3d at 1210-13 .

12
John Shingara v. Kathy A. Skiles, Wesley R. Waugh, Jaime Keating, Ralph Periandi, Robert Sanner Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.green
ca3 · 2005 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005), citing Pansy, supra at 787-791 .

11
Doe v. Stategreen
alaska · 2008 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

11
Wallace v. Stategreen
ind · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

11
State v. Letaliengreen
me · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub.

11
Small v. Juniata Collegegreen
pasuperct · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001To determine whether a defendant’s conduct is improper, a court must weigh the following seven factors: “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, “(b) the actor’s motive, “(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, “(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, “(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, “(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and “(g) the relations between the parties.” Small v. Juniata College, 452 Pa. Super. 410, 418 , 682 A.2d

2001To determine whether a defendant’s conduct is improper, a court must weigh the following seven factors: “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, “(b) the actor’s motive, “(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, “(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, “(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, “(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and “(g) the relations between the parties.” Small v. Juniata College, 452 Pa. Super. 410, 418 , 682 A.2d

11
Daily Express, Inc. v. Commonwealthgreen
pacommwct · 1979 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (22)

CaseCitedYears
Apprendi v. New Jersey green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th

2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th

22021–2021
Hudson v. United States green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2017The principle that “no one [Mendoza-Martinez] factor should be considered controlling,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , does not mean that the Mendoza-Martinez framework is an exercise in arithmetic, or that at least two of the seven factors must be present before a law can be deemed punitive.

2017The principle that “no one [Mendoza-Martinez] factor should be considered controlling,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , does not mean that the Mendoza-Martinez framework is an exercise in arithmetic, or that at least two of the seven factors must be present before a law can be deemed punitive.

22017–2017
United States v. Ward green
scotus · 1980
2 sentences

2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”).

2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”).

22017–2017
Commonwealth v. Butler green
pasuperct · 2017
1 sentence

2020It read our decision as providing that all SORNA registration requirements “are now deemed to be punitive and part of the criminal punishment imposed upon a convicted defendant.” Butler I, 173 A.3d at 1215 .

12020–2020
In Re SA green
pasuperct · 2007
1 sentence

2020To determine actual intent the Court looked at §6401 of Act 21 and concluded "the General Assembly's intent in promulgating Act 21 was not to punish sexually violent delinquent children, but rather, to establish civil commitment procedures designed to 9 provide necessary treatment to such children and to protect the public from danger." In re S.A., 925 A.2d at 843 .

12020–2020
Com.. v. Moore, L. green
pasuperct · 2019
1 sentence

2020The Commonwealth contends that an application of the two-step analysis, addressing (1) the intent of the legislature and (2) the seven factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. ____________________________________________ 7The Commonwealth also notes that “this Court may conclude that [A]ppellant should receive the benefit of the [Commonwealth v. Moore, 222 A.3d 16 (Pa. Super. 2019)] decision upon his registration as a sex offender under Subchapter I of SORNA II.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13.

12020–2020
Commonwealth v. Neiman green
pa · 2013
1 sentence

2020The PCRA court found, however, that it could not direct Appellant’s registration under Megan’s Law III because that legislation had been invalidated by Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 ____________________________________________ 3 The factors enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez include: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether th

12020–2020
Coppolino v. Noonan green
pacommwct · 2014
1 sentence

2015Williams II, 574 Pa. at 505 , 832 A.2d at 973 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169 ); Coppolino, 102 A.3d at 1264 .

12015–2015
cluster 669670 green
ca3 · 1994
1 sentence

2014Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005), citing Pansy, supra at 787-791 .

12014–2014
Ex Parte Briseno green
texcrimapp · 2004
1 sentence

2014Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 .

12014–2014
Janicik v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America green
pasuperct · 1982
1 sentence

2004“In determining fairness and efficiency, the court must balance the interests of the litigants, present and absent, and of the court system.” Janicik , 305 Pa. Super, at 141, 451 A.2d at 461 . (citations omitted) The court determines that certifying the action as a class action is fair and efficient based on the seven factors analyzed below.

12004–2004
Buchanan v. CENTURY FED. SAV. & L. ASS'N green
pasuperct · 1978
2 sentences

2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio

2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio

12002–2002
DAUPHIN DEP. BANK AND TRUST CO. v. Hess green
pa · 1999
2 sentences

2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio

2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio

12002–2002
Commonwealth v. Miller green
pa · 1980
11994–1994
Commonwealth v. Wagner green
pa · 1979
2 sentences

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

11994–1994
Commonwealth v. Williams green
pa · 1978
2 sentences

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

11994–1994
Boalbey v. Kindred green
scotus · 1980
2 sentences

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 *605 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

11994–1994
Miller v. United States green
scotus · 1980
1 sentence

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

11994–1994
Pennsylvania v. Williams green
scotus · 1980
2 sentences

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 *605 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980).

11994–1994
Mature v. Angelo green
pa · 1953
11988–1988
Commonwealth v. Pytak green
pasuperct · 1980
11983–1983
cluster 355099 green
ca9 · 1978
11982–1982

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.11 (12) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.15 (11) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.14 (10) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3126 (9) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.10 (9) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4915.1 (8) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3121 (7) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3125 (6) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9754 (6) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.16 (6) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 722 (5) PA § 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9799.12 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 48 (1982–2024) CA 35 (1994–2026) TN 34 (1998–2025) CT 30 (1982–2025) IN 26 (1995–2019) WY 25 (1998–2025) NJ 24 (1988–2026) MI 20 (1998–2025) OR 20 (1980–2024) TX 20 (1994–2024) FL 19 (1984–2023) OH 18 (1996–2026) IL 18 (1998–2022) MS 18 (1996–2018) MO 17 (2000–2025) KS 16 (1980–2022) SD 16 (1981–2025) NY 14 (1981–2023) WA 13 (2004–2025) WI 12 (1997–2022) UT 12 (1990–2012) NC 11 (1984–2024) AZ 11 (1985–2026) GA 10 (2005–2025) NM 9 (1984–2021) MD 8 (1984–2018) AL 8 (1991–2011) MT 8 (1997–2025) LA 7 (1980–2020) KY 7 (1997–2025) DE 6 (1982–2023) MA 6 (1998–2026) NE 5 (1998–2018) CO 4 (1999–2026) ME 4 (2009–2020) HI 4 (2005–2024) MN 4 (1984–2026) AR 3 (2001–2007) ND 3 (1999–2012) ID 3 (2005–2018) VA 3 (2007–2024) OK 2 (2012–2022) NV 2 (2013–2013) DC 2 (2004–2004) IA 2 (2013–2019) SC 2 (1993–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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