48 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1982–2024 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2024As a predicate to Appellant’s other constitutional challenges, we also directed the trial court on remand to consider whether the registration and notification requirements applicable to sexual offenders constituted criminal punishment, and in doing so, to address five of the seven factors, 8 discussed more fully below, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), to determine the punitive nature of legislation: (1) whether the requirements involve an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether they have been historically regarded as 2024Whether [SORNA II] is unconstitutional for violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution[?] Metzler’s Brief at 7.5 The constitutionality of a statute presents a pure question of law, over which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. ____________________________________________ so, to address five of the seven factors set in Kennedy v. Mendoza- Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , (1963). | 14 | 36 |
Commonwealth v. Perezgreen2 sentences2015See id. at 759-60 (holding that the balancing of the seven factors provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), does not show that the provisions of SORNA are sufficiently punitive to overcome the General Assembly’s categorization of them as non- punitive). 2014See id. at 759-60 (holding that the balancing of the seven factors provided in Kennedy v. Mendoza–Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), does not show that the provisions of SORNA are sufficiently punitive to overcome the General Assembly’s categorization of them as non- punitive). | 2 | 3 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th 2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”). 2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”). | 1 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2020The second step involves applying the seven factors set forth in Williams 11, 832 A.2d at 973 citing Kennedy v. Mendoza - Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes to play only on finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -retribution and deterrence; (5) whether behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which i t may rationally be connected is as 2020Having so determined, the OAJC turned its attention to the second aspect of the Mendoza-Martinez test, and evaluated the seven factors designed to aid a court in analyzing whether a “statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 971 . | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Abrahamgreen2 sentences2022The proper method “for determining whether a statute is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s intention to Identify the scheme as civil’ ts to consider the factors listed. in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct, 554 , 9 L.ed.2d 644 (1963).° Commonwealth v. Butler, — A.3d —, 2020 WL 1466299 , No! 25 WAP 2018 (Pa. March 26, 2020) (holding that newly enacted fifetime registration, notification, and counseling (RNC) requirements applicable to felons adjudicated sexually violent predators (SVPs) were not punitive); 10 accora Commonwealth v. Abraham, 619 Pa. 293, 306-9 , 62 A.3d 343 , 351-53 2022The proper method “for determining whether a statute is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s intention to Identify the scheme as civil’ ts to consider the factors listed. in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S.Ct, 554 , 9 L.ed.2d 644 (1963).° Commonwealth v. Butler, — A.3d —, 2020 WL 1466299 , No! 25 WAP 2018 (Pa. March 26, 2020) (holding that newly enacted fifetime registration, notification, and counseling (RNC) requirements applicable to felons adjudicated sexually violent predators (SVPs) were not punitive); 10 accora Commonwealth v. Abraham, 619 Pa. 293, 306-9 , 62 A.3d 343 , 351-53 | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Muniz, J., Aplt.red2 sentences2020See, e.g., Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218 (SORNA requirements have punitive effect under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) factors8 and thus SORNA’s retroactive application constitutes ex post facto violation).9 8 In Mendoza-Martinez, the United States Supreme Court listed the following seven factors as a framework for determining whether a statutory sanction is so punitive as to negate a legislature’s expressed intention to identify the scheme as civil or regulatory: “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a 2020We reasoned these statutory requirements imposed an affirmative disability or restraint upon offenders due to the onerous in-person reporting requirements and further found such requirements were akin to probation while the publication provisions and online registry were similar to public shaming, both historical forms of punishment. 164 A.3d at 1210-13 . | 1 | 2 |
John Shingara v. Kathy A. Skiles, Wesley R. Waugh, Jaime Keating, Ralph Periandi, Robert Sanner Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.green1 sentence2014Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005), citing Pansy, supra at 787-791 . | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Letaliengreen1 sentence2014See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1018 (Alaska 2008) (concluding that six of the Kennedy factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind.2009) (concluding that six of the seven factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24 (Me.2009) (concluding the first and second factors weighed in favor of finding the statute punitive); Doe v. Dep't of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Small v. Juniata Collegegreen2 sentences2001To determine whether a defendant’s conduct is improper, a court must weigh the following seven factors: “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, “(b) the actor’s motive, “(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, “(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, “(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, “(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and “(g) the relations between the parties.” Small v. Juniata College, 452 Pa. Super. 410, 418 , 682 A.2d 2001To determine whether a defendant’s conduct is improper, a court must weigh the following seven factors: “(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, “(b) the actor’s motive, “(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, “(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, “(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, “(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and “(g) the relations between the parties.” Small v. Juniata College, 452 Pa. Super. 410, 418 , 682 A.2d | 1 | 1 |
| Daily Express, Inc. v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th 2021Art. 1, § 11. 7 The seven factors set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), examine whether the at-issue sanction: (1) involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) applies to behavior that is already a crime; (6) has an alternative purpose that is rationally connected and assignable to it, and (7) appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 8 “Any fact th | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2017The principle that “no one [Mendoza-Martinez] factor should be considered controlling,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , does not mean that the Mendoza-Martinez framework is an exercise in arithmetic, or that at least two of the seven factors must be present before a law can be deemed punitive. 2017The principle that “no one [Mendoza-Martinez] factor should be considered controlling,” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , does not mean that the Mendoza-Martinez framework is an exercise in arithmetic, or that at least two of the seven factors must be present before a law can be deemed punitive. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”). 2017In this regard, the Court has emphasized that the seven factors “are all relevant to the inquiry,” that they are “neither exhaustive nor dis-positive,” and that they are “useful guideposts.” Mend oza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ; Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 ; Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 ; see Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 51 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1349 (2008) (observing that Smith’s second prong “is not applied according to any precise mathematical formulation, ... and at various times the courts have emphasized particular factors over others.”). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Butler
green
1 sentence2020It read our decision as providing that all SORNA registration requirements “are now deemed to be punitive and part of the criminal punishment imposed upon a convicted defendant.” Butler I, 173 A.3d at 1215 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re SA
green
1 sentence2020To determine actual intent the Court looked at §6401 of Act 21 and concluded "the General Assembly's intent in promulgating Act 21 was not to punish sexually violent delinquent children, but rather, to establish civil commitment procedures designed to 9 provide necessary treatment to such children and to protect the public from danger." In re S.A., 925 A.2d at 843 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Com.. v. Moore, L.
green
1 sentence2020The Commonwealth contends that an application of the two-step analysis, addressing (1) the intent of the legislature and (2) the seven factors articulated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. ____________________________________________ 7The Commonwealth also notes that “this Court may conclude that [A]ppellant should receive the benefit of the [Commonwealth v. Moore, 222 A.3d 16 (Pa. Super. 2019)] decision upon his registration as a sex offender under Subchapter I of SORNA II.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Neiman
green
1 sentence2020The PCRA court found, however, that it could not direct Appellant’s registration under Megan’s Law III because that legislation had been invalidated by Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 ____________________________________________ 3 The factors enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez include: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence; (5) whether th | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Coppolino v. Noonan
green
1 sentence2015Williams II, 574 Pa. at 505 , 832 A.2d at 973 (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-169 ); Coppolino, 102 A.3d at 1264 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
cluster 669670
green
1 sentence2014Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005), citing Pansy, supra at 787-791 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ex Parte Briseno
green
1 sentence2014Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Janicik v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
green
1 sentence2004“In determining fairness and efficiency, the court must balance the interests of the litigants, present and absent, and of the court system.” Janicik , 305 Pa. Super, at 141, 451 A.2d at 461 . (citations omitted) The court determines that certifying the action as a class action is fair and efficient based on the seven factors analyzed below. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Buchanan v. CENTURY FED. SAV. & L. ASS'N
green
2 sentences2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio 2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio | 1 | 2002–2002 |
DAUPHIN DEP. BANK AND TRUST CO. v. Hess
green
2 sentences2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio 2002The Settlement Satisfies the Seven Factors That Pennsylvania Courts Must Consider When Evaluating Proposed Class Action Settlements In Dauphin II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the following seven factors should be considered when evaluating the propriety of a proposed class action settlement: “(1) the risks of establishing liability and damages; “(2) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of the best possible recovery; “(3) the range of reasonableness of the settlement in light of all the attendant risks of litigation; “(4) the complexity, expense and likely duratio | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Commonwealth v. Miller green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Wagner
green
2 sentences1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). 1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
2 sentences1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). 1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Boalbey v. Kindred
green
2 sentences1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). 1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 *605 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Miller v. United States
green
1 sentence1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Pennsylvania v. Williams
green
2 sentences1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). 1994The Majority quotes and then applies the seven factors set forth in Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293 , 396 A.2d 1177 , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 912 , 100 S.Ct. 1843 , 64 *605 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) and in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548 , 406 A.2d 1026 (1979), overruled, Commonwealth v. Miller, 490 Pa. 457 , 417 A.2d 128 (1980). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Mature v. Angelo green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Commonwealth v. Pytak green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| cluster 355099 green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.