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11 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences1990She urges in some detail that the seven factors set forth in Wagenseller , which courts should consider in deciding whether to award fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01(A) “lead to a decision in favor of a fee award for Chavarria.” See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 , 710 P.2d 1025 (1985). 1990She urges in some detail that the seven factors set forth in Wagenseller , which courts should consider in deciding whether to award fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01(A) “lead to a decision in favor of a fee award for Chavarria.” See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370 , 710 P.2d 1025 (1985). | 1 | 5 |
Kraft v. Masongreen2 sentences2018We disagree. ¶28 The “corrupt intent” part of the superior court’s “usury instruction” defined corrupt intent as “requir[ing] a corrupt purpose in the lender’s mind to get more than [the] legal rate of interest for the money lent.” The instruction further listed seven factors, which it directed “the jury may consider in determining corrupt intent” (emphasis added), stressing that “[t]he determination of corrupt intent is to be made based upon the circumstances surrounding the entire transaction.” See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist. 2018See Kraft, 668 So. 2d at 684 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fundgreen2 sentences2004The stipulation was that “there is no fraud going to be alleged as part of this case.” This argument fails because this is not a fraud action, but a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations in which the contested element is that Roush “acted improperly.” Even if relevant, the stipulation would only go to the weight of all the other facts when applied to the seven factors set forth above. ¶ 55 To conclude, we note that Wells Fargo made clear that the standard of proof for this intentional tort is one of preponderance of the evidence and that “[ijnferenees arising from the e 2004The stipulation was that “there is no fraud going to be alleged as part of this case.” This argument fails because this is not a fraud action, but a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations in which the contested element is that Roush “acted improperly.” Even if relevant, the stipulation would only go to the weight of all the other facts when applied to the seven factors set forth above. ¶ 55 To conclude, we note that Wells Fargo made clear that the standard of proof for this intentional tort is one of preponderance of the evidence and that “[ijnferenees arising from the e | 1 | 1 |
State v. Milkegreen2 sentences1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). 1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Styersgreen2 sentences1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). 1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). 1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Amfac Mortgage Corporation v. Arizona Mall Of Tempe, Inc.green2 sentences1992See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1978). 1992See Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez
green
2 sentences1997Seven factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), were used in Noble, 171 Ariz. at 175 , 829 P.2d at 1221 , to guide the inquiry. 1997Seven factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), were used in Noble, 171 Ariz. at 175 , 829 P.2d at 1221 , to guide the inquiry. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Noble
green
2 sentences1997Seven factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), were used in Noble, 171 Ariz. at 175 , 829 P.2d at 1221 , to guide the inquiry. 1997Seven factors enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), were used in Noble, 171 Ariz. at 175 , 829 P.2d at 1221 , to guide the inquiry. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences1997These considerations provide a useful framework, although they are “certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. at 2641 . 1997These considerations provide a useful framework, although they are “certainly neither exhaustive nor dispositive.” Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 , 100 S.Ct. at 2641 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Philip Morris Inc. v. Cabarrus County
green
1 sentence1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Andrisani v. Saugus Colony Ltd.
green
1 sentence1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Carroll v. Crist
green
1 sentence1995State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116 , 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 115 S.Ct. 159 , 130 L.Ed.2d 97 (1994); State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 127 , 865 P.2d 779, 788 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994); State v. Scott, 177 Ariz. 131, 144 , 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dorsey v. Yoder Company
green
1 sentence1985Plaintiff’s last instruction on strict liability theory was based upon Dorsey v. Yoder, supra and read as follows: (4) In the instant case, you may conclude that the [product] was unreasonably dangerous if you determine that a reasonable manufacturer with knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences the trial has just revealed would not continue to market its product in the same condition in which it was sold. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.