seven factors in Oregon

2024Once a trial court establishes that the scientific evidence 2 Specifically, in Brown, we stated: “To determine the relevance or probative value of proffered scientific evidence under OEC 401 and OEC 702, the following seven factors are to be considered as guidelines: “(1) The technique’s general acceptance in the field; “(2) The expert’s qualifications and stature; “(3) The use which has been made of the technique; “(4) The potential rate of error; “(5) The existence of specialized literature; “(6) The novelty of the invention; and “(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjectiv

2024Once a trial court establishes that the scientific evidence 2 Specifically, in Brown, we stated: “To determine the relevance or probative value of proffered scientific evidence under OEC 401 and OEC 702, the following seven factors are to be considered as guidelines: “(1) The technique’s general acceptance in the field; “(2) The expert’s qualifications and stature; “(3) The use which has been made of the technique; “(4) The potential rate of error; “(5) The existence of specialized literature; “(6) The novelty of the invention; and “(7) The extent to which the technique relies on the subjectiv

2023Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice is a fact-specific inquiry which requires balancing the following seven factors: “ ‘(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of

2023Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice is a fact-specific inquiry which requires balancing the following seven factors: “ ‘(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of

2023Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice is a fact-specific inquiry which requires balancing the following seven factors: “ ‘(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of

2023Whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice is a fact-specific inquiry which requires balancing the following seven factors: “ ‘(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection; (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of

2018Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. at 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 .

2002In making that latter determination, courts have been instructed to consider the following seven factors: *557 “(1) ‘[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint’; (2) ‘whether it has historically been regarded as punishment’; (3) ‘whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter’; (4) ‘whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence’; (5) ‘whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime’; (6) ‘whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it’; and (7) ‘wh

2017In O’Key , the court identified four other factors, which “overlap, to some degree, with the seven factors set out in Brown.” State v. Southard, 347 Or 127 , 134 n 5, 218 P3d 104 (2009).

2017In O’Key , the court identified four other factors, which “overlap, to some degree, with the seven factors set out in Brown.” State v. Southard, 347 Or 127 , 134 n 5, 218 P3d 104 (2009).

2018In Smith , 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , the Court explained that, in analyzing effects in the intent-effects test, the Court would refer to the seven factors as "a useful framework." The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it was historically regarded as punishment; (3) whether it requires a finding of scienter ; (4) whether it **271 serves the traditional aims of punishment; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is a rational non-punitive purpose; and (7) whe

2018In Smith , 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , the Court explained that, in analyzing effects in the intent-effects test, the Court would refer to the seven factors as "a useful framework." The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it was historically regarded as punishment; (3) whether it requires a finding of scienter ; (4) whether it **271 serves the traditional aims of punishment; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether there is a rational non-punitive purpose; and (7) whe

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2015See Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 643 , 616 P2d 485 (1980) (“Existing law regarding proximity, causation, risk, economic benefit, and all other concepts which are useful in determining work relationship remain applicable.”); First Interstate Bank v. Clark, 133 Or App 712, 717 , 894 P2d 499 (1995) (explaining that, although the seven factors derived from Jordan were no longer the independent and dispositive test of work-connection, “depending on the circumstances, some or all of those factors will remain helpful inquiries” under the unitary work-connection test); Wallace v. Green Thumb, Inc., 61

2008Sampson, 167 Or App at 503 .

2005In State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122 , 970 P2d 215 (1998), the court elaborated on what is required to preserve error in a trial court: “[F]or purposes of preserving error, it is essential to raise the relevant issue at trial, but less important to make a specific argument or identify a specific legal source with respect to the issue raised.

2005In State v. Stevens, 328 Or 116, 122 , 970 P2d 215 (1998), the court elaborated on what is required to preserve error in a trial court: “[F]or purposes of preserving error, it is essential to raise the relevant issue at trial, but less important to make a specific argument or identify a specific legal source with respect to the issue raised.

2005ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part, “No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court[.]” In State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000), the court said, regarding the doctrine of preservation of error: “[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.” We therefore turn to the trial court record to determine

2005ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part, “No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court[.]” In State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 343 , 15 P3d 22 (2000), the court said, regarding the doctrine of preservation of error: “[A] party must provide the trial court with an explanation of his or her objection that is specific enough to ensure that the court can identify its alleged error with enough clarity to permit it to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted.” We therefore turn to the trial court record to determine

2004The seven factors are collectively referred to as the ‘establishment’ factors. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry County), 301 Or 447, 455 , 724 P2d 268 (1986).

2004The seven factors are collectively referred to as the ‘establishment’ factors. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Curry County), 301 Or 447, 455 , 724 P2d 268 (1986).

2002Reviewing courts are reminded, moreover, that “only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Hudson, 522 US at 100 .

2002In making that latter determination, courts have been instructed to consider the following seven factors: *557 “(1) ‘[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint’; (2) ‘whether it has historically been regarded as punishment’; (3) ‘whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter’; (4) ‘whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence’; (5) ‘whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime’; (6) ‘whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it’; and (7) ‘wh

1994The seven factors are: “a) Whether the activity was for the benefit of the employer ** * *; “b) Whether the activity was contemplated by the employer and employee either at the time of hiring or later * * *; “c) Whether the activity was an ordinary risk of, and incidental to, the employment * * *; “d) Whether the employee was paid for the activity * * *; “e) Whether the activity was on the employer’s premises * * *; “0 Whether the activity was directed by or acquiesced in by the employer * * »; Tand] “g) Whether the employee was on a personal mission of his own* * *.” 1 Or App at 443 .

1993Moreover, assuming the rule was applicable, we would conclude that the basketball activity at the Cascade Athletic Club was a distinct departure on a personal mission.” The Board, instead, analyzed claimant’s activity under the seven factors identified in Mellis v. McEwen, Hanna, Gisvold, 74 Or App 571, 573 , 703 P2d 255 , rev den 300 Or 249 (1985), for determining whether an injury is work related and held that the injury was not connected to work.

1993Moreover, assuming the rule was applicable, we would conclude that the basketball activity at the Cascade Athletic Club was a distinct departure on a personal mission.” The Board, instead, analyzed claimant’s activity under the seven factors identified in Mellis v. McEwen, Hanna, Gisvold, 74 Or App 571, 573 , 703 P2d 255 , rev den 300 Or 249 (1985), for determining whether an injury is work related and held that the injury was not connected to work.

1984App. 238 , 668 P.2d 395 , rev. allowed 296 Or. 236 , 675 P.2d 490 (1983).

1984A local government, in establishing a UGB, must consider the seven factors of Goal 14, which incorporate the relevant policies of the other applicable goals. 64 Or App at 743-44 . 2 See Roth v. LCDC, supra. The city’s argument leaves unclear which of two points it is drawing from or ascribing to Branscomb.

1984App. 238 , 668 P.2d 395 , rev. allowed 296 Or. 236 , 675 P.2d 490 (1983).

1984We also note that the seven factors from Goal 14 would be redundant in view of the five more comprehensive factors of Goal 3. 4 Respondents rely in part on 1000 Friends v. LCDC, 292 Or 735 , 642 P2d 1158 (1982).

1984We also note that the seven factors from Goal 14 would be redundant in view of the five more comprehensive factors of Goal 3. 4 Respondents rely in part on 1000 Friends v. LCDC, 292 Or 735 , 642 P2d 1158 (1982).

1984They do not, however, address the threshold question of whether any land should be converted to urban uses. 5 The seven factors are set forth in Goal 14: “Establishment and change of the boundaries shall be based upon consideration of the following factors: “(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban population growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals; “(2) Need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability; “(3) Orderly and economic provision for public facilities and services; “(4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the existing urban area; “

1984They do not, however, address the threshold question of whether any land should be converted to urban uses. 5 The seven factors are set forth in Goal 14: “Establishment and change of the boundaries shall be based upon consideration of the following factors: “(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate long-range urban population growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals; “(2) Need for housing, employment opportunities, and livability; “(3) Orderly and economic provision for public facilities and services; “(4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the existing urban area; “