26 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wallace v. Stategreen2 sentences2016The seven factors are: “[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 2012The Court considered the seven factors previously set forth in Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009): [1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment – retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears e | 3 | 10 |
Jensen v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Id. (quoting Wallace v. State , 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) ). [16] Harris, like Gourley, committed his child molesting offense before the SVP designation existed and specifically challenged the 2007 amendment. 2016Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 391 (Ind.2009). | 2 | 4 |
Hevner v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 (Ind.2010) (concluding that as applied to Hevner, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because on the date Hevner committed possession of child pornography, a first time offender was not classified as a sex offender under the Act); Cf. Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind.2009) (concluding that the effects of the Act are non-punitive when applied to Jensen because the “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea in 2000 2012See also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 (Ind.2010) (concluding that as applied to Hevner, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because on the date Hevner committed possession of child pornography, a first time offender was not classified as a sex offender under the Act); Cf. Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 , 394 *498 (Ind.2009) (concluding that the effects of the Act are non-punitive when applied to Jensen because the “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea i | 2 | 2 |
Herron v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 (Ind.2010) (concluding that as applied to Hevner, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because on the date Hevner committed possession of child pornography, a first time offender was not classified as a sex offender under the Act); Cf. Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 394 (Ind.2009) (concluding that the effects of the Act are non-punitive when applied to Jensen because the “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea in 2000 2012See also Hevner v. State, 919 N.E.2d 109, 112-13 (Ind.2010) (concluding that as applied to Hevner, the Act violates the prohibition on ex post facto laws contained in the Indiana Constitution because on the date Hevner committed possession of child pornography, a first time offender was not classified as a sex offender under the Act); Cf. Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384 , 394 *498 (Ind.2009) (concluding that the effects of the Act are non-punitive when applied to Jensen because the “broad and sweeping” disclosure requirements were in place and applied to Jensen at the time of his guilty plea i | 2 | 2 |
Hale v. Kempgreen2 sentences2001Typically, we analyze dual employment by applying the seven factors reiterated in Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63, 67 (Ind.1991). 1999The majority clearly, correctly and articulately analyzes the seven factors set forth by our supreme court in Hale v. Kemp, 579 N.E.2d 63 (Ind.1991), reviews the evidence on each of the factors and holds that the evidence is sufficient on a sufficient number of the factors to conclude that the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous. | 2 | 2 |
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinezgreen2 sentences2016In evaluating a statute’s effects, we are guided by the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963): [1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 55A01-1604-CR-953 | November 22, 2016 Page 8 of 13 behavior to which it applies is alre 2016In evaluating a statute’s effects, we are guided by the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963): [1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 55A01-1604-CR-953 | November 22, 2016 Page 8 of 13 behavior to which it applies is alre | 1 | 9 |
Lemmon v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019Harris , 949 N.E.2d at 810 . [23] Applying the seven factors here to determine whether the 2007 Amendment has a punitive effect as applied to Gourley, we reach the same conclusion as did the Harris court. 2016Harris, 949 N.E.2d at 810 . 4 Pettis does not dispute that, as in Harris, he was already required to register because of his prior convictions when the 2007 amendment to the Act was passed. | 1 | 4 |
In re Hughesgreen1 sentence2014See Gonzalez, 980 N.E.2d at 321 (weighing the punitive and non- punitive nature of the seven factors and holding that “to apply the 200[1] amendments so as to subject this defendant to a lifetime registration requirement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution”). | 1 | 1 |
Boss v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Boss v. State, 944 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 ). | 1 | 1 |
Flanders v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Flanders, 955 N.E.2d at 749-50 (summarizing analysis in Jensen) (case citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
GKN Co. v. Magnessgreen1 sentence2009GKN Co. v. Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ind.2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Healey v. State
green
2 sentences2013Our court applied the “intent-effects” test and determined that two of the seven factors “lean in favor of treating the effects of the 1995 amendment as punitive when applied to Healey.” Id. at 615-16 . 2012In analyzing the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, we adopt the reasoning and holding from Healey – only two of the seven factors “lean in favor of treating the effects of the 1995 amendment as punitive when applied to Healey.” 969 N.E.2d at 616 . | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Richard J. McVey v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2016He asserts that the seven factors of the intent-effects test weigh in favor of the conclusion that the unlawful entry statute, as applied, is more punitive than regulatory and that a recent decision, McVey v. State, 56 N.E.3d 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), in which another panel of this Court, concluded that application of the unlawful-entry statute to an individual convicted of child molesting in 2001 was not unconstitutional ex post facto punishment, should be reconsidered. [9] The American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana (“ACLU”) filed an amicus brief arguing that the unlawful-entry statute vio | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Allison v. Union Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2013Allison, 883 N.E.2d at 118 (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 (citing Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 767 (1977))). “[T]he weight to be given to each consideration may differ from case to case depending upon the factual circumstances, but the overriding question is whether the defendants’ conduct has been fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Allison, 883 N.E.2d at 118 (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 (citing Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 767 (1977))). “[T]he weight to be given to each consideration may differ from case to case depending upon the factual circumstances, but the overriding question is whether the defendants’ conduct has been fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 ). 2013Allison, 883 N.E.2d at 118 (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 (citing Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 767 (1977))). “[T]he weight to be given to each consideration may differ from case to case depending upon the factual circumstances, but the overriding question is whether the defendants’ conduct has been fair and reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Winkler, 638 N.E.2d at 1235 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Ward
green
2 sentences2009In assessing a statute's effects, the Supreme Court indicated that the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), "provide[ ] some guidance." United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). 2009In assessing a statute's effects, the Supreme Court indicated that the seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963), "provide[ ] some guidance." United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Witteveld v. City of Haverhill
green
1 sentence1995Because Shabnam Tapia's injuries occurred within the period of her employment with Ohlson & Associates, at a place where Tapia was expected to be, and while fulfilling the duties of her employment, her injuries arose "in the course of employment." See Wayne Adams Buick, Inc. v. Ference (1981), Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 783 , trans. denied. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.