faith and credit clause in New York

1975Even under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, where the rendering State permits assault on its judgment on such a ground, the forum State may also (Williams v North Carolina, 317 US 287 ; Sullivan v Mandigo, 39 AD2d 111 ; cf. Griffin v Griffin, 327 US 220 ).

1974The test to be applied whether New York courts will enjoin prosecution of foreign divorce decrees resulting in a void decree is whether it is entitled to full faith and credit in this State (Arpels v. Arpels, supra). ¡Since the decree which defendant seeks in California (provided procedural requirements of due process are met [Williams, supra, p. 303 ]) is entitled to a presumption of validity under the full faith and credit doctrine, it follows that he should be enjoined (Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N. Y. 371, 375 ).

1958It is well settled that where a court of a sister State has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, and the decree is substantially responsive to the issues presented by the pleadings “ the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment was based.” (Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 462 .) Accordingly, the court is constrained to dismiss the complaint solely upon the ground that by her voluntary appearance plaintif

1956Furthermore, many years after the Stockton case, in Milliken v. Meyer ( 311 U. S. 457 ), the Supreme Court decreed that where the court of a sister State had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter as it did in the present case, “ the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based.” ( 311 U. S. 462 .) It is not necessary to go into the reasoning of the New Jersey court, the logic or consistency of its reasoni

2013Thus, “[a]s a matter of full faith and credit, . . . the courts of this State [are] limited to determining whether the rendering court had jurisdiction” before enforcing a judgment of a sister state, including one obtained upon default (Fiore v Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 78 NY2d 572, 577 [1991], rearg denied 79 NY2d 916 [1992], cert denied 506 US 823 [1992]; see generally Parker v Hoefer, 2 NY2d 612, 616-617 [1957], cert denied 355 US 833 [1957]).

2013Thus, “[a]s a matter of full faith and credit, . . . the courts of this State [are] limited to determining whether the rendering court had jurisdiction” before enforcing a judgment of a sister state, including one obtained upon default (Fiore v Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 78 NY2d 572, 577 [1991], rearg denied 79 NY2d 916 [1992], cert denied 506 US 823 [1992]; see generally Parker v Hoefer, 2 NY2d 612, 616-617 [1957], cert denied 355 US 833 [1957]).

1982The full faith and credit clause does not require this State to grant any greater degree of finality to a judgment than is granted by the forum State (Sistare v Sistare, 218 US 1 ; Johnson v Muelberger, 340 US 581 ; see, also, Feinberg v Feinberg, 96 Mise 2d 443, affd 70 AD2d 612 , on the opn of Justice Gibbons at Special Term).

1973(Matter of Seitz v. Drogheo, 21 N Y 2d 181.) Theretofore New York had refused to go any further in enforcement of out-of-State alimony awards than required by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution (see Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 ; Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77, 79-80 ), and thus had refused to enforce those out-of-State alimony orders that were subject to modification in the original State.

1976Although jurisdiction is an issue which may be considered anew (Bell v Bell, 181 US 175 ; Atlas Credit Corp. v Ezrine, 25 NY2d 219 ) without violating the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (art IV, § 1), it is the very kind of issue which the Legislature sought to exclude from the county clerk’s consideration.

1943(See Bell v. Bell supra; Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 ; Kerr v. Kerr, supra; Hoffman v. Hoffman, supra; Kinnier v. Kinnier, supra.) In 3 Freeman on Judgments ([5th ed.], § 1437, p. 2959) is found the following: “notwithstanding any recitals or findings express or implied in the record, a decree of divorce may be impeached collaterally for lack of the jurisdictional facts, and particularly of the fact of domicile of the plaintiff,” and earlier in section 1435, at page 2956, quoting from Sewall v. Sewall ( 122 Mass. 156 ): “ ‘ It is competent to show that a decree of divorce granted b

1951That being so, our conclusion is here compelled by the command of the full faith and credit clause, for, as the Supreme Court has recently declared (Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra, 334 U. S. 343, 355 ), “ If in its application local policy must at times be required to give- way, such ‘ is part of the price of our federal system.’ Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 , 302 ”.

1951That being so, our conclusion is here compelled by the command of the full faith and credit clause, for, as the Supreme Court has recently declared (Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra, 334 U. S. 343, 355 ), “ If in its application local policy must at times be required to give- way, such ‘ is part of the price of our federal system.’ Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 , 302 ”.

1964(Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 ; United States v. Silliman, 167 F. 2d 607 , cert. den. 335 U. S. 825 .) Since plaintiff was not “ robbed of the opportunity to uncover [its] grievance and expose it to the court ” (Fuhrmann v. Fanroth, 254 N. Y. 479, 482 ) and had fully litigated the alleged fraud, that judgment is a complete bar to this action under the full faith and credit clause, the function of which is to avoid relitigation in other States of issues already adjudicated.

1950A foreign judgment fraudulently obtained is not entitled to protection under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution and may be attacked collaterally (Prime v. Hinton, 244 App. Div. 181 ; Averbuck v. Averbuck, 270 App. Div. 116 ; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 ; Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 ; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 ; Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N. Y. 348 ).

1964The extent of this obligation is stated in Parker v. Hoefer (2 N Y 2d 612, 616): “ Because there is a full faith and credit clause, defendant may not a second time challenge the validity of plaintiff’s right which has ripened into a judgment (Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 ), which is to say that a judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res judicata in the absence of fraud or collusion”.

1957Because there is a full faith and credit clause, defendant may not a second time challenge the validity of plaintiff’s right which has ripened into a judgment (Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 ), which is to say that a judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res judicata in the absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained upon default (Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218, 225 ).

1945Such a result would only tend to promote wholesale disregard of North Carolina’s divorce laws by its citizens, thus putting an end to ‘ the existence of all efficacious power on the subject of divorce. ’ ” Thus, by unequivocal fiat of the United States Supreme Court, in every case involving the extraterritorial validity of an ex parte divorce decree the issue of jurisdiction is excepted from the general rule that “ * * * the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of

1932(Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 237 .) “ It is settled by repeated decisions of this court that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires that the judgment of a State court which had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter in suit, shall be given in the courts of every other State the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the State where it was rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits; and that only such defenses as would be good to a suit thereon in that State can be relied on in the courts of any other State.” (Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.

1982The full faith and credit clause does not require this State to grant any greater degree of finality to a judgment than is granted by the forum State (Sistare v Sistare, 218 US 1 ; Johnson v Muelberger, 340 US 581 ; see, also, Feinberg v Feinberg, 96 Mise 2d 443, affd 70 AD2d 612 , on the opn of Justice Gibbons at Special Term).

1964The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution so forbids (Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 ).

1981Highway Express, 314 US 201, 210 ).

1956Under such circumstances, the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable or unqualified command (Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, 314 U. S. 201 ).

1969It should be stated at the very outset that the courts of this State are not required by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution to give effect to the legitimation statutes of another jurisdiction (Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U. S. 386, 395 ).

1933(Winston v. Winston, 165 N. Y. 553 ; Olmsted v. Olmsted, 190 id. 458 ; affd., 216 U. S. 386 .) It is settled that such policy is not hostile to the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. 4, § 1).

1948(Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 ; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 .) The first extension of the application of the full faith and credit clause to a divorce involving any lesser domicile developed in the case of Williams v. North Carolina ( 317 U. S. 287 ; 325 U. S. 226 ).

1941(Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 ; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 .) In the case of Morris v. Morris ( 160 Misc. 59, 61 ), I said: “ The courts of our State have uniformly refused to recognize decrees of divorce obtained in other jurisdictions when the court of such foreign jurisdiction did not obtain jurisdiction of the person either by appearance or by service of the process within the confines of that jurisdiction, excepting in some cases where the decrees were obtained because of the adultery of the offending spouse.” [Beeck v. Beeck, 211 App. Div. 720, 725 .) Neither statute nor de

1944He concluded as follows (pp. 16-17): “ First, that, generally speaking, where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future installments the right to such installments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the installments, since, as declared in the Barber case, ‘ alimony decreed to a wife in a divorce of separation from bed and board is as much a debt of record, until the decree has been recalled, as any other judgment for mone

1939In fact, Mr. Justice Stone, in Ms dissenting opinion in Yarborough v. Yarborough (supra), said: “ The court was careful to distmguish the [Sistare] case from one where the suit was brought to compel the payment of alimony in the future, see p. 16, compare Lynde v. Lynde ( 181 U. S. 183, 187 ).” As I read the Sistare case (supra) it reiterates the general rule for wMch Barber v. Barber (62 IT.

2013Thus, “[a]s a matter of full faith and credit, . . . the courts of this State [are] limited to determining whether the rendering court had jurisdiction” before enforcing a judgment of a sister state, including one obtained upon default (Fiore v Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 78 NY2d 572, 577 [1991], rearg denied 79 NY2d 916 [1992], cert denied 506 US 823 [1992]; see generally Parker v Hoefer, 2 NY2d 612, 616-617 [1957], cert denied 355 US 833 [1957]).

2013Thus, “[a]s a matter of full faith and credit, . . . the courts of this State [are] limited to determining whether the rendering court had jurisdiction” before enforcing a judgment of a sister state, including one obtained upon default (Fiore v Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 78 NY2d 572, 577 [1991], rearg denied 79 NY2d 916 [1992], cert denied 506 US 823 [1992]; see generally Parker v Hoefer, 2 NY2d 612, 616-617 [1957], cert denied 355 US 833 [1957]).