faith and credit clause in New Jersey

1990One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. [Id. at 547-548, 55 S.Ct. at 523-524 , 79 L.Ed. at 1052 (emphasis supplied)].

1990One who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. [Id. at 547-548, 55 S.Ct. at 523-524 , 79 L.Ed. at 1052 (emphasis supplied)].

2005Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-505 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939); and Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 , 63 S.Ct. 207 , 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942) (finding that “[n]or is there any authority which lends support to the view that the full faith and credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any other state.”)).

2005Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504-505 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939); and Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 296 , 63 S.Ct. 207 , 87 L.Ed. 279 (1942) (finding that “[n]or is there any authority which lends support to the view that the full faith and credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any other state.”)).

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1967Eq. 523 ( Ch. 1927), Vice Chancellor Ingersoll held: "Independent of the full faith and credit clause the general principle recognized by all courts is, that in a subsequent action between the same parties as plaintiff and defendant, involving the same issues as those of a former action, the judgment in the former suit, whether in a domestic or foreign court, is an estoppel as to the issues actually litigated and determined in the first action." Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876); 2 Black on Judgments, § 610; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 151 ( Ct. App. 1862).

1927Cromwell v. County of Sac ( 1876 ), 94 U.S. 351 , 353 ; 2 Black Jud. § 610; Lazier v. Westcott ( 1862 ), 26 N.Y. 146 , 151 .

2000As noted by the Appellate Division opinion, id. at 333-35 , 725 A.2d 126 , the United States Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425-26 , 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1191 , 59 L.Ed.2d 416, 425-26 (1979), concluded that although the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal courts against a state by citizens of another state, it does not prohibit a state from being sued in another state’s courts; nor does the full faith and credit clause require the forum State to apply another State’s law concerning sovereign immunity if to do so would contravene a significant public policy of the forum State.

2000As noted by the Appellate Division opinion, id. at 333-35 , 725 A.2d 126 , the United States Supreme Court in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425-26 , 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1191 , 59 L.Ed.2d 416, 425-26 (1979), concluded that although the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal courts against a state by citizens of another state, it does not prohibit a state from being sued in another state’s courts; nor does the full faith and credit clause require the forum State to apply another State’s law concerning sovereign immunity if to do so would contravene a significant public policy of the forum State.

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1991It altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations *410 created under the laws or established by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given nation-wide application. [Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 214 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155-56 (1943).] See Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-11 , 386 A.2d 366 (1978); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 153

1989Super. at 708-709 . [3] See Wis. Stat. §§ 801.05-801.11 . [4] The full faith and credit clause requires that a state enforce a judgment of a sister state although the suit in which the judgment was obtained "could not have been maintained under the laws and policy of the forum to which the judgment is brought," Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 213 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155 (1943); see also Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 , 67 S.Ct. 451, 455 , 91 L.Ed. 488, 495-496 (1947); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 371,

1989Super. at 708-709 . [3] See Wis. Stat. §§ 801.05-801.11 . [4] The full faith and credit clause requires that a state enforce a judgment of a sister state although the suit in which the judgment was obtained "could not have been maintained under the laws and policy of the forum to which the judgment is brought," Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 , 64 S.Ct. 208, 213 , 88 L.Ed. 149, 155 (1943); see also Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 551 , 67 S.Ct. 451, 455 , 91 L.Ed. 488, 495-496 (1947); Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 371,

1967Eq. 523 ( Ch. 1927), Vice Chancellor Ingersoll held: "Independent of the full faith and credit clause the general principle recognized by all courts is, that in a subsequent action between the same parties as plaintiff and defendant, involving the same issues as those of a former action, the judgment in the former suit, whether in a domestic or foreign court, is an estoppel as to the issues actually litigated and determined in the first action." Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876); 2 Black on Judgments, § 610; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 151 ( Ct. App. 1862).

1967Eq. 523 ( Ch. 1927), Vice Chancellor Ingersoll held: "Independent of the full faith and credit clause the general principle recognized by all courts is, that in a subsequent action between the same parties as plaintiff and defendant, involving the same issues as those of a former action, the judgment in the former suit, whether in a domestic or foreign court, is an estoppel as to the issues actually litigated and determined in the first action." Cromwell v. County of Sac., 94 U.S. 351 , 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876); 2 Black on Judgments, § 610; Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N.Y. 146, 151 ( Ct. App. 1862).

1967"The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues," as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties.' The federal purpose of the clause makes this Court, for both state and federal courts, the `final arbiter when the question is raised as to what is a permissible limitation on the full faith and credit clause.' 340 U.S., at page 584 , 71 S.Ct., at page 476 , 95 L.Ed., at page 556 ." The judgment of divorce procured ex parte by the defendant herein in the State of Florida is not entitled to full faith and credit in this State.

1967"The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues," as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties.' The federal purpose of the clause makes this Court, for both state and federal courts, the `final arbiter when the question is raised as to what is a permissible limitation on the full faith and credit clause.' 340 U.S., at page 584 , 71 S.Ct., at page 476 , 95 L.Ed., at page 556 ." The judgment of divorce procured ex parte by the defendant herein in the State of Florida is not entitled to full faith and credit in this State.

1962Moreover, assuming that where the right exists to modify or even cancel arrearages, the foreign judgment lacks the finality to bring it within the mandatory recognition feature of the full faith and credit clause (compare Justice Jackson’s view in Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 , 89 L.

1962Moreover, assuming that where the right exists to modify or even cancel arrearages, the foreign judgment lacks the finality to bring it within the mandatory recognition feature of the full faith and credit clause (compare Justice Jackson’s view in Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 , 89 L.

1962The New Jersey Supreme Court held: "We are firmly of the opinion that the principles of the Sherrer, supra and Coe, supra cases only apply to a true adversary proceeding where the parties are represented by counsel of their independent choice and where there is an opportunity to make a voluntary decision on the question as to whether or not the case should be fully litigated either on the question of jurisdiction or the merits, and that once an election has been made by the defendant under such circumstances and conditions that then and then alone can the judgment of the court be res adjudicat

1956In speaking of the Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948); and Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 , 68 S.Ct. 1094 , 92 L.Ed. *356 1451 (1948), cases cited by the defendant in this proceeding, we said in Staedler v. Staedler, supra, 6 N.J., at page 390: "We have carefully considered these cases and we do not believe that the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution was ever intended to be used as a shield for or to give validity to the type of contract here under consideration or to appro

1950For ease of analysis the amount may first be considered as if it were absolute, fixed, and subject to no contingency. "* * * generally speaking, where a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future installments, the right to such installments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the installments * * *." Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16 (1909); Conwell v. Conwell, supra, and see Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 17 (1944).

1914If the judgment is not recognized as conclusive, then an aelion or a defence based on it is rejected, and the state of facts as to the original claim is investigated in a practically distinct proceeding, in which the prior judgment plays no part except in sometimes affecting the burden of proof.” We are also of opinion that the trial court fell into an error in holding that the decree under consideration was not such a final and conclusive judgment as to bring it within the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution, as to past-due installments of alimony, and this was perhaps du

1984White Co., supra, 296 U.S. at 276-77 , 56 S.Ct. at 233-34 , 80 L.Ed. at 228 (noting that the weightiness of the purpose and the numerous situations in which full faith and credit must be given to fulfill that purpose); City of Philadelphia v. Austin, supra, 86 N.J. at 58 (explaining the purpose of the full faith and credit clause).

1984White Co., supra, 296 U.S. at 276-77 , 56 S.Ct. at 233-34 , 80 L.Ed. at 228 (noting that the weightiness of the purpose and the numerous situations in which full faith and credit must be given to fulfill that purpose); City of Philadelphia v. Austin, supra, 86 N.J. at 58 (explaining the purpose of the full faith and credit clause).

1953Peff v. Peff, supra, at page 520.

1953Peff v. Peff, supra, at page 522; Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, supra .

1951See also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 , 54 L.Ed. 530 (1910).

1951See also Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 , 54 L.Ed. 530 (1910).