30 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
PIRTEK USA, LLC v. Whiteheadgreen2 sentences2015IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution (“the full faith and credit clause”). 3 Pirbek USA, LLC v. Whitehead, 51 So.3d 291, 296 (Ala.2010). 2015See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v. Steinberg, 29 Ala.App. 515, 519 , 199 So. 246, 249 (1940) (stating that “the duly attested record of the judgment of a State court is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within the United States as by law or usage it had in the State from which it is taken”), and Pirtek, 51 So.3d at 295 (stating that “ ‘Alabama courts are generally required to give a judgment entitled to full faith and credit at least the res judicata effect accorded in the rendering court’s jurisdiction’” (quoting Menendez v. COLSA, Inc., 852 So.2d 768, 771 (Ala.Civ.App. | 1 | 1 |
Menendez v. Colsa, Inc.green1 sentence2015See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v. Steinberg, 29 Ala.App. 515, 519 , 199 So. 246, 249 (1940) (stating that “the duly attested record of the judgment of a State court is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within the United States as by law or usage it had in the State from which it is taken”), and Pirtek, 51 So.3d at 295 (stating that “ ‘Alabama courts are generally required to give a judgment entitled to full faith and credit at least the res judicata effect accorded in the rendering court’s jurisdiction’” (quoting Menendez v. COLSA, Inc., 852 So.2d 768, 771 (Ala.Civ.App. | 1 | 1 |
Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v. Steinberggreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v. Steinberg, 29 Ala.App. 515, 519 , 199 So. 246, 249 (1940) (stating that “the duly attested record of the judgment of a State court is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within the United States as by law or usage it had in the State from which it is taken”), and Pirtek, 51 So.3d at 295 (stating that “ ‘Alabama courts are generally required to give a judgment entitled to full faith and credit at least the res judicata effect accorded in the rendering court’s jurisdiction’” (quoting Menendez v. COLSA, Inc., 852 So.2d 768, 771 (Ala.Civ.App. 2015See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Credits, Inc. v. Steinberg, 29 Ala.App. 515, 519 , 199 So. 246, 249 (1940) (stating that “the duly attested record of the judgment of a State court is entitled to such faith and credit in every court within the United States as by law or usage it had in the State from which it is taken”), and Pirtek, 51 So.3d at 295 (stating that “ ‘Alabama courts are generally required to give a judgment entitled to full faith and credit at least the res judicata effect accorded in the rendering court’s jurisdiction’” (quoting Menendez v. COLSA, Inc., 852 So.2d 768, 771 (Ala.Civ.App. | 1 | 1 |
Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulkgreen2 sentences2014Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 501 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939) ("[Tjhe very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 557 , 155 So. 74, 76 (1934) ("[I]t is not always obligatory, either on the ground of comity or duty, that o 2014Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 501 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939) ("[Tjhe very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 557 , 155 So. 74, 76 (1934) ("[I]t is not always obligatory, either on the ground of comity or duty, that o | 1 | 1 |
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Fosterred1 sentence1996See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster , supra. Before considering whether any of the Disctronics Group's counterclaims were released, we consider whether those claims were due to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. | 1 | 1 |
Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences1984Accord Kulko v. Superior Court of California , 436 U.S. 84 , 98 S.Ct. 1690 , 56 L.Ed. 132 (1978). 1984Accord Kulko v. Superior Court of California , 436 U.S. 84 , 98 S.Ct. 1690 , 56 L.Ed. 132 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Durfee v. Duke
green
2 sentences2005Durfee v. Duke , 375 U.S. 106 , 84 S.Ct. 242 , 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963). 2005Durfee v. Duke , 375 U.S. 106 , 84 S.Ct. 242 , 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963). | 3 | 1981–2005 |
Alston Elec. Supply v. Ala. Elec.
green
2 sentences1996Alston Electric Supply Co. v. Alabama Electrical Wholesalers, Inc., 586 So.2d 10 (Ala. Civ.App.1991).... 1993Alston Electric Supply Co. v. Alabama Electrical Wholesalers, Inc. , 586 So.2d 10 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991). | 2 | 1993–1996 |
Thompson v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1994In 1980, Congress enacted the PKPA to establish national standards to be applied in interstate custody disputes to determine which state court should exercise jurisdiction and to determine the effect to be given child custody determinations by state courts of other jurisdictions. 3 In Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 , 108 S.Ct. 513 , 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988), the United States Supreme Court summarized the circumstances prompting the enactment of the PKPA and the purposes it was designed to achieve: “At the time Congress passed the PKPA, custody orders held a peculiar status under the full fait 1994In 1980, Congress enacted the PKPA to establish national standards to be applied in interstate custody disputes to determine which state court should exercise jurisdiction and to determine the effect to be given child custody determinations by state courts of other jurisdictions. 3 In Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 , 108 S.Ct. 513 , 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988), the United States Supreme Court summarized the circumstances prompting the enactment of the PKPA and the purposes it was designed to achieve: “At the time Congress passed the PKPA, custody orders held a peculiar status under the full fait | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Green v. Green
green
2 sentences1970If final, it is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and is enforceable in another state. * * * ( 239 Ala. at page 408 , 195 So. at page 550 ) * * * * * * “ ‘Where, by the law of the state where rendered, the decree is not subject to modification at the discretion of the court as to installments which are already due, then the judgment as to such installments is final and must be given full faith and credit in another state. * * * ” ( 239 Ala. at page 409 , 195 So. at page 550 ) The Missouri law as to past due alimony installments was stated by the St. 1970If final, it is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution and is enforceable in another state. * * * ( 239 Ala. at page 408 , 195 So. at page 550 ) * * * * * * “ ‘Where, by the law of the state where rendered, the decree is not subject to modification at the discretion of the court as to installments which are already due, then the judgment as to such installments is final and must be given full faith and credit in another state. * * * ” ( 239 Ala. at page 409 , 195 So. at page 550 ) The Missouri law as to past due alimony installments was stated by the St. | 2 | 1970–1984 |
Pratt v. Miedema
neutral
2 sentences1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . 1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . | 2 | 1947–1948 |
Davis v. Davis
green
2 sentences1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . 1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . | 2 | 1947–1948 |
Glaser v. Glaser
green
2 sentences1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . 1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . | 2 | 1947–1948 |
Keller v. Keller
neutral
2 sentences1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . 1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . | 2 | 1947–1948 |
Standish v. Standish
green
2 sentences1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . 1948Ex parte Jones, 249 Ala. 386 , 31 So.2d 314 ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 41 , 59 S.Ct. 3 , 83 L.Ed. 26, 30 , 118 A.L.R. 1518 ; Keller v. Keller, 352 Mo. 877 , 179 S.W.2d 728 ; Pratt v. Midema, 311 Mich. 64 , 18 N.W.2d 279 ; Finan v. Finan, Sup., 47 N.Y.S.2d 429 ; Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 , 12 N.E.2d 305 ; Standish v. Standish, 179 Misc. 564 , 40 N.Y.S.2d 538 ; Stone v. Stone, Dom.Rel.Ct., 44 N.Y.S.2d 558 . | 2 | 1947–1948 |
Hampton v. M'connel
green
2 sentences2015This principle stems from the full faith and credit clause and was explained as follows by Chief Justice John Marshall in Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 , 4 L.Ed. 378 (1818): “[T]he judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United States.” The courts of this State have consistently applied the full faith and credit clause 2015This principle stems from the full faith and credit clause and was explained as follows by Chief Justice John Marshall in Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 , 4 L.Ed. 378 (1818): “[T]he judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court in the United States.” The courts of this State have consistently applied the full faith and credit clause | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fauntleroy v. Lum
green
2 sentences2015The Supreme Court of the United States explained this distinction between a subject-matter-jurisdiction challenge and a merit-based challenge in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 , 28 S.Ct. 641 , 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908): “No doubt it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction between the two is plain. 2015The Supreme Court of the United States explained this distinction between a subject-matter-jurisdiction challenge and a merit-based challenge in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 , 28 S.Ct. 641 , 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908): “No doubt it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits, but the distinction between the two is plain. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Milliken v. Meyer
green
2 sentences2015She asserts that the Georgia court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment for two reasons — because it purported to effect a second-parent adoption in which a living parent’s parental rights were not terminated and because V.L. allegedly was not a bona fide Georgia resident at the time of the judgment; however, V.L. argues that these arguments in fact implicate only the merits of the Georgia judgment, and not the Georgia court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and the arguments are therefore, V.L. argues, barred by the full faith and credit clause, which “precludes any i 2015She asserts that the Georgia court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment for two reasons — because it purported to effect a second-parent adoption in which a living parent’s parental rights were not terminated and because V.L. allegedly was not a bona fide Georgia resident at the time of the judgment; however, V.L. argues that these arguments in fact implicate only the merits of the Georgia judgment, and not the Georgia court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and the arguments are therefore, V.L. argues, barred by the full faith and credit clause, which “precludes any i | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pacific Employers Insurance v. Industrial Accident Comm'n
green
2 sentences2014Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 501 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939) ("[Tjhe very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 557 , 155 So. 74, 76 (1934) ("[I]t is not always obligatory, either on the ground of comity or duty, that o 2014Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 501 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939) ("[Tjhe very nature of the federal union of states, to which are reserved some attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.”); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 557 , 155 So. 74, 76 (1934) ("[I]t is not always obligatory, either on the ground of comity or duty, that o | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Massey v. Disc Mfg., Inc.
green
1 sentence1996Although the Disctronics Group defendants argue otherwise, that agreement extinguished the prior debtor-creditor relationship, transforming the debt owed to Quixote Corporation into equity in DMI and LVAC. 2 Delaware law is the law applicable to the plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claims, because "[t]he established rule of conflicts law is that 'the internal corporate relationship is governed by the law of the state of incorporation.' " Massey v. Disc Mfg., Inc. , 601 So.2d 449 , 454 (Ala. 1992) (quoting P. John Kozyris, Corporate War and Choice of Law , 1985 Duke L.J. 1 , 15). 3 Even if | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Yarborough v. Yarborough
green
2 sentences1990The Missouri court found, however, that the policy of the full faith and credit clause "does not grant carte blanche to a rendering state to infringe on the legitimate interests of a forum state simply by virtue of a valid judgment entered in the rendering state." Thompson , at 86 . " '[T]here comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other,' [ Yarborough v. Yarborough , 290 U.S. 202 , at 215, 54 S.Ct. 181 , at 186, 78 L.Ed. 269 (1933)], and that that 'point' was especi 1990The Missouri court found, however, that the policy of the full faith and credit clause "does not grant carte blanche to a rendering state to infringe on the legitimate interests of a forum state simply by virtue of a valid judgment entered in the rendering state." Thompson , at 86 . " '[T]here comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other,' [ Yarborough v. Yarborough , 290 U.S. 202 , at 215, 54 S.Ct. 181 , at 186, 78 L.Ed. 269 (1933)], and that that 'point' was especi | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Thompson v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1990Thompson, supra. In Thompson , the Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that there were competing policies at issue: First, the full faith and credit clause of Art. 1990The Missouri court found, however, that the policy of the full faith and credit clause "does not grant carte blanche to a rendering state to infringe on the legitimate interests of a forum state simply by virtue of a valid judgment entered in the rendering state." Thompson , at 86 . " '[T]here comes a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest of the other,' [ Yarborough v. Yarborough , 290 U.S. 202 , at 215, 54 S.Ct. 181 , at 186, 78 L.Ed. 269 (1933)], and that that 'point' was especi | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ultracashmere House, Ltd., a Corporation v. Ted Meyer, D/B/A Alex Rice Company
green
1 sentence1989The result would be denial of the counterclaim and, with it, possible loss of the Illinois judgment for purposes of collection in Alabama.” In Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir.1981), the following appears: “The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S. Const, art. 4, § 1, is binding only on state courts. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Wilson v. Lee
green
1 sentence1984Wilson v. Lee , 406 So.2d 416 (Ala.Civ.App. 1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co.
green
2 sentences1984Justice Burton noted: "[I]t is now too well settled to be open to further dispute that the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect if it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound." (Footnotes omitted.) May , 345 U.S. at 533 , 73 S.Ct. at 843 (quoting Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co. , 242 U.S. 394 , 401 , 37 S.Ct. 152 , 154 , 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917)). 1984Justice Burton noted: "[I]t is now too well settled to be open to further dispute that the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect if it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound." (Footnotes omitted.) May , 345 U.S. at 533 , 73 S.Ct. at 843 (quoting Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co. , 242 U.S. 394 , 401 , 37 S.Ct. 152 , 154 , 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917)). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
May v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1984Justice Burton noted: "[I]t is now too well settled to be open to further dispute that the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect if it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound." (Footnotes omitted.) May , 345 U.S. at 533 , 73 S.Ct. at 843 (quoting Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co. , 242 U.S. 394 , 401 , 37 S.Ct. 152 , 154 , 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917)). 1984Justice Burton noted: "[I]t is now too well settled to be open to further dispute that the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed pursuant to it do not entitle a judgment in personam to extraterritorial effect if it be made to appear that it was rendered without jurisdiction over the person sought to be bound." (Footnotes omitted.) May , 345 U.S. at 533 , 73 S.Ct. at 843 (quoting Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co. , 242 U.S. 394 , 401 , 37 S.Ct. 152 , 154 , 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917)). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Morse v. Morse
green
1 sentence1984As we stated in Morse v. Morse , 394 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1981): "The Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 1, requires that `full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state.' The judgment of the court of another state having jurisdiction of the subject matter and persons is entitled to full faith and credit in Alabama courts." The full faith and credit clause generally requires every state to give foreign judgments at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would have been accorded in the state i | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Combs v. Chambers
neutral
2 sentences1983It is at most an irregularity, the judgment is not void and should be entered in a sister state." 302 F. Supp. at 200 . 1983Combs , 302 F. Supp. at 201 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
McCarty v. McCarty
red
2 sentences1983In McCarty v. McCarty , 453 U.S. 210 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 , 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), it was determined that federal law precludes a state court from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state community property laws. 1983In McCarty v. McCarty , 453 U.S. 210 , 101 S.Ct. 2728 , 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), it was determined that federal law precludes a state court from dividing military retirement pay pursuant to state community property laws. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Pruitt v. Key
green
2 sentences1981In Pruitt v. Key , 281 Ala. 433 , 203 So.2d 450 (1967) the Alabama Supreme Court observed: The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not compel a court to set aside a judgment rendered in an action involving the same issue which is subsequently adjudicated with a different result by a court of a sister state. 1981In Pruitt v. Key , 281 Ala. 433 , 203 So.2d 450 (1967) the Alabama Supreme Court observed: The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution does not compel a court to set aside a judgment rendered in an action involving the same issue which is subsequently adjudicated with a different result by a court of a sister state. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| New York Ex Rel. Halvey v. Halvey green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Speed v. Speed green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Frederick v. Wilbourne neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Overby v. Gordon green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Burbank v. Ernst green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Automotive Maintenance MacHinery Co. green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Gunn v. Howell green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Riley v. New York Trust Co. green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Sutton v. Leib green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Barber v. Barber green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Ex Parte Jones green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Adler v. Van Kirk Land & Construction Co. green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Fuhrman v. Burns green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| State v. Black green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Bell v. Bell green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Haddock v. Haddock red | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.