11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1946–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Durfee v. Dukegreen2 sentences2023In Durfee, the Supreme Court considered a suit for quiet title that had first been brought in Nebraska and then, by the losing party, in federal court in Missouri. 375 U.S. at 108 . 2023See Durfee, 375 U.S. at 109 (“Full faith and credit [] generally requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.”). | 1 | 2 |
Jose Luis Yanez-Popp v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiaegreen1 sentence2025Code § 7-2502.03 (a)(2); cf. Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Board of Immigration Appeals “does not violate the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution by not construing ‘conviction’ as do the Maryland courts”). 7 B. | 1 | 1 |
Loughran v. Loughrangreen1 sentence2024“Although the District of Columbia is not a state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is also applicable to the District.” J.J. v. B.A., 68 A.3d 721, 726 (D.C. 2013); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 228 (1934) (“[C]ourts of the District are bound, equally with the courts of the states, to observe the command of the full faith and credit clause, wherever applicable.”). 32 B. | 1 | 1 |
J.J. v. B.A.green1 sentence2024“Although the District of Columbia is not a state, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is also applicable to the District.” J.J. v. B.A., 68 A.3d 721, 726 (D.C. 2013); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 228 (1934) (“[C]ourts of the District are bound, equally with the courts of the states, to observe the command of the full faith and credit clause, wherever applicable.”). 32 B. | 1 | 1 |
Angel v. Bullingtongreen2 sentences2012Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (“Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.”); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that “the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be reliti-gated in the state in which enforcement is sought”); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 , 67 S.Ct. 657 , 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. 2012Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (“Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.”); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that “the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be reliti-gated in the state in which enforcement is sought”); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 , 67 S.Ct. 657 , 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Marworth, Inc. v. McGuiregreen1 sentence2012Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (“Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.”); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that “the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be reliti-gated in the state in which enforcement is sought”); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 , 67 S.Ct. 657 , 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Vickery v. Garretsongreen1 sentence2012Thus “[fjull faith and credit shall be given ... ‘only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the merits — had jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 110 , 84 S.Ct. 242 , 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963)); see Vickery v. Garretson, 527 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Wooster v. Woostergreen1 sentence2012Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (“Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.”); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that “the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be reliti-gated in the state in which enforcement is sought”); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 , 67 S.Ct. 657 , 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Data Management Systems, Inc. v. EDP CORP.green1 sentence2012Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (“Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.”); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that “the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be reliti-gated in the state in which enforcement is sought”); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188 , 67 S.Ct. 657 , 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Huntgreen2 sentences1989In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 , 64 S.Ct. 208 , 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943), the Court explained that although the Constitution requires state courts to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other courts, this is not true for matters of local and statutory law. 1989In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 , 64 S.Ct. 208 , 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943), the Court explained that although the Constitution requires state courts to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other courts, this is not true for matters of local and statutory law. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Insurance Guaranty Ass'n
green
2 sentences2023Not including the California Court of Appeal’s jurisdictional determination in the full faith and credit analysis would thus likely “result[] in two state courts reaching mutually inconsistent judgments on the same issue,” which is “precisely the situation the Full Faith and Credit Clause was designed to prevent.” Id. at 715 . 20 Ultimately, this case boils down to whether the Corcoran should have another opportunity to litigate a claim it has already lost. 2012Properly read, section 15-352 recognizes only a limited “caveat” to the application of the Full Faith and Credit clause because “the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers, dictates some basic limitations on the full-faith-and-credit principles.” Underwriters Nat’l Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 704 , 102 S.Ct. 1357 . | 2 | 2012–2023 |
Pink v. A. A. A. Highway Express, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court has made clear that “the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable and unqualified command.” Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 , 62 S.Ct. 241 , 86 L.Ed. 152 (1941). 2014The Supreme Court has made clear that “the full faith and credit clause is not an inexorable and unqualified command.” Pink v. AAA Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 , 62 S.Ct. 241 , 86 L.Ed. 152 (1941). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Clark v. Williard
green
2 sentences1994In Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 , 54 S.Ct. 615 , 78 L.Ed. 1160 (1934) (Clark I), Williard, trustee of a syndicate, filed suit in a Montana court against Federal Surety, an Iowa insurance company, to recover damages due upon a bond. 1994In Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 , 54 S.Ct. 615 , 78 L.Ed. 1160 (1934) (Clark I), Williard, trustee of a syndicate, filed suit in a Montana court against Federal Surety, an Iowa insurance company, to recover damages due upon a bond. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Lee v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
green
1 sentence1987We upheld this interpretation of § 36-303 in Lee v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 509 A.2d 100 (D.C.1986). 1 However, we disagree with the DOES’ conclusion that the Full Faith and Credit clause mandates deference to the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission’s find *243 ing that Ringgold’s disability during the other two periods was not caused by her work-related injury. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Sistare v. Sistare
green
2 sentences1980Cf. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 682 , 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910) (alimony payments not subject to modification are final and entitled to enforcement under full faith and credit clause). 1980Cf. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 682 , 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910) (alimony payments not subject to modification are final and entitled to enforcement under full faith and credit clause). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Winkel v. Winkel
green
2 sentences1950It is well settled that all courts are required to give full faith and credit to a foreign decree for alimony when such decree is final. 2 What constitutes a final decree with respect to alimony has been the subject of innumerable decisions, from which has been formulated the rule that a decree for future alimony is within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, even though it may be modified prospectively by future orders of the court. 3 But where the decree is subject to retroactive modification of . accrued installments past due, the decree is not entitled to full faith and cred 1950It is well settled that all courts are required to give full faith and credit to a foreign decree for alimony when such decree is final. 2 What constitutes a final decree with respect to alimony has been the subject of innumerable decisions, from which has been formulated the rule that a decree for future alimony is within the protection of the full faith and credit clause, even though it may be modified prospectively by future orders of the court. 3 But where the decree is subject to retroactive modification of . accrued installments past due, the decree is not entitled to full faith and cred | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Milliken v. Meyer
green
2 sentences1946Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 . 1946Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 , 132 A.L.R. 1357 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.