faith and credit clause in Michigan

1976II — Prior Award Does Not Bar Recovery in Second State Defendants argue that under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution plaintiff’s prior receipt of a compensation award is a bar to recovery in a Michigan proceeding concerning the same injury 4 and cite the case of Magnolia Petroleum Co v Hunt, 320 US 430 ; 64 S Ct 208 ; 88 L Ed 149 (1943), as authority.

1976II — Prior Award Does Not Bar Recovery in Second State Defendants argue that under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution plaintiff’s prior receipt of a compensation award is a bar to recovery in a Michigan proceeding concerning the same injury 4 and cite the case of Magnolia Petroleum Co v Hunt, 320 US 430 ; 64 S Ct 208 ; 88 L Ed 149 (1943), as authority.

1976The parties do not direct this Court to any such language nor has our independent inquiry revealed such a spe *654 cific restriction. 9 Thus in accordance with the rule laid down in Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v McCartin, supra, we find that plaintiffs award in California does not act as a bar under the full faith and credit clause to proceedings in this state for workmen’s compensation benefits arising out of the same injury.

1950In upholding the action of the commission this Court cited Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 US 430 ( 64 S Ct 208 , 88 L ed 149, 150 ALR 413 , 15 NCCA NS 529), and *637 the later case of Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 US 622 ( 67 S Ct 886 , 91 L ed 1140, 169 ALR 1179 ).

1976This result is consistent with the result reached by this Court in Schenkel v Tower Builders Co, Inc, 380 Mich 492 ; 157 NW2d 204 (1968).

1976This result is consistent with the result reached by this Court in Schenkel v Tower Builders Co, Inc, 380 Mich 492 ; 157 NW2d 204 (1968).

1971In Henry v. Henry (1960), 362 Mich 85, 102 , the Supreme Court stated: “We have no doubt, as appellant’s counsel contend, that in attacking a presumptively valid decree of divorce issued by a sister state, the full faith and credit clause (US Const, Art 4, § 1) and ample case precedent (citations omitted) demand that the attacking party bear the burden of proof that no domicile was established.” Therefore, all plaintiff is required to establish is that the California court rendered the judgments in question.

1970Henry, supra, at p 102 .

1948“As to both'its factual and legal aspects the case of Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L.

1948“As to both'its factual and legal aspects the case of Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (59 Sup. Ct. 3, 83 L.

1946Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L.

1946Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (35 Sup. Ct. 724, 59 L.

1939Pennoyer v. Neff, supra. The doctrine of full faith and credit.was not designed to displace the principle of natural justice which requires a person to have notice of a suit before he can be conclusively bound by the result, nor those rules of public law which protect persons and property within one State from the exercise of jurisdiction over them by another.

1938Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. (85 U. S.) 457; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 ; Bell v. Bell, supra; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (23 Sup. Ct. 237); German Savings & Loan Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125 (24 Sup. Ct. 221); People v. Dawell, supra; Reed v. Reed, supra. The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States and the legislation enacted in pursuance thereof applies only when the court rendering the decree had jurisdiction.

1985Johnson v Haley, 357 Mich 411, 418-419 ; 98 NW2d 555 (1959); Beck v Westphal, 141 Mich App 136, 140 ; 366 NW2d 217 (1984).

1985Johnson v Haley, 357 Mich 411, 418-419 ; 98 NW2d 555 (1959); Beck v Westphal, 141 Mich App 136, 140 ; 366 NW2d 217 (1984).

1985Sutton v Lieb, 342 US 402, 407 ; 72 S Ct 398 ; 96 L Ed 448 (1952).

1985Sutton v Lieb, 342 US 402, 407 ; 72 S Ct 398 ; 96 L Ed 448 (1952).

1985Johnson v Haley, 357 Mich 411, 418-419 ; 98 NW2d 555 (1959); Beck v Westphal, 141 Mich App 136, 140 ; 366 NW2d 217 (1984).

1985Johnson v Haley, 357 Mich 411, 418-419 ; 98 NW2d 555 (1959); Beck v Westphal, 141 Mich App 136, 140 ; 366 NW2d 217 (1984).

1984M’Elmoyle v Cohen, 38 US (13 Peters) 312; 10 L Ed 177 (1839).

1984Watkins v Conway, 385 US 188 ; 87 S Ct 357 ; 17 L Ed 2d 286 (1966).

1984Watkins v Conway, 385 US 188 ; 87 S Ct 357 ; 17 L Ed 2d 286 (1966).

1976Thus in this case we are dealing with an "award” and not the type of voluntary payment found in Cline v Byrne Doors, Inc, 324 Mich 540 ; 37 NW2d 630 (1949), where this Court found the full faith and credit clause was inapplicable.

1976Thus in this case we are dealing with an "award” and not the type of voluntary payment found in Cline v Byrne Doors, Inc, 324 Mich 540 ; 37 NW2d 630 (1949), where this Court found the full faith and credit clause was inapplicable.

1976Other cases distinguishing Magnolia include: Loudenslager v Gorum, 355 Mo 181; 195 SW2d 498, 500 (1946); Spietz v Industrial Commission, 251 Wis 168; 28 NW2d 354 (1947); Industrial Indemnity Exchange v Industrial Accident Commission, 80 Cal App 2d 480; 182 P2d 309, 312 (1947). 8 See Cook v Minneapolis Bridge Construction Co, 231 Minn 433; 43 NW2d 792, 794-797 (1950); Cramer v State Concrete Corp, 39 NJ 507; 189 A2d 213, 215 (1963); Lavoie’s Case, 334 Mass 403; 135 NE2d 750, 753-754 (1956), cert den, sub nom Phoenix Indemnity Co v Lavoie, 352 US 927 ; 77 S Ct 224 ; 1 L Ed 2d 162 (1956).

1976Other cases distinguishing Magnolia include: Loudenslager v Gorum, 355 Mo 181; 195 SW2d 498, 500 (1946); Spietz v Industrial Commission, 251 Wis 168; 28 NW2d 354 (1947); Industrial Indemnity Exchange v Industrial Accident Commission, 80 Cal App 2d 480; 182 P2d 309, 312 (1947). 8 See Cook v Minneapolis Bridge Construction Co, 231 Minn 433; 43 NW2d 792, 794-797 (1950); Cramer v State Concrete Corp, 39 NJ 507; 189 A2d 213, 215 (1963); Lavoie’s Case, 334 Mass 403; 135 NE2d 750, 753-754 (1956), cert den, sub nom Phoenix Indemnity Co v Lavoie, 352 US 927 ; 77 S Ct 224 ; 1 L Ed 2d 162 (1956).

1976Other cases distinguishing Magnolia include: Loudenslager v Gorum, 355 Mo 181; 195 SW2d 498, 500 (1946); Spietz v Industrial Commission, 251 Wis 168; 28 NW2d 354 (1947); Industrial Indemnity Exchange v Industrial Accident Commission, 80 Cal App 2d 480; 182 P2d 309, 312 (1947). 8 See Cook v Minneapolis Bridge Construction Co, 231 Minn 433; 43 NW2d 792, 794-797 (1950); Cramer v State Concrete Corp, 39 NJ 507; 189 A2d 213, 215 (1963); Lavoie’s Case, 334 Mass 403; 135 NE2d 750, 753-754 (1956), cert den, sub nom Phoenix Indemnity Co v Lavoie, 352 US 927 ; 77 S Ct 224 ; 1 L Ed 2d 162 (1956).

1973The Court also speaks to the full faith and credit issue: "Of interest herein is the statement by this court that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution has sufficient flexibility to permit an injured employee to secure workmen’s compensation benefits in one of several forums including the state in which the injury occurred, the state where the employment relation exists by reason of localization of the employer’s business, and the state where the contract of employment was made, since any of these státes has a legitimate governmental interest in the work injury to justify *420 a

1972In International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945), the Supreme Court said: " * * * Due Process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” The stipulated facts establish that defendant had the minimum contacts in Texas to subject defendant to suit in that state and the maintenance of such suit does not offend tradition

1972In International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945), the Supreme Court said: " * * * Due Process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” The stipulated facts establish that defendant had the minimum contacts in Texas to subject defendant to suit in that state and the maintenance of such suit does not offend tradition

1969Co., (1917), 199 Mich 134, 137, 138 ; Thornton v. Luria Dumes Co-Venture (1956), 347 Mich 160, 162 ; Coates v. Continental Motors Corporation (1964), 373 Mich 461, 467 .

1969Co., (1917), 199 Mich 134, 137, 138 ; Thornton v. Luria Dumes Co-Venture (1956), 347 Mich 160, 162 ; Coates v. Continental Motors Corporation (1964), 373 Mich 461, 467 .

1969That such a result is not palatable is borne out by the board’s words; “Since the evidence establishes plaintiff’s injury and disability were chargeable to Emery, and benefits under the Michigan act derive therefrom, we cannot see, even with the present effect given the full faith and credit clause, how we can credit Emery with the Midwest settlement, much as we might wish to.” At this point, it might be well to reiterate the words spoken by our Supreme Court in November, 1968, in Johnson, supra (p 390): “ ‘The sole question on review by the Court of Appeals, and in turn here, is “whether ther

1968Commercial Driveaway (1930), 250 Mich 454 . [4] Recently the Court rejected the claim that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution prevents an Indiana resident employed in Indiana by an Indiana employer, injured during employment in Michigan, from recovering under the Michigan act after an award had been made by Indiana.

1968Schenkel v. Towers Builders Company, Inc. (1968), 380 Mich 492 . [5] See, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Insurance Company (1965), 380 US 39 ( 85 S Ct 769 , 13 L Ed 2d 641 ). [6] The employer's home office was in Michigan; the employee was a resident of Illinois; the contract of hire was made in Texas and the injury suffered in Tennessee.

1968Schenkel v. Towers Builders Company, Inc. (1968), 380 Mich 492 . [5] See, e.g., Crider v. Zurich Insurance Company (1965), 380 US 39 ( 85 S Ct 769 , 13 L Ed 2d 641 ). [6] The employer's home office was in Michigan; the employee was a resident of Illinois; the contract of hire was made in Texas and the injury suffered in Tennessee.