faith and credit clause in Louisiana

1975NOTES [1] The court in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 682 , 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910), stated: "(W)here a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future instalments, the right to such instalments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the instalments, since, as declared in the Barber Case, [ 21 Haw. 582 , 16 L.

1937In Gallant v. Gallant, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in dealing with the full faith and credit clause, referred to Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S., 21 How., 582, 16 L.Ed. 226 , and Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 , 21 S.Ct. 555 , 45 L.Ed. 810 , and Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16 , 30 S.Ct. 682, 686 , 54 L.Ed. 905 , 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 1068, 20 Ann.Cas. 1061.

1975NOTES [1] The court in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 682 , 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910), stated: "(W)here a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future instalments, the right to such instalments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the instalments, since, as declared in the Barber Case, [ 21 Haw. 582 , 16 L.

1975NOTES [1] The court in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 , 30 S.Ct. 682 , 54 L.Ed. 905 (1910), stated: "(W)here a decree is rendered for alimony and is made payable in future instalments, the right to such instalments becomes absolute and vested upon becoming due, and is therefore protected by the full faith and credit clause, provided no modification of the decree has been made prior to the maturity of the instalments, since, as declared in the Barber Case, [ 21 Haw. 582 , 16 L.

2003However, Douglas noted that there is no “authority which lends support to the view that the full faith and credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any other state.” Williams, 317 U.S. at 296 , 63 S.Ct. 207 .

2003However, Douglas noted that there is no “authority which lends support to the view that the full faith and credit clause compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any other state.” Williams, 317 U.S. at 296 , 63 S.Ct. 207 .

2004It is established that a court in one state, when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another state, "may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment." Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 , 84 S.Ct. 242 , 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963). * * * If that foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties, full faith and credit need not be given to the sister state's judgment.

2004It is established that a court in one state, when asked to give effect to the judgment of a court in another state, "may constitutionally inquire into the foreign court's jurisdiction to render that judgment." Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 , 84 S.Ct. 242 , 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963). * * * If that foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties, full faith and credit need not be given to the sister state's judgment.

1990Alternatively, Harrah's filed an exception of res judicata, contending that the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution requires a state where gambling is illegal to enforce the judgment of another state even though the judgment enforces a gambling debt, citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 , 28 S.Ct. 641 , 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908).

1990Alternatively, Harrah's filed an exception of res judicata, contending that the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution requires a state where gambling is illegal to enforce the judgment of another state even though the judgment enforces a gambling debt, citing Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 , 28 S.Ct. 641 , 52 L.Ed. 1039 (1908).

1990In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (1951), the United States Supreme Court, quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948), interpreted the scope of the full faith and credit clause and enunciated a test for determining when full faith and credit must be accorded a decree as follows: '[W]e believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here.

1990In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (1951), the United States Supreme Court, quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948), interpreted the scope of the full faith and credit clause and enunciated a test for determining when full faith and credit must be accorded a decree as follows: '[W]e believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here.

1990In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (1951), the United States Supreme Court, quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948), interpreted the scope of the full faith and credit clause and enunciated a test for determining when full faith and credit must be accorded a decree as follows: '[W]e believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here.

1990In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (1951), the United States Supreme Court, quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948), interpreted the scope of the full faith and credit clause and enunciated a test for determining when full faith and credit must be accorded a decree as follows: '[W]e believe that the decision of this Court in the Davis case and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here.

1986Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So.2d 544 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1964).

1969In the cases of Gibbs v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 169 La. 450 , 125 So. 445 (1929), and Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So.2d 544 , (La.App.3d Cir., 1964), the above noted principle was upheld.

1976While a court may gain jurisdiction to grant a divorce by constructive service upon a nonresident wife, such a service does not give it jurisdiction to adjudicate alimony rights, and so it is held that an ex parte divorce obtained by the husband cannot affect the right which the wife may have to alimony under the laws of another state, and any express or implied adjudication against her claim is void and will not be given effect by comity or under the full faith and credit clause.” As an example of the effect to be given the ex parte divorce judgment, the United States Supreme Court in Estin v

1976While a court may gain jurisdiction to grant a divorce by constructive service upon a nonresident wife, such a service does not give it jurisdiction to adjudicate alimony rights, and so it is held that an ex parte divorce obtained by the husband cannot affect the right which the wife may have to alimony under the laws of another state, and any express or implied adjudication against her claim is void and will not be given effect by comity or under the full faith and credit clause.” As an example of the effect to be given the ex parte divorce judgment, the United States Supreme Court in Estin v

1940Once we find that we have jurisdiction of the matter and that the laws of Illinois are obnoxious to the public policy of this State, we would have the right and power, under the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 , to enforce our local compensation statute, notwithstanding the provisions of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, art. 4, § 1.

1940Once we find that we have jurisdiction of the matter and that the laws of Illinois are obnoxious to the public policy of this State, we would have the right and power, under the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 , 59 S.Ct. 629 , 83 L.Ed. 940 , to enforce our local compensation statute, notwithstanding the provisions of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, art. 4, § 1.

1967Thus under the principles of law enunciated in Boudreaux v. Welch, 249 La. 983 , 192 So.2d 356 , the decree of divorce in favor of Ruth Cason must be considered a valid and final judgment entitled to Louisiana recognition under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. [1] Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 , 68 S.Ct. 1094 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 (1948); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 , 72 S.Ct. 157 , 96 L.Ed. 146 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (

1967Thus under the principles of law enunciated in Boudreaux v. Welch, 249 La. 983 , 192 So.2d 356 , the decree of divorce in favor of Ruth Cason must be considered a valid and final judgment entitled to Louisiana recognition under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. [1] Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 , 68 S.Ct. 1087 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 , 68 S.Ct. 1094 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 (1948); Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 , 72 S.Ct. 157 , 96 L.Ed. 146 (1951); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 , 71 S.Ct. 474 , 95 L.Ed. 552 (

1966Weaver v. Schumpert, 118 La. 315 , 42 So. 949 .” I am not unmindful of Devore v. Devore, La.App., 172 So.2d 923 (cert. den.), decided by this court, wherein we held that a provision in a divorce decree for alimony payable in installments, is a final judgment within the full faith and credit clause insofar as accrued installments are concerned.

1966Weaver v. Schumpert, 118 La. 315 , 42 So. 949 .” I am not unmindful of Devore v. Devore, La.App., 172 So.2d 923 (cert. den.), decided by this court, wherein we held that a provision in a divorce decree for alimony payable in installments, is a final judgment within the full faith and credit clause insofar as accrued installments are concerned.

2007Douglass v. Gyulai, 144 La. 213 , 80 So. 258 (1918).

2007Douglass v. Gyulai, 144 La. 213 , 80 So. 258 (1918).

2004The basic constitutional principles of Full Faith and Credit and Due Process which govern the Grants' attack on the Georgia judgment were discussed by this court in Dunn v. Mortenson, 36,878 (La.App.2d Cir.3/5/03), 839 So.2d 1007, 1011 , as follows: The structure of our nation of states, each possessing equal sovereign powers, however, dictates some basic limitations of the full faith and credit principle.

2003Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 422-424 , 99 S.Ct. 1182 .

2003Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 422-424 , 99 S.Ct. 1182 .

1991The Louisiana Supreme Court, in reviewing the *352 dismissal of plaintiff's suit, found that the Texas award was "final and conclusive only to the rights arising in Texas, and Louisiana [was] free under the full faith and credit clause to grant an award of compensation in accordance with its own laws, after giving credit for the sums paid under the Texas Act." Griffin, supra, at page 752.

1990Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra; Brown v. Brown, 377 So.2d 438 (La.App. 2d Cir.1979), affirmed, 387 So.2d 565 (La.1980), U.S. cert. denied.

1990Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra; Brown v. Brown, 377 So.2d 438 (La.App. 2d Cir.1979), affirmed, 387 So.2d 565 (La.1980), U.S. cert. denied.

1989As noted earlier, prior to trial, this court addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction *1251 in Bonura v. United Bankers Life Insurance Company, supra .

1987The extrinsic fraud rule was succinctly stated in Fidelity Standard Life Insurance Co. v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of Vidalia, Ga., 382 F.Supp. 956 (S.D.Ga.1974), as follows: [T]he impeachment of a foreign judgment is limited to existence of fraud that is extrinsic in its nature, that is, fraud preventing one from having a real contest of the suit based on conduct or activities outside of the court proceedings themselves.

1987This principal was also recognized in Stephens Photo Inc., supra, though in less concise language.

1985Moreover, under the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. 4, § 1, our courts are bound to give effect to divorce judgments rendered by sister states, even when such states have jurisdiction over only one of the parties, Lewis v. Lewis, 404 So.2d 1230 (La.1981).

1985We further note that our courts may, in a collateral action, inquire into the jurisdiction founded on domicile of a sister state court over at least one of the parties to a marriage to determine whether full faith and credit will be accorded a non-Louisiana divorce, Lewis v. Lewis, supra; Andries v. Andries, 398 So.2d 123 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981).

1985We further note that our courts may, in a collateral action, inquire into the jurisdiction founded on domicile of a sister state court over at least one of the parties to a marriage to determine whether full faith and credit will be accorded a non-Louisiana divorce, Lewis v. Lewis, supra; Andries v. Andries, 398 So.2d 123 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981).

1983The opinion gives a rather complete treatment to considerations underlying the full faith and credit clause, and concludes, inter alia, “Error in the proceeding of the other court is not a defense to enforcement of a judgment.” Crichton, supra, at 112 .