faith and credit clause in Vermont

1976Vermont’s only delineation of the full faith and credit implications of an in-state accident to an employee under an out-of-state contract is DeGray v. Miller, supra, 106 Vt. at 276 . [W] hen an employee is injured in this State while working under a contract made in another state, we will ordinarily, upon the principles of comity, or under the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution (Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 , 76 L.ed. 1026, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696 ), decline to take jurisdiction, and leave the parties to their remedies in the jurisdiction w

1934It appears from the provisions of sections 5770 and 5774 of our act, to which we have referred, that the rule of this State is the same as that of Connecticut, in that a contract of hire made in this State to be performed in another state is governed, as to compensation for an injury occurring in such other state, by the Compensation Act of this State; and, when an employee is injured in this State while working under a contract made in another state, we will ordinarily, upon the principles of comity, or under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution (Bradford Electric Ligh

1971The general requirements as to a recognition of the validity of an extraterritorial divorce decree are set forth in Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 479 , 114 A.2d 518 (1955): “The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution requires the extraterritorial recognition of the validity of a divorce decree obtained in accordance with the requirement of procedural due process in the state by the spouse who under the law of such state had acquired a domicile there, although the spouse who remained in the state of the original matrimonial domicile did not appear in the divorce suit and was not

1971The general requirements as to a recognition of the validity of an extraterritorial divorce decree are set forth in Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 479 , 114 A.2d 518 (1955): “The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution requires the extraterritorial recognition of the validity of a divorce decree obtained in accordance with the requirement of procedural due process in the state by the spouse who under the law of such state had acquired a domicile there, although the spouse who remained in the state of the original matrimonial domicile did not appear in the divorce suit and was not

1964Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 , 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed. 1577 , 157 A.L.R. 1366 .

1964Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 , 65 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 , 89 L.Ed. 1577 , 157 A.L.R. 1366 .

1976In a later Supreme Court case, Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), California’s only interest was as the place of injury, whereas Massachusetts was the site of contract, employer, and employee residence.

1976As the forum state, California had the right to apply its own' statutes, and it was noted that “[o]ne who challenges that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.” Id. at 547-48 .

1976Vermont’s only delineation of the full faith and credit implications of an in-state accident to an employee under an out-of-state contract is DeGray v. Miller, supra, 106 Vt. at 276 . [W] hen an employee is injured in this State while working under a contract made in another state, we will ordinarily, upon the principles of comity, or under the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution (Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 , 76 L.ed. 1026, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696 ), decline to take jurisdiction, and leave the parties to their remedies in the jurisdiction w

1976Vermont’s only delineation of the full faith and credit implications of an in-state accident to an employee under an out-of-state contract is DeGray v. Miller, supra, 106 Vt. at 276 . [W] hen an employee is injured in this State while working under a contract made in another state, we will ordinarily, upon the principles of comity, or under the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution (Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 , 76 L.ed. 1026, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, 82 A.L.R. 696 ), decline to take jurisdiction, and leave the parties to their remedies in the jurisdiction w

1971The general requirements as to a recognition of the validity of an extraterritorial divorce decree are set forth in Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 479 , 114 A.2d 518 (1955): “The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution requires the extraterritorial recognition of the validity of a divorce decree obtained in accordance with the requirement of procedural due process in the state by the spouse who under the law of such state had acquired a domicile there, although the spouse who remained in the state of the original matrimonial domicile did not appear in the divorce suit and was not

1971The general requirements as to a recognition of the validity of an extraterritorial divorce decree are set forth in Loeb v. Loeb, 118 Vt. 472, 479 , 114 A.2d 518 (1955): “The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution requires the extraterritorial recognition of the validity of a divorce decree obtained in accordance with the requirement of procedural due process in the state by the spouse who under the law of such state had acquired a domicile there, although the spouse who remained in the state of the original matrimonial domicile did not appear in the divorce suit and was not

1962In Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 491 , 149 So. 483, 492 , the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval the statement in Schouler on Marriage and Divorce (6th Ed.) §1896: “These judgments (of custody) are necessarily provisional and temporary in character, and are ordinarily not res judicata, either in the same court or that of a foreign jurisdiction, except as to facts before the court at the time of the judgment.” See Meadows v. Meadows, 78 Fla. 576 , 83 So. 392 .

1962In Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 491 , 149 So. 483, 492 , the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval the statement in Schouler on Marriage and Divorce (6th Ed.) §1896: “These judgments (of custody) are necessarily provisional and temporary in character, and are ordinarily not res judicata, either in the same court or that of a foreign jurisdiction, except as to facts before the court at the time of the judgment.” See Meadows v. Meadows, 78 Fla. 576 , 83 So. 392 .

1962In Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 491 , 149 So. 483, 492 , the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval the statement in Schouler on Marriage and Divorce (6th Ed.) §1896: “These judgments (of custody) are necessarily provisional and temporary in character, and are ordinarily not res judicata, either in the same court or that of a foreign jurisdiction, except as to facts before the court at the time of the judgment.” See Meadows v. Meadows, 78 Fla. 576 , 83 So. 392 .

1962In Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 491 , 149 So. 483, 492 , the Florida Supreme Court quoted with approval the statement in Schouler on Marriage and Divorce (6th Ed.) §1896: “These judgments (of custody) are necessarily provisional and temporary in character, and are ordinarily not res judicata, either in the same court or that of a foreign jurisdiction, except as to facts before the court at the time of the judgment.” See Meadows v. Meadows, 78 Fla. 576 , 83 So. 392 .

1919Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 , 36 L. ed. 1123, 13 Sup. Ct. 224, decided in December, 1892, has come to be regarded as a leading case on the question and marks the departure referred to above.