31 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2023He maintains, therefore, that we should apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case in which the Supreme Court held that, when an individual’s due process rights are implicated, a court should consider three factors: 1) “the private interest that will be affected by the 19 official action;” 2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administ 2023He maintains, therefore, that we should apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case in which the Supreme Court held that, when an individual’s due process rights are implicated, a court should consider three factors: 1) “the private interest that will be affected by the 19 official action;” 2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administ | 5 | 29 |
Beeman v. Department of Health & Mental Hygienegreen2 sentences2021Id. at 142-43, 666 A.2d at 1324 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 ). 1996See Beeman v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 107 Md.App. 122, 141-42 , 666 A.2d 1314 (1995). | 1 | 2 |
Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2001In Meyers, the inquiry was centered around the balancing test contained in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 2001In Meyers, the inquiry was centered around the balancing test contained in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976): [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the | 1 | 2 |
Golden Sands Club Condominium, Inc. v. Wallergreen1 sentence2021See id. at 495 , 545 A.2d at 1338 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976)) (“[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected . . . second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Managers of the Netherlands Condominium v. Trenchergreen1 sentence2021See id. at 495 , 545 A.2d at 1338 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976)) (“[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected . . . second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, . . . the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”). | 1 | 1 |
Rhoads v. Sommergreen2 sentences2014In Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 160 , 931 A.2d 508, 525 (2007), this Court stated: 2 Indeed, Bartlett has never even disputed the merits of PRA’s claim or otherwise asserted that he did not have a delinquent credit card account. -3- “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 2014In Rhoads v. Sommer, 401 Md. 131, 160 , 931 A.2d 508, 525 (2007), this Court stated: 2 Indeed, Bartlett has never even disputed the merits of PRA’s claim or otherwise asserted that he did not have a delinquent credit card account. -3- “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg v. Kellygreen2 sentences2003There are: 1) the private interests at stake that will be affected by the disputed “official action”; 2) “the risk” that the procedures used will lead to an “erroneous deprivation of such interest”; and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 ; Rodriguez, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 656 . 2003There are: 1) the private interests at stake that will be affected by the disputed “official action”; 2) “the risk” that the procedures used will lead to an “erroneous deprivation of such interest”; and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 ; Rodriguez, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 656 . | 1 | 1 |
Hare v. Motor Vehicle Administrationgreen2 sentences1999In addition, a court must ponder three competing interests: “[FJirst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Hare v. Motor Veh 1999In addition, a court must ponder three competing interests: “[FJirst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Hare v. Motor Veh | 1 | 1 |
Brosan v. Cochrangreen2 sentences1999In addition, a court must ponder three competing interests: “[FJirst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Hare v. Motor Veh 1999In addition, a court must ponder three competing interests: “[FJirst the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976); Hare v. Motor Veh | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 134-35, 811 A.2d 349 (quoting Coleman , 369 Md. at 143 -44 , 797 A.2d 770 ) (some quotations omitted). 2018Id. at 134-35, 811 A.2d 349 (quoting Coleman , 369 Md. at 143 -44 , 797 A.2d 770 ) (some quotations omitted). | 2 | 2002–2018 |
Washington v. Harper
green
1 sentence2021In Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. at 236 , the Court endorsed Justice Powell’s view and held that “the provision of an independent lay adviser who understands the psychiatric issues involved is sufficient protection.” 24 Under the final Mathews factor, we consider the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Sewell v. Norris
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 134-35, 811 A.2d 349 (quoting Coleman , 369 Md. at 143 -44 , 797 A.2d 770 ) (some quotations omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Ryan W.
green
2 sentences2018In determining the risk the Ryan court articulated the following factors which aid in the evaluation of risk: "[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. 2018Ultimately, "[i]n determining what process is due, this Court will balance both the government interests and the private interests affected." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Department of Transportation v. Armacost
green
2 sentences2006Therefore, determination of what is required must be made by balancing the private and government interests affected----[T]he Supreme Court [has] set forth the appropriate factors: “... [Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 2006Therefore, determination of what is required must be made by balancing the private and government interests affected----[T]he Supreme Court [has] set forth the appropriate factors: “... [Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rodriguez v. Department of Real Estate
green
1 sentence2003There are: 1) the private interests at stake that will be affected by the disputed “official action”; 2) “the risk” that the procedures used will lead to an “erroneous deprivation of such interest”; and 3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 ; Rodriguez, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d at 656 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
2 sentences2003In Pickett, 365 Md. at 78 , 775 A.2d 1218 , the Court of Appeals explained that, “[i]n order to properly challenge state action as a violation of procedural due process, the party challenging the action must show that the state acted to *340 deprive the complainant of a property interest encompassed by the language of the due process clause.” (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)). 2003In Pickett, 365 Md. at 78 , 775 A.2d 1218 , the Court of Appeals explained that, “[i]n order to properly challenge state action as a violation of procedural due process, the party challenging the action must show that the state acted to *340 deprive the complainant of a property interest encompassed by the language of the due process clause.” (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
2 sentences2003In Pickett, 365 Md. at 78 , 775 A.2d 1218 , the Court of Appeals explained that, “[i]n order to properly challenge state action as a violation of procedural due process, the party challenging the action must show that the state acted to *340 deprive the complainant of a property interest encompassed by the language of the due process clause.” (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)). 2003In Pickett, 365 Md. at 78 , 775 A.2d 1218 , the Court of Appeals explained that, “[i]n order to properly challenge state action as a violation of procedural due process, the party challenging the action must show that the state acted to *340 deprive the complainant of a property interest encompassed by the language of the due process clause.” (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 , 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Maryland State Police v. Zeigler
green
2 sentences1993“Procedural due process ... requires that administrative agencies performing adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory functions observe the basic principles of fairness as to parties appearing before them.” Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 559 , 625 A.2d 914 (1993). 1993“Procedural due process ... requires that administrative agencies performing adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory functions observe the basic principles of fairness as to parties appearing before them.” Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 559 , 625 A.2d 914 (1993). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Maryland Department of Human Resources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery
green
2 sentences1991Bo Peep, 317 Md. at 596 , 565 A.2d 1015 . 1991Bo Peep, 317 Md. at 596 , 565 A.2d 1015 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.