substitute procedural requirement in New Jersey

2025In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court held: [D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [ 424 U.S. at 335 .] A-2198-23 12 "Other

2024These are: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action;" (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;" and (3) "the Government's interest, A-1489-21 22 including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. at 335 .

2026A-3684-23 25 To determine what procedural protections are required in a given case, New Jersey courts have adopted the Mathews factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Id. at 106-07 (quoting Zinermon v. Burc

2000They include: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [ Ibid. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 902 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976)).] If the weighing process falls in favor of th

2025In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court held: [D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [ 424 U.S. at 335 .] A-2198-23 12 "Other

2024Permits, 185 N.J. 452, 467 (2006) (cataloging the Mathews factors our courts often employ to decide what process is due, as the private interest affected by the official action; "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute A-3576-19 18 procedural safeguards"; and "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail") (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ).

2012Courts weigh the following factors in determining what process is due in a particular case: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such intei'est through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Id. at 106, 662 A.2d 367 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct.

2008To determine the precise procedural protections mandated by due process in a particular case, we have applied the balancing test set forth in Mathews, supra, which considers three discrete factors: [F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requ

2021Analysis of the due process claim requires consideration of the three factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 9-

2021Analysis of the due process claim requires consideration of the three factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976): (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 9-

1984See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ] at 263-271, 25 L.Ed. 2d 287 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 [at 1018-22]. [ 424 U.S. 319 at 334-335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 at 902-03 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 ].

1984See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [ 397 U.S. 254 ] at 263-271, 25 L.Ed. 2d 287 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 [at 1018-22]. [ 424 U.S. 319 at 334-335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 at 902-03 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 18 ].

2025In Mathews, the United States Supreme Court held: [D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [ 424 U.S. at 335 .] A-2198-23 12 "Other

2024Ultimately, "[t]he essence of due process is the requirement that 'a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him and [an] opportunity to meet it.'" Id. at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

2024Although satisfied those procedural safeguards were sufficient to protect Fortney's due process rights, the court held "the question of whether or not [Rutgers] violated the adequate procedures in place should be decided by a jury." See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 682 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting "a court, not a jury, should decide whether the licensing scheme satisfied procedural due process," leaving for the jury the question of "whether the City violated the prescribed procedure in denying the licenses "), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Cir

2020To determine the precise protections required in a given case, courts apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge and consider three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 31 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [ 424 U.

2019See 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 710-11 (finding a CERCLA lien deprived property owners of "a significant property interest" but the hearing before a regional judicial officer "afforded sufficient due process"); Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518-19 (finding a CERCLA lien affected significant private interests, especially because the lien lacked a definite sum, and procedures then in place, which afforded "no pre-deprivation proceedings A-2665-15T1 15 at all," were inadequate to protect due process); Van Horn v. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 423 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding th

2019See 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 710-11 (finding a CERCLA lien deprived property owners of "a significant property interest" but the hearing before a regional judicial officer "afforded sufficient due process"); Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518-19 (finding a CERCLA lien affected significant private interests, especially because the lien lacked a definite sum, and procedures then in place, which afforded "no pre-deprivation proceedings A-2665-15T1 15 at all," were inadequate to protect due process); Van Horn v. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 423 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding th

2019See 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d at 710-11 (finding a CERCLA lien deprived property owners of "a significant property interest" but the hearing before a regional judicial officer "afforded sufficient due process"); Reardon, 947 F.2d at 1518-19 (finding a CERCLA lien affected significant private interests, especially because the lien lacked a definite sum, and procedures then in place, which afforded "no pre-deprivation proceedings A-2665-15T1 15 at all," were inadequate to protect due process); Van Horn v. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 423 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding th

2009We agreed with the aggrieved teacher that inclusion of her name in the Central Registry caused injury to the teacher's reputation and burdened her employment rights. [2] East Park, supra, 314 N.J.Super. at 160, 714 A. 2d 339 .

2009We agreed with the aggrieved teacher that inclusion of her name in the Central Registry caused injury to the teacher's reputation and burdened her employment rights. [2] East Park, supra, 314 N.J.Super. at 160, 714 A. 2d 339 .

2009Recognizing that due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 484, 494 (1972), the Mathews Court created a test, which requires consideration of three factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and final-ly, the Government's interest, including the fu

2009Recognizing that due process is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 , 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 484, 494 (1972), the Mathews Court created a test, which requires consideration of three factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and final-ly, the Government's interest, including the fu

2007The interest in being free from physical detention by the government is "the most elemental of liberty interests." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 , 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2646 , 159 L.Ed. 2d 578, 599 (2004).

2007The interest in being free from physical detention by the government is "the most elemental of liberty interests." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 , 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2646 , 159 L.Ed. 2d 578, 599 (2004).

2006See, e.g., Buttrey v. United States, 690 F. 2d 1170, 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that due process did not entitle dredge-and-fill permit applicant to trial-type hearing), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 , 103 S.Ct. 2087 , 77 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983); Shoreline Assocs. v. Marsh, 555 F.Supp. 169, 174-76 (D.Md.1983) (upholding denial of federal tidal wetlands permit and adjudicatory hearing to property owner who received “a meaningful opportunity” to comment, submit expert reports, and meet with administering agency (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (4th Cir.1984); Fichter v

2006See, e.g., Buttrey v. United States, 690 F. 2d 1170, 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that due process did not entitle dredge-and-fill permit applicant to trial-type hearing), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 , 103 S.Ct. 2087 , 77 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983); Shoreline Assocs. v. Marsh, 555 F.Supp. 169, 174-76 (D.Md.1983) (upholding denial of federal tidal wetlands permit and adjudicatory hearing to property owner who received “a meaningful opportunity” to comment, submit expert reports, and meet with administering agency (internal quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 725 F.2d 677 (4th Cir.1984); Fichter v