substitute procedural requirement (Washington) · Go Syfert
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substitute procedural requirement in Washington

66 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 63 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1979–2025
2 sentences

2025Therefore, we do not address the Fourth Amendment challenge. 13 No. 59255-0-II safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . b.

2025Finally, courts assess the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 7 We note that the state-wide efforts to vacate UPCS convictions pursuant to Blake were well- publicized and extensively covered by the press. 16 No. 59255-0-II entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

763
State v. Maulegreen
washctapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See State v. Maule, 112 Wash.App. 887, 893 , 51 P.3d 811 , 77 P.3d 362 (2002) ("the State's interest in testimony from a witness who is incompetent is nil").

2011See State v. Maule, 112 Wn.

22
Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641green
wash · 1992 · cited in 6 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2001–2014
2 sentences

2014Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 78 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992) (adopting and applying the Mathews test). ¶19 The analysis in Post illustrates the application of the Mathews test in a setting similar, but not identical, to that presented here.

2014Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 78 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992) (adopting and applying the Mathews test). ¶19 The analysis in Post illustrates the application of the Mathews test in a setting similar, but not identical, to that presented here.

16
Post v. City of Tacomagreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

15
City of Bellevue v. Leegreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Under Mathews, courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,the risk ofan erroneous deprivation ofsuch interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 424 U.S. at 33

11
City of Bellevue v. Leegreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Under Mathews, courts consider three factors in determining whether the process afforded to an individual was sufficient to satisfy the due process clause: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,the risk ofan erroneous deprivation ofsuch interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 424 U.S. at 33

11
In re the Marriage of Kinggreen
wash · 2007 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Those factors are '"[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official -21 No. 69117-1-1 (consol. with No. 69610-6-l)/22 action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.'" King, 162 Wn.2d at 395 (alteration in original) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ).

11
In Re The Detention Of Mark A. Blackgreen
washctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015In Mathews , the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to aid in determining when, and to what extent, procedural protections are required: [D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable *397 value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

2015App. 641, 649-50 , 357 P.3d 91 (2015).

11
State v. Maulegreen
washctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See State v. Maule, 112 Wash.App. 887, 893 , 51 P.3d 811 , 77 P.3d 362 (2002) ("the State's interest in testimony from a witness who is incompetent is nil").

11
Dixon v. Lovegreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
1 sentence

1982Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 112-13.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (17)

CaseCitedYears
Post v. City of Tacoma green
wash · 2009
2 sentences

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

32011–2024
Morrissey v. Brewer green
scotus · 1972
2 sentences

2011Under the Mathews balancing test, cited above, a court must consider three factors in identifying the due process that a person is entitled to receive in a particular circumstance: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

2011Under the Mathews balancing test, cited above, a court must consider three factors in identifying the due process that a person is entitled to receive in a particular circumstance: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would

32000–2011
Addington v. Texas green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2010Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . ¶17 The standard of proof is a procedural safeguard that serves to “allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L.

2010Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . ¶17 The standard of proof is a procedural safeguard that serves to “allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L.

32010–2010
In re the Detention of Morgan green
wash · 2014
2 sentences

2024Id. at 396-397 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.

2015In Mathews , the United States Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to aid in determining when, and to what extent, procedural protections are required: [D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable *397 value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens

22015–2024
Hardee v. Department of Social & Health Services green
wash · 2011
2 sentences

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

2024Hardee v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 172 Wn.2d 1, 10 , 256 P.3d 339 (2011): First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Post v. City of Tacoma, 167 Wn.2d 300, 313 , 217 P.3d 1179 (2009) (quoting Mathews v.

22024–2024
Goldberg v. Kelly green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

2006The third factor of the Mathews test is “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 , 90 S. Ct. 1011 , 25 L.

2006The third factor of the Mathews test is “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 , 90 S. Ct. 1011 , 25 L.

22006–2006
Matter of Harris green
wash · 1982
2 sentences

2005Id. at 335 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 839 ; In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

2005Id. at 335 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 839 ; In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

22005–2005
In Re the Detention of LaBelle green
wash · 1986
2 sentences

2005Id. at 335 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 839 ; In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

2005Id. at 335 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 839 ; In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

22005–2005
Dunner v. McLaughlin green
wash · 1984
2 sentences

2005Id. at 335 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wn.2d at 839 ; In re Harris, 98 Wn.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

2005Id. at 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , quoted in In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wash.2d 196, 221 , 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Dunner, 100 Wash.2d at 839 , 676 P.2d 444 ; In re Harris, 98 Wash.2d 276, 285 , 654 P.2d 109 (1982).

22005–2005
Bellevue School District v. E.S. green
wash · 2011
1 sentence

2018This analysis requires us to compare the status quo to the procedures sought and identify(1)"the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2)"the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3)"the [g]ovemment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ; E.S., 171 Wn.2d at 705 .

12018–2018
United States v. Salerno green
scotus · 1987
1 sentence

2013Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . ¶58 As in Salerno , the State’s interest in preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 , 104 S. Ct. 2403 , 81 L.

12013–2013
Schall v. Martin green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2013Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . ¶58 As in Salerno , the State’s interest in preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 , 104 S. Ct. 2403 , 81 L.

2013Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 . ¶58 As in Salerno , the State’s interest in preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 , 104 S. Ct. 2403 , 81 L.

12013–2013
Nguyen v. Department of Health green
wash · 2001
1 sentence

2006The Nguyen majority held that this third factor only "relates to practical and financial burdens to be imposed upon the government were it to adopt a possible substitute procedure" and "does not relate to the interest which the government attempts to vindicate through the procedure itself." 144 Wash.2d at 532 , 29 P.3d 689 (emphasis added).

12006–2006
In Re the Personal Restraint of Sinka green
wash · 1979
1 sentence

2006These requirements are flexible, however, and depend on a balancing of the following factors: “First, the private interest that will he affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Sinka, 92 Wn.2d at 565 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335

12006–2006
Nguyen v. STATE HEALTH MED. QUALITY ASSUR. green
wash · 2001
1 sentence

2006The Nguyen majority held that this third factor only "relates to practical and financial burdens to be imposed upon the government were it to adopt a possible substitute procedure" and "does not relate to the interest which the government attempts to vindicate through the procedure itself." 144 Wash.2d at 532 , 29 P.3d 689 (emphasis added).

12006–2006
MacKey v. Montrym green
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

2006Ed. 2d 18 (1975), cited with approval in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S. Ct. 2612 , 61 L.

2006Ed. 2d 18 (1975), cited with approval in Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 , 99 S. Ct. 2612 , 61 L.

12006–2006
State v. James green
washctapp · 1984
1 sentence

1996James, 38 Wn.

11996–1996

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 34.05.570 (15) USC § 42u.s.c.1983 (9) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (8) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.310 (8) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.350 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.010 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.100 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 18.130.180 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.240 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.030 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.020 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 104 (1978–2025) IL 83 (1979–2025) TX 68 (1987–2025) WA 66 (1979–2025) CT 52 (1979–2025) NJ 50 (1978–2026) MI 46 (1978–2026) OH 40 (1981–2026) ME 38 (1981–2023) MN 35 (1983–2026) PA 33 (1976–2025) ID 32 (1980–2026) TN 32 (1993–2024) MD 31 (1977–2023) NY 31 (1978–2025) OR 29 (1976–2026) IA 23 (1979–2023) NM 23 (1983–2025) MA 22 (1982–2023) LA 22 (1985–2022) NC 18 (1981–2026) NH 17 (1980–2021) WI 16 (1978–2024) DC 16 (1978–2024) ND 15 (1988–2022) AZ 13 (1983–2025) CO 12 (1977–2022) WV 12 (1978–2002) KS 11 (1988–2024) IN 11 (1980–2020) AK 11 (1983–2024) UT 9 (1995–2014) OK 8 (1996–2018) NE 7 (1990–2021) AR 7 (1987–2012) FL 7 (1986–2024) RI 7 (1990–2015) VA 6 (1992–2025) DE 5 (1989–2019) KY 5 (2005–2024) HI 5 (1996–2023) MO 5 (1986–2019) MT 4 (1984–2016) NV 4 (1987–2021) VT 3 (2015–2021) GA 3 (1986–2008) SD 2 (1986–2011) SC 2 (1996–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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